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INTRODUCTION
Laura Lale Kabis-Kechrid
Although Tunisia has made great strides over the past 
seven years, its democratization process remains 
fragile. Disillusionment with and distrust in the gov-
ernment, particularly high among the young, also 
manifest themselves in low voter turnout. Young vot-
ers were strikingly absent in the 2014 parliamentary 
elections, and in the first municipal elections in May 
2018, only 33.7 percent of Tunisians cast their votes. 
To a great extent, this disillusionment stems from the 
various, persistent socio-economic problems which 
had led to the uprisings and the ouster of the former 
autocratic regime in 2011. Especially in Tunisia’s his-
torically marginalized regions, these issues remain a 
key challenge.
To ensure that Tunisia’s democratic transition suc-
ceeds, targeted policies are essential to advance the 
country’s political, economic and social develop-
ment and to regain the citizens’ trust in the state. An 
important step toward this goal would be to establish 
administrative structures that safeguard a greater 
division of power through the current decentraliza-
tion process. Such structures would also strengthen 
the ability of local and regional administrations to 
respond to their communities’ needs. Yet, the imple-
mentation of the democratization process has been 
slow, and introducing effective and inclusive partic-
ipatory tools at the local level has proven difficult. In 
addition, as the 2014 Tunisian Constitution provides 
for the foundation for the country’s new political 
system, it is vital for the credibility of the transition 
to establish Tunisia’s Constitutional Court. Once 
installed, the court would represent a crucial insti-
tution to guarantee the authority of the constitution.
This edited volume brings together papers written 
by the participants of the workshop “Promotion of 
Think Tank Work on the Development of Marginal-
ized Regions and Institution-Building in Tunisia”. The 
workshop was conducted as part of DGAP’s project 
on strengthening think tanks and similar institutions 
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 
and Europe. The authors analyze key challenges con-
fronting Tunisia, ranging from decentralization and 
institution-building to the development of margin-
alized regions. The volume offers recommendations 
for the Tunisian government as well as the EU and its 
member states, who have extended significant sup-
port to Tunisia to safeguard the country’s political 
transformation and support its economic develop-
ment.
Among the recommendations are the following: 
Tunisian authorities and state institutions should 
increase transparency and accountability in order to 
build public trust in the state. To this end, author-
ities should revise participatory tools on the local 
level with the aim to make them more inclusive and 
to embed effective monitoring and evaluation mech-
anisms within them. At the same time, the Tunisian 
government should strengthen local authorities by 
reforming the local tax system and granting them 
a greater role in the process of tax collection. This 
would also help ensure the financial autonomy of 
local authorities and their ability to provide basic ser-
vices to the people. Offering digital tools and online 
platforms could improve accessibility and informa-
tion-sharing in areas such as public services or the 
health sector.
Additionally, targeted policies to support the 
socio-economic development of marginalized 
regions are deemed essential to address exist-
ing grievances and build loyalty toward the state. 
This includes financial and technical support for 
small-scale agricultural businesses, as well as urban 
restructuring and territorial rehabilitation programs 
that go hand in hand with a participatory approach to 
governance. Launching incentives to establish facto-
ries and start-ups in marginalized regions could also 
be a viable option, and educational curricula should 
be revised in consultation with the private sector to 
bridge the current gap between the education sys-
tem and labor market needs.
Adjusting and improving education is not only essen-
tial to increase the employability of young Tunisians. 
It is also indispensable for addressing issues related 
to health, political participation and deradicalization 
policies. For this reason, a comprehensive revision of 
education and training programs appears necessary, 
which also includes health education, the expan-
sion of civic education programs, and the training of 
prison personnel working with radicalized individu-
als.
Some of the authors argue that the EU could sup-
port the development and implementation of such 
reforms through the transfer of expertise in areas 
including civic education, prison-run deradicaliza-
tion programs or tax reform. In addition, continuous 
support for civil society organizations (CSOs) is con-
sidered crucial, as they have been the driving force 
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of the transition. To underpin the EU’s current activ-
ities, it is recommended that the EU provide more 
institutional funding to Tunisian CSOs, increase the 
number of small grants, and more explicitly target 
funding at civil society organizations in the interior 
regions.
The Contributions in Short
Chapter I: Decentralization and State-Citizen 
Relations
“Local Governance in Tunisia – A Holistic Decentral-
ization Strategy”: Mohamed Lamine Bel Haj Amor 
warns that in light of Tunisia’s economic woes and 
stifling tax pressure, the additional financial burden 
that comes with decentralization may exacerbate 
the existing economic crisis. A local administration 
governance model could potentially help optimize 
resource allocation and prevent corruption.
“When Will Local Taxation Reform in Tunisia Com-
mence?”: Zied Boussen writes on the importance of 
local tax reform within the framework of Tunisia’s 
decentralization process. Local taxes are a crucial 
source of revenue for local authorities. However, 
since 2011, the majority of Tunisians have not paid 
their local taxes, and the central government has not 
been able to collect them. As a result, local authorities 
have been incapable of providing basic services such 
as waste management and infrastructure develop-
ment. The author emphasizes the need to strengthen 
local authorities by reforming the local tax system 
which would equip local authorities with sufficient 
financial autonomy to collect and manage local taxes. 
The EU and other international partners could play 
an important role in supporting such a reform.
“The Lack of Effective Participation in Tunisia’s Decen-
tralization and Democratization Process”: Ahmed Ben 
Nejma argues that the tools municipalities currently 
use to design and decide on local development plans 
are not inclusive, and lack an adequate monitoring 
and evaluation framework. This flies in the face of 
the 2014 Tunisian Constitution, which obliges local 
authorities to implement participatory approaches 
for such plans. The author suggests that in order to 
build trust between the state and its citizens, munic-
ipalities need to establish mechanisms which ensure 
citizen participation, transparency, and accountabil-
ity.
“Effective Youth Participation in the Improvement of 
Public Administration”: The paper by Jihene Ferchi-
chi focuses on the obstacles to citizen participation 
in the reform and improvement of public services 
in Tunisia. The author argues that citizens – and 
the youth in particular – have very limited means 
to make their voices heard as there is no adequate 
communication channels between citizens and the 
state bureaucracy. This absence also leads to a lack 
of administration accountability. She emphasizes 
that it is key to establish a legal framework to regu-
late communication and interaction between citizens 
and administrations, as this will ultimately facilitate 
effective citizen participation.
“Fostering Democratic Participation through Civic 
Education Initiatives”: Tahar Kechrid stresses the 
need to strengthen and expand civic education pro-
grams in Tunisia. Engaging the country’s youth in the 
political process is essential to ensure Tunisia’s dem-
ocratic transition. Yet, surveys indicate a substantial 
lack of trust in the central government among young 
Tunisians, and voter turnout among this age group 
has been strikingly low in national and local elections. 
The author argues that civic education programs 
can be an important instrument to increase youth 
engagement in the political process, to improve their 
understanding of the new political system, and to 
foster democratic participation.
“Bridging the Gap between Center and Cross-Border 
Regions in Tunisia – Inclusive Strategies to Cope with 
Marginalization”: The paper by Giulia Cimini argues 
that a comprehensive strategy is necessary to restore 
state legitimacy in the historically marginalized bor-
der regions of Tunisia. This strategy should address 
both material claims and the people’s perception of 
abandonment to build a more inclusive and trustful 
government-citizen relationship. Doing so would also 
contribute to reducing cross-border factors of inse-
curity.
“Radicalization in the Marginalized Regions of Tunisia 
– Addressing the Root Causes”: Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi 
analyzes the root causes of radicalization in Tunisia 
and critically assesses the government’s response 
to the problem. Tunisia ranks among the highest in 
the region in terms of youth radicalization, and more 
than 3,000 Tunisian fighters have traveled abroad to 
join extremist groups in Syria, Iraq and Libya. The 
author argues that rather than focusing on a secu-
rity-centered approach, the Tunisian government 
must develop a comprehensive, long-term strategy 
that addresses the drivers of radicalization.
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“Prison and Rehabilitation Officials and the Return of 
Islamic State Fighters to Tunisia”: The paper by Arwa 
Ben Ahmed deals with the issue of deradicalization 
and rehabilitation of Tunisian foreign fighters in pris-
ons. The author argues that while the government 
has adopted a national strategy to develop a roadmap 
to respond to the challenge and has announced the 
implementation of a deradicalization program, a clear 
strategy toward deradicalization in prisons is still 
lacking. She emphasizes that it is vital to adequately 
train and equip those prison and rehabilitation offi-
cials who work with radicalized inmates.
Chapter II: Socio-Economic Challenges and the 
Development of Marginalized Regions
“Towards Sustainable Water Resource Management 
and Food Sovereignty in Tunisia”: The paper by  Darius 
Görgen focuses on the issue of water availability and 
access to water in Tunisia. Rural areas and small-scale 
farms are particularly affected by  Tunisia’s declining 
water resources. The author emphasizes that the 
impact of decreasing water availability on the rural 
economy may exacerbate rural-urban migration, and 
also affect Tunisia’s food sovereignty.
“Equitable and Sustainable Development in the 
 Tunisian Livestock and Smallholder Sectors”: In her 
paper, Elhem Ben Aicha discusses economic, envi-
ronmental and social challenges confronting Tuni-
sian smallholders (farmers with an agricultural land 
smaller than 50 acres). They are under increasing 
pressure from intensive production farms, animal 
diseases, livestock smuggling into Libya, and the 
impact of climate change. As livestock is central to 
the livelihoods of the country’s rural population, the 
author underlines the need for targeted policies to 
enhance the sustainability and resilience of livestock 
breeders.
“Challenges of Developing Tunisia’s Interior – Current 
Issues and Perspectives in the Tataouine Governorate”: 
Laroussi Bettaieb discusses youth unemployment 
in the southern Governorate of Tataouine, which 
at 27.06 percent is particularly high in Tunisia. The 
author argues that the two key problems which need 
to be addressed are firstly, the gap between the skills 
supply and demand on the labor market, and sec-
ondly, the lack of entrepreneurial activity.
“Regional Disparities and Health Inequity in Tunisia”: 
The paper by Anne Martin focuses on Tunisia’s health 
care system and highlights the persisting regional 
inequities. Inadequate provision and access in health-
care provision are a country-wide problem. How-
ever, the author argues that marginalized regions in 
the west and the interior of Tunisia are particularly 
affected by health inequalities, especially in regard to 
healthcare infrastructure and the health status of the 
population. She emphasizes that the cross-cutting 
dimension of health issues makes enhanced coor-
dination among stakeholders paramount to improve 
Tunisia’s healthcare system.
“Informal Marginalized Districts in Tunis – An Urban 
Development Failure Leading to Rampant Social 
Inequalities”: The paper by Maha Kouas addresses 
the phenomenon of informal settlements on the out-
skirts of Tunisia’s urban centers and the resulting 
social challenges. The lack of industrial, educational, 
health, and social infrastructures in these neighbor-
hoods has resulted in high unemployment and high 
school dropout rates, gender discrimination, and 
crime. They have also become a fruitful ground for 
religious fundamentalist groups. In order to address 
these issues and improve conditions in the informal 
settlements, the author underscores the need for 
a participatory approach to governance that goes 
hand in hand with urban restructuring and territorial 
rehabilitation programs.
“Tax Collection – An Important Lever for Inclusive 
Growth”: The paper by Oumaima Jegham explores the 
role of fiscal policy in fostering economic growth and 
social development. The author critically remarks 
that the tax reform launched in 2014 by the Tunisian 
government has caused more burden on consumers, 
particularly low-income households. She also notes 
that the corporate tax system does not sufficiently 
consider small producers. The author concludes 
that a less burdensome, more progressive and more 
inclusive fiscal system are an imperative to boost 
economic activity and ensure social stability.
Chapter III: The Role of the Judiciary
“Reinforcing the Judiciary – Tunisia’s Struggle to 
Establish its Constitutional Court”: Rim Dhaouadi 
argues that it is crucial to advance the currently 
stalled process of establishing a constitutional court 
as foreseen in the 2014 Tunisian Constitution. She 
assesses the factors which have delayed or blocked 
the process, and calls on political stakeholders to pri-
oritize and accelerate the nomination of court mem-
bers.
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Chapter IV: The Role of International Actors
“The Unintended Impacts of EU Democratic Assistance 
on Tunisian Civil Society:” The support of and con-
sultation with Tunisia’s civil society is a key pillar of 
the EU’s strategy to further the country’s democratic 
development. However, Ragnar Weilandt argues that 
the EU’s mode of operation may at times undermine 
its own goals, e.g. by inadvertently encouraging a 
shift within Tunisian civil society away from grass-
roots activism toward professional career struc-
tures. He emphasizes the need to readjust the EU’s 
approach to Tunisia’s civil society in order to mitigate 
such developments.
Chapter I: Decentraliza-
tion and State-Citizen 
Relations
Chapter I: Decentralization and State-Citizen Relations
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LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN TUNISIA 
– A HOLISTIC DECENTRALIZATION 
STRATEGY
Mohamed Lamine Bel Haj Amor
With the adoption of a new constitution in 2014 and a 
new local authority code in 2018, Tunisia has entered 
an era of decentralization. The aim is to promote local 
development in order to boost the economy of the 
entire country. However, given the existing economic 
crisis, increased indebtedness, and stifling tax pres-
sure, decentralization presents several risks since its 
implementation entails additional burdens on the pub-
lic budget. The imposition of new tax levies and greater 
reliance on external credits will further exacerbate the 
existing economic crisis. One possible counter-strat-
egy is the implementation of a local administration 
governance model to optimize resource allocation and 
avoid corruption, estimated to cost around two percent 
of GDP.
Post-revolutionary Tunisia has opted to reorganize 
its public authorities and its political regime in par-
ticular. This policy choice follows from the adoption 
of the new Constitution of 2014, which replaces the 
previous Constitution of 1959. The seventh chapter 
of the new Constitution deals with local authority 
decentralization.1 Decentralization now refers to 
three structural categories: municipalities, regions, 
and districts. The new electoral law stipulates that 
municipal councils and regions are to be directly 
elected by constituents, while districts are elected 
by municipal and regional council members. In this 
fragile socio-economic context, Tunisia faces a major 
challenge: to ensure the success of decentralization 
without increasing state expenditures that might 
increase burdens on the taxpayer or generate higher 
external debt. 
Possible Consequences of Decentralization in 
Tunisia
The new Constitution has necessitated the creation 
of new municipalities, whose number increased 
from 284 in 2015, to 350 in 2017. This expansion was 
in accordance with Article 131 of the new Constitu-
1 Article 131 of the Constitution of January 27, 2014.
2 Article 134 of the Constitution of January 27, 2014.
3 Prior to the promulgation of the new Code of Local Authorities, municipal budgets were approved according to the following system: for municipalities 
whose operating budget for the previous year was less than ten million dinars, approval was issued by competent governors with territorial jurisdiction, 
and for municipalities whose operating budget for the previous year was equal to or over ten million dinars, their budgets were approved by the Minister of 
Finance and the Minister of the Interior.
4 The new Code of Local Authorities provides that local authorities are no longer subject to the prior approval of their spending, which was previously 
issued by the Office of the President of the Government and therefore from the central state.
5 A role that was previously reserved for public procurement control boards. 
tion, which stipulates that each type of local author-
ity must cover the entire Tunisian territory and not 
just inhabited areas.2 Furthermore, a strict separa-
tion must be maintained between governorates and 
regions, since governors are appointed centrally, 
while the presidents and members of regional coun-
cils are elected by direct suffrage. In addition, dis-
tricts must raise their own revenues to cover operat-
ing expenses as well as those relating to investment. 
Districts are further required to guarantee regional 
balance by exercising a policy of positive discrimina-
tion in favor of their most disadvantaged areas.
The Constitution further provides that local authori-
ties must enjoy a reasonable margin of decision-mak-
ing autonomy, independent of central power. This is 
manifested in the new local authority code promul-
gated by Organic Law No. 2018-29 of May 9, 2018. The 
code organizes the exercise of local authority power 
according to the principle of free administration, 
by radically revising the prerogatives of the central 
state on the one hand,3 and on the other, by reducing 
the number of external auditing bodies to one: the 
Court of Accounts. This means that local authorities 
no  longer require central approval of their current 
expenditures4 or public procurements.5 Prior to this 
reorganization, local authority spending was subject 
to prior approval by the General Commission on Pub-
lic Expenditures (under the authority of the prime 
minister) and other auditing authorities.
The gradual abandonment of traditionally rigorous 
and exhaustive central controls on all public finances 
is likely to have consequences for public manage-
ment. This policy choice appears to reflect the obser-
vation that previous auditing bodies did not prove 
their effectiveness. At a press conference in Kairouan 
in March 2018, the National Anti-Corruption Agency 
(INLUCC) estimated that one quarter of public pro-
curement is tainted by corruption, which seems to 
corroborate the inefficiency of Tunisian auditing and 
oversight bodies. Local governments are therefore 
potential prime targets for corruption: from Janu-
ary 1, 2019, they will no longer need to submit their 
spending plans for central auditing and approval.
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In the absence of reliable internal control systems, 
local government management appears vulnera-
ble to corruption. Areas of risk in the management 
of decentralized structures pose even more serious 
problems because local authority spending, unlike 
that of central government, must be allocated only 
after revenues have been accrued according to the 
local taxation code. On the other hand, local author-
ities will also be obliged to adopt best practices in 
governance. They will have to observe the rules of 
transparency and free access to information, and 
implement a participatory approach that guarantees 
visibility in management procedures, and greater 
involvement of stakeholders in the planning, execu-
tion, and evaluation of their policies.
Recommendations
 - Upgrade the management of local authorities
Article 6 of the Framework Decree Law No. 2011-120 
of November 14, 2011 on the fight against corruption 
stipulates that public bodies must adopt “procedural 
manuals which determine precisely and clearly the 
conditions and procedures of service delivery.” Such 
manuals allow for a better application of norms, laws, 
and regulations to the specific context of each local 
authority type, taking into consideration its organi-
zation and the tasks performed by each stakeholder. 
Creating new manuals will define who does what, 
how, and for how long. The slightest failure would be 
easily detectable, which in turn will directly impact 
the perception of the quality of services provided to 
benefit citizens.
 - Establish an internal control system
The annual ranking of municipality governance by 
the Ministry of Local Affairs indicates that local gov-
erning bodies have often failed or been ineffective in 
their roles. A new system of internal controls should 
6 Amending and supplementing decree No. 2014-1039 on the regulation of public procurements.
7 Article 7 of Legislative Decree No. 2011-120 on the fight against corruption.
be established, one that aims to separate tasks more 
clearly and avoid the concentration of incompatible 
tasks, resulting in fewer risks, but above all, better 
performance of services. To this end, a reduction in 
delays to paying suppliers or the optimization of rev-
enue collection from local taxation would help estab-
lish trust between local authorities and their external 
partners, including citizens, suppliers, funders, and 
even communities with whom decentralized cooper-
ation agreements are concluded.
 - Digitize procedures to help prevent corruption and 
ensure compliance with the laws and regulations in 
force
While digitization and the increasing use of comput-
ers for administrative tasks initially require logistical 
and human investment, they will ultimately act as 
a guardrail to ensure transparent municipal gover-
nance, produce reliable and immediate information, 
and provide first-rate decision-making assistance for 
mayors, local elected representatives, and all other 
stakeholders. To minimize the potential for corrup-
tion and deviation from professional norms, digitiza-
tion should cover all forms of local accounting and 
inventory management.
Administrative contracts such as public procure-
ments, concessions, and public-private partner-
ships, which are particularly susceptible to corrup-
tion, must be administered digitally via computer 
and online tools. Moreover, Decree No. 2018-416 of 
May 11, 20186 stipulates that from September 1, 2019, 
use of the online public procurement tool “TUNEPS” 
is mandatory for local authority procurements. To 
enable local governments to meet this obligation, 
their logistic and human resource capacities must be 
upgraded. However, since local authorities are now 
endowed with a reasonable degree of decision-mak-
ing autonomy, they can also use their own initiative 
to improve organizational procedure without waiting 
for deadlines imposed by central government.
 - Introduce mechanisms to ensure compliance with 
the laws and regulations in force
It is crucial to strengthen internal structures respon-
sible for monitoring, auditing, inspection, evaluation, 
and regulation within local communities, and to pro-
vide them with the material and human resources 
needed in the fight against corruption.7 The effi-
ciency and effectiveness of these structures require 
The risk of corruption is 
particularly high in local 
governments
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a careful choice of personnel to integrate them. This 
choice should be based on competence and integrity. 
Moreover, the staffing of these bodies should have 
at least a minimum of independence, which can be 
assured in part by their direct attachment to the 
mayor of the commune, or the regional or district 
president, as opposed to central state structures.
Currently, the only Tunisian local authority with its 
own internal auditing service is the Municipality of 
Tunis. However, all local authorities need to be pro-
vided with horizontal management structures. The 
government should create a new professional class 
of local authority inspectors or auditors to provide 
support and impartiality for decision-makers regard-
less of their political color. Hence, the adoption by 
central government of clear guidelines on the attri-
butions of these structures, as well as their careers 
and reporting follow-up procedures, will provide the 
cornerstone for a system of monitoring and good 
governance in Tunisian local authorities. It should 
also be emphasized that the agents and managers of 
these structures – both locally elected officials and 
centrally assigned civil servants – are among the first 
to be involved in stable and regular capacity-building, 
enabling them to detect failures early and actively 
work to correct them. The effectiveness of these and 
other structures should be measured by indicators to 
evaluate their performance.
 - Implement a results-based management approach
To date, state budget allocation has only been 
assessed in terms of disbursement, with no attention 
paid to results or expected performance. The new 
approach to be adopted by both local and central 
government is to divide the budget into missions and 
programs, making evaluation possible through per-
formance indicators that must be reliable, realistic, 
achievable, and above all, measurable.
 - Strengthen the role of local elected representatives 
in local authority management control
In addition to the internal controls, local elected offi-
cials could play an important role in upgrading local 
administrative capacities and establishing a corrup-
tion warning system. Potential tools could include 
the creation of ad-hoc commissions, and unan-
nounced audits and inspections. The involvement 
of civil society organizations, whose participation 
depends on improved public access to information, 
could actively support and contribute to streamlining 
local community management.
 - Control the flow of capital and fight against the 
shadow economy
Integrating informal trade into the legal economy can 
provide local authorities with more revenue as they 
adjust to a decentralized system. Although this strug-
gle appears to be a long-term project, simple mea-
sures can be considered in the immediate future. For 
example, reserving communal spaces for irregular, 
seasonal trade would control illegal flows and oblige 
the informal sector to integrate into a legal frame-
work. Central government could also impose a limit 
on cash transactions and require stakeholders to use 
the banking system to control the money supply in 
circulation. Economists have recommended chang-
ing the currency in circulation, which would force 
the barons of the parallel economy – who hold huge 
reserves in cash – to regularize their activities with 
the financial and monetary authorities in Tunisia, and 
integrate into the lawful economy. This would gen-
erate additional tax revenues for the benefit of both 
central and local authorities.
Mohamed Lamine Bel Haj Amor is the head of the 
inspection of the Municipality of Tunis and mission 
leader at the Mayor’s office of Tunis since August 
2015. From 2005 to 2015, he worked as a control-
ler of public expenditures at the Presidency of the 
Government. He has broad experience as a con-
sultant and trainer in the fields of public finance, 
public procurement, decentralization, and local 
governance.
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WHEN WILL LOCAL TAXATION 
REFORM IN TUNISIA COMMENCE?
Zied Boussen
In a relatively short amount of time, Tunisia has suc-
cessfully achieved two important steps towards the 
stabilization of its democratic process: in April 2018, 
the Code of Local Authorities enforced the principles 
and mechanisms of decentralization in accordance 
with the new Constitution, and on May 6, 2018, the 
very first free municipal elections took place. Now, the 
country needs to fulfill its commitments to decentral-
ization by strengthening local authorities and ensur-
ing their financial autonomy through better collection 
and management of local taxes. This includes reori-
enting a share of nationally paid taxes for use by local 
or regional services under new tax sharing arrange-
ments, increasing the ratio for category A (university 
degree) employees to at least 25 percent, and improv-
ing transparency by fully implementing existing mech-
anisms. The European Union and all international 
partners could play an important role if attention is 
paid to the right issues and international experiences 
are shared more broadly.
In the aftermath of its revolution, Tunisia has 
embarked on a journey of democratization. The pro-
cess has included several free national elections in 
2011 (a National Constituent Assembly) and 2014 (both 
legislative and presidential elections), a deep reorga-
nization of powers within the state, and the design 
of new institutions to help secure the first achieve-
ments of the rule of law.8 The Constitution of 2014 
reaffirmed major principles of human rights and 
forged new institutions and mechanisms to secure 
the path toward democracy. One of the most impor-
tant changes is the recognition of “local power” as a 
fourth branch of power within the state, designed to 
help resolve the deep imbalance in development and 
representation between inner and coastal regions of 
Tunisia.9
8 Dahmène Touchent, “A Guide to the Tunisian Legal System,” GlobaLex, Hauser Global School of Law Program, August 2005 <http://www.nyulawglobal.
org/globalex/Tunisia.html> (accessed November 19, 2018).
9 Ines Labiadh, “Décentralisation et renforcement du pouvoir local : La Tunisie à l’épreuve des réformes institutionnelles. Maillages territoriaux, 
démocratie et élection,” Monastir, January 2016 <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01293413/document> (accessed November 19, 2018).
10 Sarah Yerkes and Marwan Muasher, “Decentralization in Tunisia: Empowering Towns, Engaging People,” The Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, May 17, 2018 <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/17/decentralization-in-tunisia-empowering-towns-engaging-people-pub-76376> 
(accessed November 19, 2018).
11 The 1975 laws on municipalities and municipal budgets, and the 1989 law on regional councils have been overturned by the New Code of Local 
Authorities.
12 “Projet de loi organique N°48/2017 portant promulgation du code des collectivités locales,” Marsad.maljes, <https://majles.marsad.tn/2014/fr/
lois/591dbe75cf4412226ec753d9> (accessed November 19, 2018).
13 According to the final results announced by the electoral commission ISIE on June 13, 2018.
14 Figures announced by the president of the electoral commission ISIE on public radio RTCI, on June 13, 2018.
The new decentralization system, designed in Chap-
ter VII, is partly based on the old 1959 Constitution. 
Municipalities are responsible for “proximity ser-
vices,” regions oversee economic and social develop-
ment, and districts are in charge of designing devel-
opment strategies. These three levels are the new 
layers of decentralized governance structures deal-
ing with the inequalities, disparities, and imbalances 
between inner and coastal regions of the country.10
Chapter VII granted all three local authority types 
administrative and financial autonomy, allowing 
them to take important decisions without interfer-
ence from central state representatives (Article 132). 
The Constitution even mentions (but does not define) 
another principle of “free decision-making,” which 
affects all local authority powers within the range of 
the Constitution and the law (Article 132). If correctly 
implemented, it is Chapter VII, more than any other 
piece of legislation, that embodies the spirit of the 
revolution and sows the seeds of democracy, the rule 
of law, and social justice. 
A new Code of Local Authorities has been adopted in 
2018 to replace many of the old system’s laws.11 This 
new Code has concluded another long, two-and-a-
half-year process. Since October 2015, 17 drafts of the 
Code have been released and national and regional 
consultations with citizens, civil society organiza-
tions, international partners and experts were held. 
The bill was discussed at 61 parliamentary committee 
meetings and 14 meetings of the plenary session, with 
dozens of government and civil society hearings for 
more than six months.12
The Code also allowed for another major achieve-
ment: on May 6, 2018, the very first democratic and 
free municipal elections were held in Tunisia. Despite 
a low turnout of 35.6 percent, almost two million 
voters elected 7,212 members to 350 municipal coun-
cils.13 Over 93 percent of candidates gained a seat 
and, crucially, 47.5 percent of the elected members of 
municipal councils are women, and 37.16 percent are 
aged under 35.14
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Local Taxes: The Forgotten Reform of Decentral-
ization
All focus is now on implementing the new Code of 
Local Authorities in accordance with Chapter VII of 
the Constitution. Undeniably, the biggest challenge 
is related to the autonomy of local authorities vis-à-
vis the central state, reflecting the extent to which 
a local authority is free to adopt its own decisions, 
budgets, and plans. All these decisions significantly 
impact on their finances, which must be seen as at 
the core of local autonomy, and depend on several 
factors relating to how local authorities manage their 
funds, including the design and adoption of annual 
budgets and three-year development plans, their 
implementation, execution and auditing.
Further factors relate to other actors in local author-
ity funding: the central state is defined by Article 
136 of the Constitution as responsible for support-
ing local authorities in terms of balancing incomes 
and expenditures, and in “allocating supplementary 
funds to weaker local authorities in compliance with 
the principle of solidarity.” Financial autonomy is also 
influenced by the amount of taxes paid by citizens, 
which impacts on the amount of local government 
revenue.
Reforming local taxes has been discussed several 
times since the beginning of the decentralization 
process by government representatives, civil soci-
ety organizations, international NGOs, and finance 
experts as one of the main challenges for local 
authorities in achieving real financial autonomy.15 A 
law from February 1997 (Law No. 97-11) is the very 
first legal document in Tunisian history that attempts 
to standardize the entire local taxation system, from 
payment to collection and overall control. Prior to 
that, numerous and disparate legal texts defined var-
ious elements of local tax.16
15 Rihab Zaatour, “What steps is Tunisia taking towards fiscal reforms?,” Africa Business Insight, March 20, 2017 <https://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/
steps-tunisia-taking-towards-fiscal-reforms/57989/> (accessed November 19, 2018).
16 These include the January 31, 1887 decree on the contribution of riparian owners, the September 16, 1902 decree on tax on the rental value of 
buildings, and the January 15, 1914 decree on tax for temporary occupation of public areas owned by municipalities. James Alm, “Analyzing and Reforming 
Tunisia’s Tax System,” Commitment to Equity Working Paper No. 34, May 2015, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
17 Figures mentioned by the Minister of Interior on June 5, 2015, before the Parliamentary Commission on the Reform of the Administration and Armed 
Forces Affairs.
18 Nabil Abdellatif, “Décentralisation et Fiscalité Locale en Tunisie,” presentation of January 10, 2014 <http://www.finances.gov.tn/assises_fiscalite/
pdf/4-Decentralisation_de_la_Fiscalite_MF_011014.pdf> (accessed November 19, 2018).
19 Unpublished report by the Ministry of Interior about the operational organization of decentralization, May 2013, p. 15.
20 Although the Ministry of Finance did not make the internal note public, it referred to the PEFA review: Roger Picard and Ahmed Guidara, “Public 
Expenditure and Financial Accountability – Final Report on the efficiency and management of public finances,” November 10, 2015, p. 43.
21 “Tunisie : Débat autour du plan de développement 2016-2020 adopté à l’ARP,” HuffPost Tunisie, April 13, 2017 <https://www.huffpostmaghreb.
com/2017/04/12/plan-de-developpement-201_n_15962884.html> (accessed November 27, 2018).
22 Article 131 of the Local Authorities Code.
Weak Local Authority Power over Local Taxation
A brief overview of local authorities’ current finan-
cial systems shows that in 2014, local finances barely 
represented one percent of Tunisia’s GDP, and three 
percent of state finances.17 For the purposes of com-
parison, the latter statistic is at around 10 percent 
in Morocco, 12 percent in England, 15.2 percent in 
France, and 20 percent in Turkey.18
Municipal revenues in Tunisia can fluctuate wildly: 
total local authority revenues experienced a 45 per-
cent drop in 2011 to 270 million dinars, but exceeded 
their 2010 level in 2014, reaching 476 million dinars.19 
A 2014 report from the Ministry of Finance20 pro-
jected a raise in revenues of four percent of GDP by 
2019, and eight percent of state finances. This report 
served as the primary basis for the five-year devel-
opment plan (2016-2020) adopted by the People Rep-
resentative Assembly, Tunisia’s legislative body, in 
2017.21 Although updated statistics have not yet been 
published, it seems that the goals will not be reached.
Local taxes are one of, if not the, most import-
ant source of revenue for local authorities, repre-
senting a major guarantee for their autonomy: the 
more municipalities, regions, and districts rely on 
incomes they successfully levy and collect by them-
selves, the less they need support from the central 
state, whose help is always conditional upon man-
datory reforms, and which does not always coincide 
with local authorities’ best interests. The new Code 
has acknowledged this fact, stating that “the State 
shall, gradually, through the laws of finance, tax 
laws and property laws, make the resources of each 
local authority the most important share of their r e-
sources.”22 Under the previous system, local author-
ities were not allowed to determine how taxes were 
calculated or who was subject to them. Under the 
new Code of Local Authorities, municipalities can 
now determine the rate of some local taxes and fees: 
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“local authorities’ elected councils shall determine 
the amounts or tariffs of different fees.”23
The latest recommendations of the OECD suggest 
that local taxes should be collected directly by local 
authorities to strengthen their accountability and, in 
the mid-term, contribute to solidifying their budgets 
and financial autonomy vis-à-vis central state insti-
tutions. Local authorities “carrying out their expen-
diture responsibilities are likely to be more efficient, 
responsible and accountable if they are required to 
raise the revenue that they spend. Furthermore, this 
is dependent on the fiscal autonomy or fiscal discre-
tion that local governments have in determining their 
tax base and setting their tax rates. […] Fiscal auton-
omy is least when both the tax base and tax rate are 
set or controlled by senior levels of government.”24
On another level, it appears that the division between 
national taxes paid to the central state and local taxes 
paid to local authorities does not rely on objective 
criteria, but rather depends on the will of the central 
state. Important taxes that are more directly relevant 
to local taxation are therefore paid by tax payers to 
the central state instead of the local authorities. The 
best example here is the vignette, or car traffic tax, 
paid by every car owner for the regular maintenance 
of the roads that they use. A close look at each insti-
tution’s responsibilities reveals that roads built for 
public use are the property of local authorities (Arti-
cle 69 of the Code of Local Authorities), who bear the 
sole responsibility to “build and maintain roads and 
sidewalks” (Article 240). However, the vignette is paid 
23 Article 139 of the Local Authorities Code.
24 Harry Kitchen, “Local taxation in selected countries: a comparative examination,” IIGR Working Paper 2004 (5), Queen’s University, p. 4.
25 “Tunisia 2015,” PEFA <https://pefa.org/assessments/tunisia-2015> (accessed November 19, 2018).
26 Arne Hoel, “A New Horizon for Local Governments in Tunisia,” World Bank Organization, October 20, 2015: “An opinion survey conducted in 2014 in a 
mid-sized municipality near the capital, Tunis, pointed to a significant disconnect: just 4 percent of households reported having received any communication 
from the local government in the past year; some 35 percent of households did not know who their municipal councilors were; over 64 percent of households 
thought their councilors did not work to represent their interests; 38 percent of households reported that they did not pay their local taxes.” <http://www.
worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/10/19/a-new-horizon-for-local-governments-in-tunisia> (accessed November 19, 2018).
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
by every car owner around the country directly to 
the central state.
The Maze of Local Tax Collection Systems
Local taxes represent another challenge for local 
authorities in terms of collection. Common sense 
would lead local authorities to elaborate tax col-
lection systems themselves, which would be later 
checked by central state representatives and the 
judiciary. Instead, the new Code of Local Authorities 
perpetuates the old practice of highly-centralized 
tax recovery that almost completely excludes local 
authorities and thus contributes to their dependence 
on central state interventions.
Another consequence of this has already been wit-
nessed and reported by most municipalities in 
 Tunisia that have undergone a Public Expenditure 
and Financial Accountability (PEFA) review.25 The 
PEFA report highlighted many weaknesses in com-
munication about local tax changes, and considered 
these shortcomings as the main reason behind the 
low recovery figures.26 In the municipality of Tunis, 
for example, no changes have been introduced to the 
taxation of industrial, economic, and professional 
companies since 2011, which helps explain the recov-
ery rate of seventy percent for 2014, in comparison 
to a two percent recovery rate from hotels.27 The lat-
ter were subject to five different changes (basis and 
rates) for the same period of time. No support was 
provided in 2014 to tax payers who were willing to 
complete the forms.28
This is a practice mainly inherited from the French 
centralized system that resulted in the creation of 
a public accountancy function for local authorities. 
Shortened to “local public accountant,” this public 
servant is affiliated to the Ministry of Finance and is 
defined by Article 129 of the Code of Local Authori-
ties as “a public accountant of the state [who] has the 
status of chief accountant only specialized in keep-
ing the accounts of local communities.” Not only do 
they audit local tax collection, they are also the only 
individuals allowed to administer collection. This sit-
uation gave rise to the ongoing absurdity of “munic-
Local taxes represent 
a guarantee for local 
 authorities’ autonomy
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ipal tax collection offices”29 in different areas of the 
country, which have no legal link to municipalities 
other than in name, and who work under the direct 
supervision of the Ministry of Finance.
Furthermore, collection systems also greatly impact 
local authorities’ revenues. Indeed, less than half of 
local taxes were paid by individual/household tax in 
2014.30 This figure can dramatically drop to 13 percent 
for tax on built properties, where the taxation rate 
also depends on how many services are provided. 
Although the law obliges municipalities to conduct 
their own census of buildings and properties within 
their municipal limits,31 most municipalities rely on 
citizens’ declarations without any direct field control. 
The tax collection process for built properties there-
fore faces tremendous gaps, notwithstanding the 
fact that the average tax rate per building per year in 
Tunisia is around 27 dinars (less than €9).
Local Taxes Reveal a Structural Weakness within 
Municipalities
Since 2011, most Tunisians do not pay their local 
taxes and the central state fails to collect them. Both 
factors can help explain the crisis in local authority 
financing and their inability to fulfill vital services 
such as waste collection and management, the build-
ing and maintenance of roads and sidewalks, and 
street lighting.32
Two more points must be raised at this level: first, 
central state and local public accountants have also 
suffered from political and social instability since 
2011, and security issues in many areas of the country 
have rendered local tax collection an impossible task. 
Second, not all taxes have suffered the same drop: 
local taxes imposed on companies, such as the tax 
on industrial, commercial, or professional activities 
reached more reasonable collection rates, such as 
seventy percent in the Tunis municipality in 2014.33 
In part, this can be explained by the fact that com-
panies are bound in all their legal interactions with 
third parties to complete all administrative and fiscal 
procedures, and to comply with the law. 
29 Translated from the Arabic Idarat al kebatha al mahalya.
30 “Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes Peer Reviews: Tunisia 2016,” OECD, March 2016, p. 15.
31 Article 4 of the Code of Local Tax.
32 “Country profile on the solid waste management situation in Tunisia,” GiZ and Sweepnet, April 2014 <https://www.retech-germany.net/fileadmin/
retech/05_mediathek/laenderinformationen/T unesien_PROFIL_laenderprofile_sweep_net.pdf> (accessed November 27, 2018).
33 “Global Forum on Transparency,” p. 81. 
34 Roger Picard and Ahmed Guidara, “Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability – Final Report on the efficiency and management of public 
finances,” November 10, 2015, p. 9. <http://www.collectiviteslocales.gov.tn/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Rapport_synthese_vf-2018.pdf> (accessed 
November 27, 2018).
35 Ibid., p. 10.
Theoretically, individuals are bound by equivalent 
conditions, but since 2011, Tunisia has witnessed a 
dramatic growth of illegal buildings and construc-
tions. In the municipality of Gabes, the sixth-largest 
municipality in terms of population (with 131,00o in 
habitants according to the 2014 national census), 
the rate of all local taxes on properties (built prop-
erties and lands) is only seven percent.34 This issue 
has already been reported by the World Bank to the 
Ministry of Finance in a 2015 evaluation report.35 In 
turn, this low recovery rate impacts local authorities’ 
budgets.
Problematic local tax collection rates can be traced 
to the unwillingness of municipalities and central 
state representatives to engage with any judicial 
procedures. This is a consequence of the tense social 
and political atmosphere throughout the country, but 
can also be related to the absence of directly elected 
representatives leading municipalities. With the local 
elections of May 6, 2018, focus needs to be main-
tained on this issue.
Last, even if local tax collection does not depend on 
the direct intervention of municipalities, but is rather 
a power of the local public accountant representing 
the Ministry of Finance, municipalities need the right 
personnel to design local public policies on tax col-
lection. Whether it is through campaigning to raise 
awareness among tax payers and citizens, setting up 
the required administrative sanctions, or even sim-
ply thinking about alternatives, it is vital for munic-
ipalities to employ qualified and competent staff. In 
general, the Tunisian state measures the competence 
of public officials using an index called the supervi-
Most Tunisians do not pay 
local taxes and the state 
fails to collect them
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sion ratio, which calculates the percentage of public 
officials currently in post who have the appropriate 
competence for their position. An ideal supervision 
ratio of 100 percent in municipalities would mean 
that every position in municipalities, from secretary 
generals to gardeners and street cleaners, is held by 
adequately qualified employees. Qualifications are 
ranked in law from A (relevant university degree) to 
D (six years of elementary education); public servants 
at all levels are classified according to the same sys-
tem.36
However, an unpublished 2015 report from the Min-
istry of Interior revealed that only 11 percent of class 
A posts were filled by category A officials.37 While this 
has been the case for many years, decisions taken 
by governors in the first years of the revolution have 
contributed to making the situation even worse. In 
2012 alone, 6,839 individuals were integrated into the 
public service system without any prior examination 
on the sole basis of the general legislative amnesty 
announced by then then interim President Moncef 
Marzouki. While 2,929 other individuals were inte-
grated as an acknowledgement of their status as 
“relatives of the Revolution martyrs,”38 most munici-
palities and regions were required to integrate more 
than 54,000 contract employees by governors.39
Notwithstanding the tremendous advances agreed 
by municipalities, or imposed upon them by gover-
nors (including infrastructure investments, funding 
for associations, and contract-based new recruits), 
under pressure from sit-ins, street protests, and 
strikes between 2011 and 2014, the local public sec-
tor remains under permanent threat of collapse. For 
instance, during the summer of 2011, the munic-
ipality of El Guetar in Gafsa Governorate hired 138 
new employees and raised the amount allocated for 
salaries and wages to an overall 236 percent of the 
initially planned budget.40 This and numerous similar 
examples suggest that recruitment has been used as 
a tool to calm protesters and silence unrest. These 
recruitment practices focused exclusively on low- to 
unskilled employees, leaving municipalities in 2017 
with a large base of category C and D workers (89.8 
percent) and almost no qualified category A and B 
36 Decree No. 99-12 of January 4, 1999, related to the definition of the categories and grades of public servants in the Tunisian administration.
37 The report was distributed to members of the parliamentary commission while discussing the draft of Code of Local Authorities in January 2018.
38 “Caractéristiques des agents de la fonction publique et leurs salaires 2010-2014,” National Institute of Statistics, Tunisia, July 2017.
39 Amir Ben Ameur and Erin Neale, “Democracy in Tunisia: Façade or Reality?,” Atlantic Council, March 23, 2018 <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/
menasource/democracy-in-tunisia-facade-or-reality> (accessed November 19, 2018).
40 El Guettar Municipality 2014 yearly budget and narrative report, Ministry of Interior, 2015.
41 Figures announced by Mokhtar Hammami, General Director of the Relations with Local Authorities at the Ministry of Relations with Local Authorities 
and Environment, at a press conference on November 24, 2017.
staff (10.2 percent) to design policies and provide 
tasks to be executed.41
Although nothing has been done to explicitly improve 
supervision ratios, Article 9 of the Code of Local 
Authorities clearly requires local authorities “to con-
trol the volume of expenditures for salaries provided 
that the ceiling does not exceed fifty percent of the 
regular resources earned from their budgets.” Arti-
cle 9 further imposes a ceiling of fifty percent on all 
management expenditures allocated to wages and 
salaries. All local authorities above this ceiling must 
design and release plans with deadlines to reduce 
these expenditures. Once designed and approved 
by their councils, plans are adopted as contracts 
between each local authority and the central state. 
Although the Code does not detail the format or con-
tent of these contracts, it does refer to governmental 
decrees to be adopted on the matter.
Recommendations
Local tax reform will be a prerequisite for true finan-
cial autonomy at the local authority level. In addi-
tion to recognizing a share of local taxes for regions, 
more effective efforts must be made to provide tax 
payers with full and comprehensive information 
about all local tax obligations. This reform would also 
have to concentrate all efforts on strengthening the 
resources and budgets of municipalities and regions.
 - The central state should acknowledge more flexibil-
ity vis-à-vis local authorities
The central state should grant relative power to mod-
ulate bases and rates of local taxes and exemptions, 
especially when the aim is to attract more invest-
ments, more residents, or more tax payers. A larger 
share of taxes paid nationally should be reoriented 
for use by local or regional services, all under new tax 
sharing arrangements. Such changes must be coordi-
nated between all decentralization actors and rely on 
a clear and transparent policy to effectively increase 
local tax revenue to eight percent of the state budget 
and four percent of GDP. A rational deadline must be 
set for such a commitment: the next five-year devel-
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opment plan will start in 2020 and end in 2025, which 
seems to be an appropriate deadline.
 - Local authorities must be allowed more autonomy 
in tax collection and control
Coordination between local public accountants and 
local authorities should take place more regularly, 
and local public accountants must act with the same 
transparency towards municipalities as they employ 
with the Ministry of Finance. The central state should 
also make commitments to devolve tax collection 
powers to municipalities that have shown strong 
capabilities. This should happen with a framework 
established in law and closely managed by the Min-
istry of Finance. 
Continuous sharing of expertise and experience 
should take place between central financial and fiscal 
institutions (including the Ministry of Finance, gover-
nors, Court of Auditors, and the High Council for the 
Local Tax System) and local authorities. This would 
greatly impact the way local authorities consider and 
collect their taxes. They would have more responsi-
bility throughout the process, from designing ser-
vices to implementing them. Municipalities would 
also be more oriented toward attracting investment, 
developing local employment opportunities, and 
helping set up local development projects.
 - The supervision ratio for category A employees 
should be raised to at least 25 percent, especially 
regarding taxation policies and financial account-
ability
This would also positively affect development and 
urban plans directly linked to investment and taxa-
tion. Municipalities and regions should have greater 
powers to sue all irregular tax payers. Stronger crim-
inal and financial sanctions must be at the disposal of 
local authorities, who will also require robust support 
from the security forces specialized in these issues. 
This will involve greater coordination with governors 
reporting to the Ministry of Interior. Local author-
ities who do not enforce payment of local taxes 
should be questioned, both formally and informally, 
over their policies or the absence thereof. Possible 
formal channels include an audit of local represen-
tatives by the High Council of Local Authorities, and 
public meetings to hold councils accountable before 
their citizens.
 - All levels of government should improve trans-
parency and access to information
All levels of government must practice high levels of 
transparency regarding their budgets, policies, func-
tioning, and services. The legal frameworks already 
exist and only need to be respected and enforced. 
The Code of Local Authorities establishes the princi-
ple of transparency and devolves the mandatory cre-
ation of transparency mechanisms to municipalities. 
The 2016 law on the right of access to information 
obliges all public institutions, including decentralized 
ones, to establish their own internal services to fur-
nish information requests. All these existing mecha-
nisms for a democratic system of rule must be fully 
and duly implemented.
 - International partners should share experiences 
more broadly
International partners who actively support decen-
tralization and democratization should focus their 
support on reforming the local taxation system by 
sharing comparative experiences with both the cen-
tral state (in devolving more powers) and with local 
authorities (in improving their management and 
collection capabilities). On-site trainings, exchange 
missions, research, reports, and fluid communication 
would embody the determination of strong partner-
ships to support Tunisia’s path toward democracy.
 - Tunisian civil society organizations should help 
local authorities to raise awareness
Tunisian CSOs can help inform citizens about the 
vital need to contribute to municipal and regional 
budgets, and highlight the benefits and risks of 
behaviors. This requires transparency in local taxes, 
budgets, decision-making processes, and stakes that 
have not yet been fully or duly disclosed.
 - National and local tax collection mechanisms 
should be secured against corruption
Such reforms have few chances of success if cor-
rupt practices continue to hijack efforts by central 
and local administrations. Therefore, both central 
and local authorities in charge of tax collection and 
financial accountability must exercise more control, 
and judicial institutions such as the Court of Auditors 
must allocate more human and financial resources 
to control operations. Newly adopted laws must be 
enforced to help support the struggle against cor-
ruption, especially at the local level, such as the legal 
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provisions protecting whistleblowers, or the law 
that requires elected representatives at all levels to 
declare their assets.
Finally, focus must be maintained on the relevant 
governmental decrees. The Code of Local Authorities 
requires the enactment of 42 reforms relating to gov-
ernors’ powers, participatory democracy tools, local 
taxation procedures, and intercommunal collabora-
tion processes. So far, only eight of these reforms 
have been adopted, which clearly shows that prog-
ress must be accelerated. 
Zied Boussen is the head of Pandora Consulting – 
a Tunisian research and training center specialized 
in governance, public policies, and human rights. 
He is also a research fellow at the Arab Reform 
Initiative in Tunis. At the time of the workshop, he 
worked as a researcher for Pandora Consulting. 
He holds an MA in International Law, with a focus 
on post-conflict state building and reconstruction 
from the University of Aix-Marseille.
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THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE 
PARTICIPATION IN THE TUNISIAN 
DECENTRALIZATION AND 
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS
Ahmed Ben Nejma
In the process of building a new democracy, Tunisia 
has opted for a participatory governance system at 
the local level to institutionalize a new relationship 
between citizens and the state. However, the tools cur-
rently in use by municipalities are not technically or 
practically inclusive, and do not push for transparency 
and accountability. The evaluation system adopted 
by the Ministry of Local Affairs and Environment to 
evaluate citizen participation at the local level is not 
efficient in monitoring the effectiveness of participa-
tory tools implemented by the municipalities. Within 
the new context heralded by the municipal elections 
of May 2018, the new municipal councils need effec-
tive participatory tools based on transparency and 
accountability towards citizens. This indicates the 
need to use a methodology that ensures the inclusion 
of all socio-economic groups through a participatory 
communication plan, as well as the guarantee of access 
to public meetings for all citizens. Moreover, it is nec-
essary to provide municipalities with a well-defined 
barometer of indicators in order to monitor and eval-
uate the efficiency of the implemented tools.
Tunisian citizens have inherited a long history of 
mistrust in public institutions from the Ben Ali 
regime, which was characterized by corruption and 
the use of the state institutions for personal and 
private gain. The lack of municipal transparency 
and accountability led citizens to lose trust in local 
authorities. Consequently, citizens began refusing 
to pay local taxes since they were kept in the dark 
regarding the municipal budget, and did not receive 
good municipal services or infrastructure in return. 
Thus, the amount of the budget collected by munic-
ipalities from local taxation decreased, rendering 
local authorities unable to afford local development 
projects due to a lack of funding. This situation led 
to a deteriorating infrastructure and poor cultural 
and economic frameworks, especially in the interior 
regions. In this context, and according to the latest 
report by the Tunisian anti-corruption NGO I-Watch, 
municipalities recorded the highest national number 
of corruption alerts, as reported to I-Watch and the 
42 “Local Authorities Top the Ranks of Corruption,” [in Arabic] I-Watch, May 30, 2018 <https://www.iwatch.tn/ar/article/496> (accessed November 14, 
2018).
43 Declaration of the Ministry of Local Affairs and Environment at a 2015 press conference on municipalities and their financial resources.
44 Ibid.
Tunisian National Commission for Fighting Corrup-
tion.42
Consequently, and according to a 2015 announce-
ment from the Ministry of Local Affairs and Environ-
ment, the national average rates of local tax collec-
tion in Tunisian municipalities did not even reach 
one-fifth of what they should have been,43 reflecting 
the relationship of mistrust between municipalities 
and citizens. 
Figure 1: Average Local Taxes Ecollection 
at the municipal level
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Non Collected 
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Source: Visualization by the author of tax collection data contained in a declaration of 
the Ministry of Local Affairs and Environment at a 2015 press conference.44
Moreover, during the last municipal elections, only 
one-third of registered citizens cast their ballots, 
despite a prominent awareness campaign and com-
munication plan implemented by a wide range of 
governmental agencies and NGOs in many regions to 
encourage citizens to take part in the electoral pro-
cess. This abstention from voting represents a strong 
indicator of the deterioration in the relationship 
between citizens and their local authorities.
Ineffective, Exclusive, and Unaccountable Partici-
patory Tools used by Municipalities
According to the new Constitution and the new local 
authority code ordained in Act 29, municipalities are 
legally obliged to adopt participatory approaches 
in designing and deciding local development plans. 
Since 2015, Tunisian municipalities have begun 
implementing a new participatory tool provided 
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by the Ministry of Local Affairs and Environment: 
the Annual Investment Plan (AIP). The AIP has been 
developed to help municipalities plan and spend 
their annual budgets with input from citizens. Theo-
retically, and according to the AIP, citizens should be 
able to take part in the decision-making process with 
their municipalities to decide how the annual local 
investment budget should be spent.
However, this tool has demonstrated many draw-
backs since its first implementation in 2015. First, 
even though it is supposed to be participatory, the 
AIP was structured in a very top-down way: its design 
process only involved experts from the Ministry of 
Local Affairs and Environment. Neither municipalities 
nor NGOs were consulted on their opinions about 
the methodology. Moreover, the AIP has proved that 
it is not as participatory as it should have been. For 
instance, according to official statistics from Ariana, 
one of the biggest cities in the Tunis agglomera-
tion, only 88 citizens took part in the 2016 AIP pub-
lic meeting, from over 114,486 inhabitants.45 Citizens 
should have participated, sharing their proposals and 
opinions on how the municipality should spend its 
investment budget and choose the priorities for the 
city. However, the weak communication strategy of 
the AIP as well as its non-participatory approaches 
have discouraged citizens from taking part, since 
they feel they will only be used as tokens without 
effectively participating.
In addition, the official methodology of the AIP46 does 
not specify any specific measures to insist on the 
participation of minorities, disabled people, women, 
or youth. This led to the conspicuous participation 
of adult men, as in the case of the city of Ariana. 
However, these shortcomings were not observed in 
municipalities that used a more efficient and par-
ticipatory tool, such as the Participatory Budgeting 
(PB) process, a mechanism to include citizens in deci-
sion-making processes on development projects.
The PB process was first introduced as a participa-
tory tool in the Brazilian municipality of Porto-Alegre 
in 1989 to provide a space for citizens in local deci-
sion-making. The use of PB then spread to other 
 cities, countries, and continents. In Tunisia today, 19 
municipalities have already implemented the PB pro-
cess. These municipalities gave citizens real power 
to decide on local development projects together 
45 “Participatory Public Sessions,” Municipality of Ariana, figures for 2016-2018 <http://bit.ly/2Fn2Et0> (accessed November 14, 2018).
46 AIP official methodology [in Arabic], 2016 <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1NXsfzIdELXU3xw_WWuJQEBGrnS Ulx42-/view?usp=sharing> (accessed 
November 14, 2018).
47 Description and results of PB implementation in Tunisia, Associative Action <https://www.actionassociative.org/en/eye-on-the-budget/> (accessed 
November 27, 2018).
with the municipality, in contrast to the AIP, which is 
based on project proposals of the municipality itself. 
Tunisian municipalities using PB have observed high 
participation rates at public meetings and a greater 
diversity of participants thanks to the inclusivity of 
its communication plans.47 For instance, it is only 
through the PB process that the municipality of 
Sfax (the second biggest city after Tunis) elected a 
disabled woman as a citizen delegate in 2015 to rep-
resent the interest of her neighborhood vis-à-vis 
the municipality. No municipality using the AIP has 
demonstrated such an example.
Finally, the PB process provides an opportunity for 
the citizens to hold the municipality accountable 
through the training of citizen delegates in monitor-
ing and evaluating municipality project implementa-
tion, and providing them with an easy-to-use guide, 
a component that is completely absent from the AIP 
methodology.
Inadequate Evaluation of Participatory Approaches
Since the adoption of the AIP by the Ministry of Local 
Affairs and Environment in 2015, municipalities have 
received an annual score based on an evaluation sys-
tem provided by the Ministry. Municipalities need to 
obtain a seventy percent score before they receive 
state grants to execute their development projects. 
The evaluation system is based on a number of fac-
tors, including transparency, public procurement 
methodology, and human resources management. 
However, as good as the evaluation system appears, 
it does not work properly for many reasons.
First, the evaluation methodology compares all 350 
Tunisian municipalities according to the same crite-
ria, which tends to discriminate against the largest 
and most-populated municipalities. Large cities find 
themselves poorly ranked simply for having larger 
populations, since the scores are based either on the 
participation rate in public meetings, or the number 
of demands a municipality receives for a specific ser-
vice. Both these factors are strongly correlated to 
the number of citizens. For instance, according to 
this evaluation system, the municipality of El Krib (a 
very small city in the interior region of Tunisia) was 
ranked as the best Tunisian municipality in 2016. 
However, if compared to the municipality of Sfax, the 
second biggest city after Tunis, El Krib receives far 
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fewer complaints compared to Sfax, due to its smaller 
number of inhabitants (around 20,000, while Sfax 
has around 955,000, according to the latest statistics 
from by the National Institute of Statistics).48 Con-
sequently, El Krib finds itself rewarded on the score 
for managing citizens’ complaints, even though Sfax 
handles far more complaints.
Moreover, the evaluation system is mainly based 
on reports elaborated by municipal officers. The 
Min istry organizes visits to some municipalities 
to inspect the validity of the information provided. 
However, the results of these should not be trusted 
since they are not gathered during the implementa-
tion of the AIP, but only after the process is finished. 
Consequently, the verification step becomes an 
administrative operation rather than a real evaluation 
of how the process is being implemented.
In addition, the AIP does not use a clear methodology 
to ensure the accountability of the tool. During the 
AIP process, citizen delegates who are supposed to 
monitor and evaluate the execution of projects are 
not elected by other citizens (and are sometimes cho-
sen by the municipality itself), nor are they trained in 
monitoring and evaluation. The process provides no 
form of training or assistance for the monitoring and 
evaluation phase.
These failures have rendered the AIP process a tool 
that tokenizes citizen participation, rather than pro-
moting it as a factor in building trust. In addition, it 
does not offer an effective evaluation structure to 
improve the participatory process or fix its short-
comings. The newly elected municipal councils pro-
vide the last hope for real change in the Tunisian 
democratic transition. Accordingly, municipalities 
should adopt effective participatory tools that opt for 
transparency and accountability.
Recommendations
 - Adopt a participatory approach in designing an 
effective evaluation system with experts and NGOs
The government should implement a monitoring and 
evaluation framework to measure to what extent 
municipal participation tools are participatory, inclu-
sive, transparent, and accountable. This framework 
should be designed in a participatory way with input 
from municipalities and experts in the field, includ-
48 Tunisia Census, National Institute of Statistics <http://regions.ins.tn/vwxgdxb/tunisia-census> (accessed November 27, 2018).
49 Population by age group, National Institute of Statistics <http://regions.ins.tn/mnigucg/la-population-par-groupe-d-%C3%A2ge-recensement-
2014?region=1001310-el-krib> (accessed November 27, 2018).
ing the private sector and NGOs with a bottom-up 
approach. Consequently, the process would be more 
inclusive. All stakeholders should be effectively con-
sulted in designing the most suitable process.
 - Improve the AIP using success stories such as Par-
ticipatory Budgeting
Tunisian municipalities could consider PB as a vi able 
model, in light of its successful introduction in 19 
municipalities.49 The Ministry of Local Affairs and 
Environment should improve the AIP process by inte-
grating the strengths and advantages of similar, suc-
cessful processes, such as PB. More specifically, the 
AIP should import the PB methodology of designing 
an inclusive and participatory communication plan 
that includes all socio-economic categories, and tar-
gets them through awareness and information cam-
paigns. The Ministry should further ensure higher 
levels of citizen participation, such as the PB practice 
of joint decision-making between municipal council 
and citizens, rather than the AIP’s use of mere con-
sultation meetings.
In addition, the Ministry should design an account-
ability phase to enable citizens to monitor and eval-
uate the execution of projects through organizing 
training sessions on municipal projects implemen-
tation, as well as providing an easy-to-use guide. It 
should use a bottom-up approach in designing and 
modeling participatory approaches by consulting and 
involving local civil society organizations.
Ahmed Ben Nejma has been working with differ-
ent NGOs on a variety of national and interna-
tional causes since 2009. He is a national trainer 
in the Participatory Budgeting Process, training 
and supporting local municipality members and 
local NGOs in 19 Tunisian municipalities to imple-
ment Participatory Budgeting.
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EFFECTIVE YOUTH PARTICIPATION 
IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION
Jihene Ferchichi
Since the 2011 Revolution in Tunisia, the direct par-
ticipation of Tunisian citizens, and Tunisian youth in 
particular, in reforming and improving public services 
has posed a real challenge. Young people are unable 
to make themselves heard in an organized, structured 
and efficient way, despite the fact that they are in reg-
ular close contact with public administrations and 
public services. This is due to a lack of communication 
channels, which leads to an absence of administration 
accountability. Establishing a legal framework to reg-
ulate communication and interaction between public 
structures and citizens using Information and Com-
munication Technologies (ICT) is therefore one means 
that should be seriously considered and exploited by 
decision-makers to encourage active participation of 
young people in shaping public services in their com-
munities.
Despite the successful democratic transition, several 
factors continue to create tension in Tunisia, and the 
growing need to support youth has become espe-
cially urgent after their needs were not met following 
the revolution.50 Although their leading role in bring-
ing change to the regime is undisputed, Tunisian 
youth are still not fully included in decision-making 
processes and feel left out on matters that affect 
them directly.51 While the general political discourse 
revolves around young people, their needs, and par-
ticipation in decision-making, there are no clear and 
efficient channels for youth to effect change in the 
administration, its function, and services. Indeed, 
many challenges lie ahead in the formation of demo-
cratic and participatory citizenship in Tunisia, espe-
cially when it comes to engaging young people. The 
evolution of and adaptation to new social, economic, 
and technological realities can be challenging for 
policy-makers, decision-makers and the broader 
population.
50 “Breaking the Barriers to Youth Inclusion: Tunisia,” The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank Group, 2014 <http://
www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/MNA/tunisia/breaking_the_barriers_to_youth_inclusion_eng.pdf> (accessed November 13, 2018).
51 Ibid., p. 10.
52 “Integrity Scan of Tunisia,” OECD, CleanCovBiz Integrity in Practice, June2013 <https://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/Tunisia-Integrity-ScanEN.pdf> 
(accessed November 13, 2018).
53 Abdel Kader Lebbaoui, President of the National Union for the Neutrality of the Administration, Maghreb, August 1, 2013, cited in Hamadi Redissi and 
Afifa Ayadi, “Shall Tunisia Succeed in Becoming a Strong Democratic State?,” EUSPRING, p. 5 <http://aei.pitt.edu/70441/1/arab_citizenship_review_n.13.
pdf> (accessed December 5, 2018).
Weak Performance of Public Services
The relationship between Tunisian citizens and their 
public administration is characterized by dissatis-
faction. Despite the crucial role administration still 
plays in citizens’ lives, Tunisians still face major diffi-
culties dealing with the administration and its agents. 
Obtaining papers, authorizations, or even proper and 
complete information can be a hassle for ordinary 
Tunisians. For students, parents, business people or 
investors, dealing with public service administration 
can be a lengthy, energy-consuming experience.
While administration is supposed to support citizens’ 
lives and help them obtain adequate information in 
undertaking projects or even simple administrative 
formalities, Tunisian youth in particular suffer from 
the slow administration, inadequate services, and 
complex procedures.
Poor state performance is an important element in 
analyzing youth readiness to be involved and to con-
tribute to social change and public life. The state’s 
performance is characterized by low quality, a lack of 
discipline, and growing corruption. Issues relating to 
the politicization of the state and partisan attempts 
to make public appointments based on loyalties have 
also had a negative impact on services.52 Indeed, as 
confirmed by Abdel Kader Labbaoui, President of the 
National Union for the Neutrality of the Administra-
tion, “more than 70 percent of the total appointments 
in the ‘troika’ era have yet not been reviewed.”53 
 Labbaoui further insisted on “the need to scrutinize 
the 1,200 appointments in the state institutions, that 
is, the ministries, public administration institutions, 
and public utilities.”
In fact, the number of public servants has increased 
from 444,905 in 2011 to 533,069 in 2012. Notwith-
standing the recruitment of 88,164 additional public 
servants in one year, basic services for citizens are 
still frequently organized in an overly complex way, 
with the assignment of duties across various admin-
istrative levels and authorities causing persistent 
problems. For citizens, it is often unclear who is 
responsible and which documents they need to pre-
sent for which service, or even how long they will 
have to wait.
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Youth Disengagement and Lack of Trust between 
Citizens and Administrations
Young people today show reluctance towards active 
participation in public life. They prefer to limit 
their investment towards humanitarian causes with 
immediate concrete results.54 Only a small fraction 
of young Tunisians is active in civil society organi-
zations (CSOs).55 Such behavior can be explained by 
the new era in which Tunisians live, a time of con-
tinuous evolution, speed, and change. Among other 
social factors to be considered is the characterization 
of young people as inept, which hinders both young 
people and broader society from accepting youth in 
decision-making roles. Indeed, despite the low lev-
els of participation in civil society, nine out of ten 
young Tunisians nevertheless consider volunteering 
in CSOs to be important for their communities.56
To take the example of European countries, young 
people and their representative bodies are rec-
ognized as stakeholders in the implementation 
of national youth policies, a system referred to as 
co-management. This means engaging a range of 
youth and student organizations, as well as national- 
and local-level youth councils, to serve as channels 
for young voices on critical public policy issues.
Poor public service provision causes a lack of reliance 
on and trust in administration, and leads to the inef-
ficient utilization of limited resources. To improve 
administrative services, young people’s voices must 
be heard through well-established channels and 
taken into consideration in improving administra-
tions. Without a basic minimum level of confidence 
in institutions, such as local politicians, courts, 
police, and political or religious groups, it is difficult 
for youth to work constructively with institutions. 
Trust is an enabling condition for active citizenship 
and crucial to youth engagement in the issues that 
affect their community and country. Unfortunately, 
in Tunisia tension exists between youth expectations 
and the resolutions expressed in policies designed 
to target their needs. This creates a growing lack of 
comprehension between the older generation and 
youth.
The Tunisian government has recently undertaken 
several initiatives to enhance open governance in the 
54 “Breaking the Barriers to Youth Inclusion,” p. 15.
55 According to a recent survey, as little as three percent of rural youth participate in CSOs. Observatoire National de la Jeunesse, Social Science Forum, 
2013.
56 Ibid., Chapter II.
57 “National OGP Action Plan,” Secretariat of State in Charge of Governance and Civil Service, September 2014 <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/
sites/default/files/Tunisia%20O GP%20NAP_0.pdf> (accessed November 13, 2018).
public policy-making process.57 The Open Govern-
ment Partnership (OGP), for example, was launched 
in 2011 to provide an international platform for 
domestic reformers committed to making their gov-
ernments more open, accountable, and responsive to 
citizens. The OGP provides an opportunity for mem-
bers to exchange experiences in the fields of trans-
parency, the fight against corruption, improvement 
of public service delivery, citizens’ engagement in 
the public policy-making process, and the use of new 
technologies.
Public consultations were carried out on actions 
to be included in the OGP action plan to ensure 
input from citizens on potential reforms. The first 
consultation was conducted from May 6 to June 
29, 2014 on what should be included in the action 
plan. As a result, more than 600 propositions were 
received through the consultation website, the OGP’s 
 Facebook page, e-mail, and regular mail. Although 
these actions have considerably improved popular 
relations with the administration, it is necessary to 
develop a global plan enabling every citizen to have a 
single entry point for all contacts with public admin-
istration, extensively relying on ICT and increasing 
participation in public life by permanently taking cit-
izens’ claims into consideration.
Recommendations
 - Build trust between citizens and administrations
Trust between young people and the administration 
can only be achieved through successful youth par-
ticipation in public service change. In order to acti-
vate and promote citizenship among youth, policies 
Tunisian youth in 
 particular suffer from the 
slow administration and 
inadequate services
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that help construct trust and willingness to engage 
with institutions are essential. When young people 
share their opinions, experiences, and suggestions to 
reduce administrative complexity on an open plat-
form, this helps contribute to data collection, data 
analyses, and better reforms. An online platform 
gathering feedback from administration users in an 
organized manner will persuade policy-makers and 
legislators to consider the direct input of citizens on 
issues relating to their everyday lives.
 - Establish a legal framework to regulate communi-
cation and interaction between citizens and public 
administration using Information and Communi-
cation Technologies (ICT)
Establishing a legal framework to regulate commu-
nication and interaction between public administra-
tion and citizens using ICT is necessary for faster and 
more citizen-friendly change. The internet is broadly 
accessible and presents no time or space barriers for 
individuals to freely participate through sharing lived 
experiences or innovative ideas on improving admin-
istration quality. As user input is needed for evalua-
tion and accountability, ICT represents the best tool 
for youth to participate and engage in ensuring posi-
tive change in the quality of public services. Technol-
ogy can then substantiate accountability, which is a 
fundamental principle of open government. Such an 
approach can also be used for other facilities, includ-
ing courts, the post office, governorates, municipal-
ities, and so on.
 - Develop an e-participation portal accessible to all 
administrations and users
Developing an e-participation portal accessible to 
all administrations and users will help create a live 
platform to facilitate communication and interac-
tion between service providers and users. The portal 
should generate open data and facilitate its reuse. 
Portal development should be based on a participa-
tory approach that involves civil society representa-
tives. Multiple channels of communication should be 
adopted to enable youth to express their opinions, 
make suggestions, share their ideas on public policies 
and programs, and to follow up on their implemen-
tation. The data gathered, together with its analysis 
and subsequent recommendations, should be pub-
lished and communicated to the public through the 
same portal.
58 Namely, “Rights and Freedoms” in Part II of the Constitution, the provisions of Article 32 on the right to information access, and Article 49, which states 
that the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution should be explicated by laws.
In accordance with the relevant provisions of Part 
II of the Constitution,58 the current Data Protection 
Act and related legislation will need to be amended 
so that they meet international standards, especially 
in the ICT field, which would further encourage the 
implementation of e-portals accessible to all.
 - Create quality control divisions in public adminis-
trations
Quality control in public administrations, improving 
the efficiency of processes, and setting fact-based 
policy are critical processes for achieving a level of 
excellence in public services. Therefore, measuring 
quality at both local and national levels would enable 
assessment of the system’s strengths and weak-
nesses, and help enforce improvement. Quality con-
trol divisions should focus on research and collecting 
specific data from citizens for evaluating selected 
quality criteria, including process indicators, out-
come indicators, and structural indicators. Such data 
should include satisfaction ratings, suggestions, and 
complaints. This would reflect the many aspects of 
public service quality to bring about its improvement, 
and institute information-based policies in adminis-
tration.
Jihene Ferchichi is a legal consultant at the 
Houerbi Law Firm in Tunisia. She is also active 
with civil society associations in Tunisia with a 
main focus on developing policies related to civil, 
economic, and political rights.
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FOSTERING DEMOCRATIC 
PARTICIPATION THROUGH CIVIC 
EDUCATION INITIATIVES
Tahar Kechrid
Although the Tunisian transition to a democracy 
stands out in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region as relatively successful, the workings 
of the democratic process remain new and unfamil-
iar, especially among the country’s youth. In partic-
ular, in marginalized regions that have yet to see a 
recognizable payoff from the “democratic dividend,” 
many young people have become disenfranchised and 
disillusioned with the transition. For many, this has 
led to a complete withdrawal from the political pro-
cess, as illustrated by the severely dwindling voting 
rates among young Tunisians. In some cases, frus-
tration and disillusionment have contributed to rad-
icalization or irregular migration. In order to engage 
young  Tunisians, improve their understanding of the 
new political system, and foster democratic partici-
pation, the Tunisian government should strengthen 
and expand civic education programs. This includes: 
revamping the civic education curriculum in collabo-
ration with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry 
of Youth and Sports; learning from and collaborating 
with local and international best practices in civic 
education methods and programs that have proved 
successful in Tunisia; and ensuring a fair and propor-
tional distribution of education and training programs 
throughout all schools.
Although some parts of Tunisian society have seen 
improvements since 2011, many of the major objec-
tives of the Jasmine revolution – mainly targeting 
economic, social, political, and cultural reform – 
remain largely unfulfilled. The intervening years have 
seen countless declarations from Tunisian officials 
and international actors proclaiming their ambitions 
and initiatives to improve the country’s situation. Yet 
the consolidation of many improvements remains 
unfinished, particularly in terms of the current failing 
economic situation, security sector reforms, and the 
implementation of the 2014 Constitution. Progress 
in all these areas has been slow and laden with hin-
59 Sarah Yerkes, “Young People are staying away from Tunisian politics – here’s why,” Brookings, Brookings, March 21, 2017 <www.brookings.edu/blog/
markaz/2017/03/20/young-people-are-staying-away-from-tunisian-politics-heres-why/> (accessed November 7, 2018).
60 Sarah Yerkes, “Where Have All the Revolutionaries Gone?,” Brookings, March 20, 2017 www.brookings.edu/research/where-have-all-the-
revolutionaries-gone/ (accessed November 7, 2018).
61 Sam Kimball, “Tunisia’s Neglected Youth Find their Voice in Hip Hop, Rap,” AP News, May 2, 2015 <www.apnews.
com/3dfddba6f0d64cca83dd203165b759e5> (accessed November 7, 2018).
62 Kimball, “Tunisia’s Neglected Youth.”
63 “Low Voter Turnout of 33.7% Mars Tunisia’s First Free Municipal Elections, PM Youssef Chahed Calls It ‘Negative Sign’,” Firstpost, May 7, 2018 <www.
firstpost.com/world/low-voter-turnout-of-33-7-mars-tunisias-first-free-municipal-elections-pm-youssef-chahed-calls-it-negative-sign-4458471.html> 
(accessed November 7, 2018).
drances, not least due to distrust among the leading 
political parties. The marginalized interior regions of 
Tunisia, as well as Tunisian youth, have been the least 
served by the nation’s actions since the revolution.
Young Tunisians make up roughly sixty percent of 
the national population.59 Yet despite their active 
role in the Jasmine revolution, youth participation 
in the national democratic process has since greatly 
decreased. Paralyzed by disillusion and distrust in 
the central government’s ability to serve their needs, 
a mere 8.8 percent of rural youth and 31.1 percent 
of urban youth claim to have trust in their govern-
ment. In addition, recent surveys have indicated that 
according to seventy percent of youth, “old people 
have too much political influence (compared to just 
49 percent of those over 50).”60 Additionally, polls 
have shown that over seventy percent of Tunisians 
do not believe that policy makers place any impor-
tance on the position and demands of youth.61 Given 
that Tunisia’s current president is 91 years old, and 
that the average voting age at local and national elec-
tions is well over forty, it is evident that there is a 
generational gap, the results of which are reflected 
in the country’s democratic participation. To wit, the 
absence of youth in local and national politics was 
highlighted during the 2015 parliamentary elections, 
which yielded an abysmal voter turnout “with over 80 
percent of Tunisians between 18 and 25 boy cotting 
the ballot.”62 The most recent municipal elections 
yielded a mere 33.7 percent voter turnout, and as 
noted by Prime Minister Youssef Chahed, this turn-
out signaled “a negative sign, a strong message [...] 
for politicians.”63
The situation is particularly dire in the interior 
and southern regions of Tunisia, which historically 
have been largely marginalized. In addition to the 
socio-economic challenges they continue to face, 
these regions lack appropriate representation as 
the country has maintained a highly centralized sys-
tem of government, far removed from the needs of 
more rural Tunisians. Although the Tunisian govern-
ment has been working to introduce a more decen-
tralized system as established by the 2014 Tunisian 
Constitution, progress on implementing concrete 
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legislative initiatives has proven slow. The introduc-
tion of quotas requiring youth to be represented at 
municipal elections has set a precedent for increased 
youth involvement in politics; however, voter turnout 
among youth remains low.
The Value of Education to a Functioning Democ-
racy
A strong foundation in education is essential to the 
success and strength of any modern democratic 
state. Although Tunisian politicians often laud the 
national educational system, pointing out that the 
country has the highest education standards within 
the Arab region, these statements often pertain to 
higher education and do not shed any light on pri-
mary or secondary education. Prime Minister Youssef 
Chahed echoed these sentiments as recently as 2017 
in talks with Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin.64 
Moreover, attention is seldom paid towards the 
value of civic education in the development of young 
 Tunisians.
Civic education is an integral part of a child’s edu-
cation, providing them with the tools necessary to 
contribute constructively to their country’s devel-
opment. UNESCO defines civic engagement and cit-
izenship education as “educating children, from early 
childhood, to become clear-thinking and enlight-
ened citizens who participate in decisions concern-
ing society.”65 Such an initiative for citizen education 
is greatly lacking in the Tunisian educational infra-
structure. Learning about the value and importance 
of civic engagement from a young age could reinvig-
orate young Tunisians’ desire to work together with 
public institutions in the future.
Civic Education Initiatives in Tunisia
A significant move to embed civic education into the 
national school system came about in 1989 when a 
reform was passed to include citizenship as a for-
mal subject. Thereafter, in Tunisian primary and 
sec ondary schools, all students had to attend civic 
education classes. Along with national loyalty and 
patriotism, civic education lessons are intended to 
teach de mocratic participation. Though this is ideal 
in theory, generations of Tunisians had attended civic 
education classes while living under authoritarian 
64 Youssef Chahed, “Tunisia’s Democratic Transition and the Challenge for the Youth,” Leaders, February 14, 2018 <www.leaders.com.tn/article/21664-
youssef-chahed-tunisia-s-democratic-transition-and-the-challenge-for-the-youth> (accessed November 7, 2018).
65 “Citizenship Education for the 21st Century,” UNESCO, <www.unesco.org/education/tlsf/mods/theme_b/interact/mod07task0 3/appendix.htm> 
(accessed November 7, 2018).
66 “Civic Education Conference 2016,” Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, May 30, 2016 <http://www.bpb.de/presse/228490/civic-education-
conference-2016> (accessed November 7, 2018).
rule; therefore, it is difficult to convince pupils today 
that these lessons are in fact crucial to their devel-
opment. Over time, civic education has lost impor-
tance as a subject, and as a result, many schools do 
not even provide proper civic education teachers, 
instead combining civic education with classes on 
Islam, among other methods.
Currently, local organizations such as the Union of 
Independent Tunisians for Liberty (UTIL) as well as 
international organizations, including the Federal 
Agency for Civic Education (bpb) and the Goethe 
Institute in Germany, are contributing to efforts 
to promote political participation. In 2016, the bpb 
and the Goethe Institute hosted the Civic Educa-
tion Conference in Hammamet, which allowed edu-
cation sector representatives and young Tunisians 
to exchange ideas with policy-makers from Tunisia 
and Germany. The conference generated 37 policy 
recommendations promoting civic education as a 
means to increase youth engagement. As indicated in 
their recommendations, the consensus among par-
ticipants pointed to the need for capacity building 
programs for civil society agents and teachers. Other 
recommendations included the creation of cultural 
spaces, and the introduction of modules in teacher 
training programs on inclusion and tolerance in mul-
ticultural societies.66 However, there has since been 
little follow-up or initiative from the Ministry of Edu-
cation (MoE) to build on and implement any of these 
recommendations.
While many international organizations have 
launched initiatives targeting youth participation in 
the democratic process, very few have been real-
ized; nor has any collaboration materialized with the 
national government leading and institutionalizing 
such programs. Similarly, countless youth-led cam-
paigns, including Bawsala, iWatch, Sawty, Jamaity, 
Reso, Manesh Msamhin, Mounaqiboun, and Sayeb 
Trottoir have proven successful in improving young 
people’s national awareness. These initiatives, how-
ever, show no indication of close collaboration or any 
joint endeavors with the national government or any 
ministries. It must also be noted that although civil 
society organizations (CSOs)and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) have received significant inter-
national investments, the formal political sphere has 
been largely overlooked in terms of youth inclusion. 
Chapter I: Decentralization and State-Citizen Relations
31No. 2 | January 2020 – first published in December 2018
REPORT
Recommendations
 - Include civic education in the school curriculum
Reinforcing the provision of civic and political edu-
cation courses and overhauling the national educa-
tion curriculum would provide young Tunisians with 
an early understanding of the importance of demo-
cratic participation, as the 2014 Constitution intends. 
Trained teachers must be selected to oversee these 
courses so that they have a lasting effect.
The MoE needs to make civic educational reforms a 
priority on the school curriculum agenda. Work has 
been done by the Arab Institute for Human Rights 
(IADH) and the Networking Arab Civic Education 
(NACE) platform to coordinate with the MoE and 
pressure it to update teaching manuals to include 
and highlight education on human rights, citizen-
ship, and democracy. The reforms proposed at the 
2016 Civic Education Conference in Hammamet 
should be implemented. The sooner the MoE follows 
the advice of various institutions offering their sup-
port and know-how, the sooner a new and improved 
civic education curriculum can be established and 
implemented throughout the Tunisian public school 
system.
 - Build on the successful work of existing organiza-
tions
Building on the work by NGOs and CSOs already 
active in Tunisia can save national government the 
time and resources required to help forge closer ties 
with youth.
 - Promote new digital technologies
The rise in the use of digital technology in Tunisia 
gives youth an alternative avenue for visibility in poli-
tics, and a new political space for activism promoting 
more government accountability. For example, the 
“Charek Min Darek” (Participate from Home) smart-
phone application explains the electoral processes in 
a simplified manner and provides a broad scope of 
information on each candidate, including their con-
tact information. In a similar way, “Elect Bot” helps 
users register to vote and learn about candidates and 
their platforms, while the “Balad’App” helps Tunisians 
learn about civil society projects in their local com-
munities and awards bonus points for participating in 
or initiating civic activities. The government should 
help promote these technologies to further popular-
ize their use.
 - Seek civic education know-how from established 
international entities
Not only is it important to accept and work with 
international organizations and NGOs working to 
improve civic education standards, it is also essen-
tial to learn from their experiences. The bpb and the 
Goethe Institute are already integrated into Tunisian 
societal activities and initiatives, and these partner-
ships would be ideal for the Tunisian government to 
pursue. Such international cooperation could provide 
a blueprint for an updated and forward-minded civic 
education curriculum, one that is oriented towards 
encouraging democratic participation.
 - Proportionally distribute education and trainings
Marginalized areas of Tunisia must receive equal and 
proportional training opportunities and attention as 
that granted to Tunis, Sousse, Sfax, and other major 
cities. For an implementation of a revised civic edu-
cation program to be feasible, it must be consistently 
applied throughout the country and not limited to 
certain more developed areas.
Tahar Kechrid is a project officer with the Ger-
man Energy Agency (dena). At the time of the 
workshop, he was an MA candidate at the Hertie 
School of Governance in Berlin, where he studied 
International Affairs with a focus on security and 
sustainability. In addition, he worked as a student 
assistant with dena. He previously worked with 
Search for Common Ground (SFCG) in Tunisia, 
where he worked directly with civil society organi-
zations and youth councils throughout the gover-
norates of Tunisia.
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BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN 
CENTER AND CROSS-BORDER 
REGIONS IN TUNISIA – INCLUSIVE 
STRATEGIES TO COPE WITH 
MARGINALIZATION
Giulia Cimini
The prolonged absence or ambivalent presence of the 
state, pressure from the collapse of Libya, and the 
illicit trafficking of goods and people combine to make 
Tunisian southern cross-border areas highly sensitive 
hubs of permanent instability, whose unpredictably 
reverberate both nationally and regionally. Given that 
a shared narrative of exclusion, marginalization, and 
humiliation has successfully mobilized people against 
central authority – which preferred to police and 
securitize these territories and communities rather 
than administer them – there is an urgent need for a 
comprehensive strategy of restoring state legitimacy to 
address both material claims and the feeling of state 
abandonment. Such a strategy would help tackle the 
factors that generate cross-border insecurity in the 
longer-term. In particular, newly elected municipal 
councils should enact new behaviors and styles of gov-
ernance to foster rapprochement between citizens and 
public institutions; civil society organizations should 
constructively work to maintain a fruitful and trust-
ful relationship between the citizenry and its elected 
representatives; and central state authorities should be 
more responsive to local needs.
Tunisia has long centralized political power and 
directed selective development policies towards the 
Sahel (coastal) regions, from where the elites origi-
nated during the Bourguiba and Ben Ali eras. Conse-
quently, inland and southern governorates suffered 
from social and economic marginalization. In particu-
lar, border regions have eluded government authority 
in the sense that they were largely left under-ruled, 
with weak public services and infrastructures. Addi-
tionally, the influence of non-state actors, including 
tribes, clans, and even armed groups, has further 
67 Grégory Chauzal and Sofia Zavagli, “Post-Revolutionary Discontent and F(r)actionalisation in the Maghreb: Managing the Tunisia-Libya Border 
Dynamics,” Clingendael Report, Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, August 2016 <https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/
files/pdfs/Clingendael percent20Report percent20Tunisia-Libya percent20border percent20dynamics percent20-percent20August percent202016_0.pdf> 
(accessed November 8, 2018).
68 Irene Bono et al., L’État d’injustice au Maghreb: Maroc et Tunisie (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 2015); Moncef Kartas, On the Edge? Trafficking and Insecurity 
at the Tunisian–Libyan Border, Working Paper 17, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2013; ICG, 
Tunisie: Lutter Contre L’impunite, Restaurer La Securité, Middle East and North Africa Report No. 123, International Crisis Group, May 9, 2012.
69 Kartas, On the Edge? Trafficking and Insecurity.
70 Max Gallien, “An Economic Malaise Lies at the Heart of Libya-Tunisia Border Standoff,” Middle East Eye, July 30, 2018 <https://www.middleeasteye.net/
columns/economic-malaise-heart-libya-tunisia-border-standoff-883226567> (accessed November 8, 2018).
71 Hamza Meddeb, “Rente Frontalière et Injustice Sociale en Tunisie,” in Irene Bono et al., L’État d’Injustice au Maghreb: Maroc et Tunisie (Paris: Éditions 
Karthala, 2015), pp. 63-98.
isolated these populations by fomenting a feeling of 
“peripheral abandonment.”67 
After the 2010-11 uprisings in Tunisia and the civil 
war in Libya, the subtle equilibrium in these areas 
has been challenged. Indeed, regime change exposed 
the fragility of government structures, particu-
larly in those areas where tribal structures prevail.68 
 Qaddafi’s fall left Tunisia more vulnerable on its 
southern borders with Libya and provoked a re-or-
ganization of contraband cartels, bringing an end 
to the informal agreement they had enjoyed earlier 
with the state. Prior to 2011, in exchange for toler-
ated trafficking – which provided considerable rev-
enue for the area given the poor economic oppor-
tunities otherwise available – the central state relied 
on cartels for controlling the circulation of firearms 
and drugs, and the entry of undocumented people.69 
Even more importantly, the smuggling of licit goods 
leveraged on price differences, tariff evasion, and 
subsidies between neighboring countries was part of 
a vibrant border economy.70 Since law enforcement 
costs would have been too high, the Ben Ali regime 
preferred to keep the system of smuggling in place 
as a safety valve for the local population, assisted by 
key informants who assured security alongside des-
ert borders.71
Remarkably, with the proliferation of jihadis and 
arms in border areas, the existing cartels suddenly 
appeared less effective at local management. Simi-
larly, the arrival of innumerable Libyan refugees had 
a considerable impact on the local economy and 
balance of power. Meanwhile, popular mobilizations 
took place addressing socio-economic grievances 
(the demand for jobs, better services, and infrastruc-
tures), and often-neglected cultural and identity 
claims.
The peculiar nature of the (mostly desert) borders, 
the existence of tribal allegiances that compete with 
state institutions to provide strong bonds of iden-
tity, the involvement of non-state actors and illicit 
flows of goods (and people) favoring an underground 
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economy, as well as the widespread popular feeling 
of abandonment, all point to the undermining of the 
state’s capacity to implement decisions and effective 
control, a situation in which statehood is limited.72 In 
the context of re-configuring Tunisian state insti-
tutions, coupled with fragile regional balances and 
widespread discontent with the political elites, this 
situation is potentially explosive. Although the cur-
rent socio-economic situation in southern Tunisian 
border areas is, in many respects, reminiscent of 
other marginalized regions of the country in terms 
of the potential for destabilization, these areas’ pro-
longed disconnect from central authority more 
markedly exposes impoverished and neglected areas 
at risk of violence confrontations, illegal migration, 
smuggling, and the appeal of terrorism-inspired net-
works.
A Prolonged Disconnect Between the State and 
Tunisian Southern Borderlands
On March 7, 2016, the attack on the town of Ben 
Guerdane, located 25-30 kilometers from Libya in 
the southern Tunisian governorate of Medenine, 
renewed the debate on border security, Islamic State 
(IS)-affiliated groups that have proliferated in the 
area, and the management of fighters returning from 
war in Syria and Libya.73 Likewise, it also highlighted 
the risk of youth radicalization in marginalized areas 
due to a lack of viable alternatives, and the appeal 
of terrorism-inspired networks that appear to offer 
a different option. At the same time, the Ben Guer-
dane case is often praised by security officers as an 
example of successful co-ordination between differ-
ent security bodies, and support from the local popu-
lation, who resisted the terrorists’ attempt to involve 
them in the assault.74
The limits of the state in Tunisia’s south-eastern bor-
der region are primarily evident in the lack of quality 
public services, and mass structural unemployment.75 
72 Thomas Risse (ed.), Governance Without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). On 
the notion of limited statehood in the Tunisian case, see Ruth Hanau-Santini, Limited Statehood in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia: Citizenship, Economy and 
Security (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
73 Shortly after the sunrise, an unknown number of Islamic State jihadists (most likely a cell of 50-100 terrorists) entered Tunisia from Libya and stormed 
a police station and an army barracks, with the aim of seizing the town. The swift response by the National Guard, police, and army succeeded in quelling the 
attack. The death toll included 43 armed militants from ISIS and Ansar al-Sharia, 13 members of the security forces, and seven civilians.
74 Author’s interviews with Tunisian security experts, EU Delegation, French, German and US Embassies, Tunis, November 2015, and April and June 2017.
75 Olfa Lamloum, Marginalisation, Insecurity and Uncertainty on the Tunisian–Libyan Border: Ben Guerdane and Dhehiba from the Perspective of Their 
Inhabitants, International Alert, December 2016.
76 OECD, Études Économiques De L’OCDE: Tunisie 2018 (Paris: Éditions OCDE, 2018).
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Moncef Kartas, “Opinion: Discussions about Border Security Need to Begin with Conversations about Tribes,” Tunisia Live, March 29, 2016.
80 Ibid.
81 In 1910, the French Protectorate and the Ottoman Empire signed the treaty establishing the borders between the two countries that split the Jeffara in 
two.
While the country’s unemployment rate stands at 
around 15 percent, the southern and interior gover-
norates average between 19 percent to 33 percent, 
with Tataouine and Gafsa scoring the highest.76 Sim-
ilarly, according to the regional development index 
elaborated by the Ministry of Development, Invest-
ment and International Cooperation, the south and 
center-west regions performed the worst, including 
Kasserine, Tataouine and Medenine.77 Decades-long 
center-periphery disparities, which benefited the 
capital and coastal territories to the detriment of 
the south and the inner regions, have contributed 
to the general impoverishment of the area, where 
public and private investments are largely absent. 
For instance, private companies are overwhelm-
ing located in Greater Tunis and the coasts. Border 
regions like Tataouine, Medenine, and Kasserine only 
account for 0.9 percent, 3.5 and 2 percent respec-
tively of the national distribution of private compa-
nies.78
Socio-economic exclusion is rooted in cultural and 
identity factors as well. Informal networks and ties 
have long characterized the shared border region 
between Libya and Tunisia, the so-called Jeffara,79 
further emphasizing the existence of a complex 
trans-border sub-system. This undefined region, 
stretching from the island of Djerba to Tripoli, and 
occupied for centuries by a number of semi-nomadic 
Arab and Amazigh tribes, developed in relative iso-
lation from the Ottoman empire.80 French coloniza-
tion, the forced sedentarization of tribes following 
the destruction of the agro-pastoral and caravan 
local economies, as well as militarization and the 
imposition of an arbitrary border,81 have profoundly 
altered local equilibria, and laid the foundations for a 
tormented and ambivalent border history.
Relations with the central state have been charac-
terized by different, and often contrasting features, 
combining abandonment, conflicts, and tacit agree-
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ments.82 Following Ben Ali’s takeover in 1987, and 
despite the presence of police stations in most vil-
lages and neighborhoods marking the presence of an 
omnipresent surveillance apparatus, illicit traffick-
ing in the border regions was not prevented,83 even 
flourishing with the connivance of security forces 
and the protection of patrons well-entrenched within 
the hegemonic governing Democratic Constitutional 
Rally (RCD) party, and also as part of the informal 
agreement between the state and the cartels that 
existed prior to 2011. 
Despite significant differences from case to case 
in terms of tribal allegiances and their roles in the 
cross-border economy,84 border areas in the south 
share a common history of relative marginalization 
and isolation from the central state. This situation 
persisted in both colonial and post-colonial eras, 
producing a discourse of stigmatization to the detri-
ment of local populations. It comes as no surprise 
that the inhabitants of Dehiba and Ben Guerdane, 
the two sole official border crossing points, primarily 
refer to the idea of “marginalization.”85 Moreover, in 
the presence of short-term state management prac-
tices restricted to the renewal of one-off aid grants 
and unemployment-reduction programs creating fic-
titious jobs, it is no exaggeration to state that people 
in these areas feel they are treated as a “labor pool” 
on loan for other regions.86
Equally present at the national level is a stigmatiz-
ing discourse that conflates the south with terrorism 
and smuggling. During the 2014 presidential electoral 
campaign, Mohamed Beji Caid Essebsi called Moncef 
82 The area was marked by resistance to French colonization and violent repressions in response. Similarly, Bourguiba harshly repressed the Youssefist fiefs 
in the South, where the movement found strong support. Remarkably, notwithstanding Bourguiba’s state-formation project pushing the tribes into secrecy, 
tribal organization persisted (on this point, see, for instance, M. Kartas “Opinion.”) Tense relations between the peripheries and central state are epitomized 
by multiple episodes of protests expressing dissatisfaction and anger. More recently, protests spread in Ben Guerdane in August 2010, against the attempt 
of the Trabelsi, the family of Ben Ali’s wife, to extend their circles of power to the border economy of the town. See O. Lamloum, “Marginalisation, Insecurity 
and Uncertainty on the Tunisian-Libyan Border.” As for the controversial “laissez-faire” approach by central authorities towards smuggling as an “economy 
of necessity” in peripheral-border regions, see Hamza Meddeb, Courir Ou Mourir: Course À El Khobza Et Domination Au Quotidien Dans La Tunisie De Ben Ali 
(Thèse de Doctorat en Science Politique, CERI – Sciences Po, 2012); and Hamza Meddeb, Young People and Smuggling in the Kasserine Region of Tunisia: 
Stories of Dispossession and the Dynamics of Exclusion (International Alert, May 2016).
83 Moncef Kartas, “Foreign Aid and Security Sector Reform in Tunisia: Resistance and Autonomy of the Security Forces,” Mediterranean Politics 3 (2014), 
pp. 373–91.
84 For a more accurate analysis of diversity in south-eastern areas of Tunisia, see: O. Lamloum, Marginalisation, Insecurity and Uncertainty on the 
Tunisian–Libyan Border.
85 Ibid.
86 H. Meddeb, “Rente Frontalière et Injustice Sociale en Tunisie.”
87 “Les évolutions budgétaires du ministère de l’Intérieur entre 2011 et 2018,” L’observatoire en ligne du secteur de la sécurité <https://www.observatoire-
securite.tn/fr/evolution-du-budget-du-ministere-de-linterieur-depuis-2011/> (accessed November 12, 2018).
88 State Expenditure [in Arabic] <http://budget.marsad.tn/> (accessed November 11, 2018).
89 Kartas, “Foreign Aid and Security Sector Reform in Tunisia.”
90 According to the Security Assistance Monitor, which tracks US defense assistance programs worldwide, aid to Tunisia for security matters increased by 
200 percent in 2016, and 350 percent compared to pre-revolutionary figures.
91 In comparison to the €23 million program devoted by the European Union to security sector reform, in 2017, the US earmarked over $86 million for 
military and police aid, and $79 million for humanitarian and development assistance. So far, the bulk of US support in security assistance to Tunisia revolves 
around – but is not limited to – two axes: military assistance, both infrastructure and equipment, and training. Assistance to the armed forces focuses 
especially on troops along the borders with Libya.
92 Security Assistance Monitor, “Country Profile: U.S. Security Assistance To Tunisia,” Center for International Policy, April 2015.
Marzouki, his opponent from the south, “the candi-
date of jihadists;” in 2011, Essebsi had courted contro-
versy when he praised the civilized coastal regions, 
implying that those in the south were not on the 
same level.
Shifting the Focus: Securitization as a Substitute 
for Socio-Economic Measures
Despite the persistence of popular demands through 
continuing street protests to refocus state priorities, 
so far, growing terrorist threats have pushed both 
governments and international actors to enhance 
the military’s capabilities and strengthened its posi-
tion to deal with border areas. Under the securiti-
zation mantra, the budget of the Ministry of Interior 
(MoI) has more than doubled since 2011.87 Similarly, 
from 2011 to 2016, the Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) 
budget grew more quickly than that of any other 
ministry.88 In the meantime, while foreign aid has 
targeted mainly the MoI since the uprisings,89 over 
recent last years, the MoD has also become a major 
recipient. Not surprisingly, in 2012 – the year after 
the Jasmine revolution – and in 2016, following three 
major terrorist attacks in the country, these figures 
grew exponentially.90 Between the fiscal years 2011 
and 2014, the US, one of Tunisia’s main technical and 
financial partners in border management and secu-
rity, together with Germany,91 allocated an estimated 
US $121 million in security assistance to Tunisia, cor-
responding to 73 percent of total aid to the country.92
As for the border regions, since August 2013, a 
 buffer zone has been in place in the far south, and 
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military authorities have assumed operational com-
mand in the region.93 In addition, following the June 
2015 Sousse attacks, Tunisia undertook the building 
of a “wall” – which is in fact a moat – at the Libyan 
border. Equipped with electronic surveillance and 
trenches, it is supposed to target cross-border net-
works trafficking arms, drugs, and jihadists, by acting 
as a deterrent and buffer. Such increased “militariza-
tion” of the area, as well as the continuous closures of 
border crossing points, have not succeeded in stop-
ping illicit trade activities or the jihadi threat, not-
withstanding the reduction in the number of official 
crossings, and have ultimately strengthened state 
control of the borders.
Interestingly, these measures seem to have increased 
the sense of insecurity among the local population, 
where over ninety percent of survey respondents 
maintained they were more afraid of the restric-
tions on border trade and the lack of socio-eco-
nomic opportunities than the jihadist assaults.94 The 
resumption of clashes in Ben Guerdane in August 
2018 between police and a group of citizens over a 
delay in the reopening of the Ras Jedir border cross-
ing with Libya are but the last episode in a wave of 
protests that has been simmering over recent years, 
and express a diffused and protracted discontent 
that should not be underestimated. 
Police repression and the use of tear gas on protest-
ers, such as in El Kamour in 2017 or the Kerkennah 
islands in 2016, and the stigmatizing association of 
demonstrators with potential terrorists to discredit 
them, further delegitimize the state in that it is also 
represented by its security forces. Not least, such 
an approach increases the feeling of a lasting colo-
nial-style militarization to manage dissent rather 
delivering on people’s needs.95 If borders are not sur-
prisingly perceived as the “materialization of a spa-
tial and social marginalization” by local populations,96 
heavy-handed measures and a physical barrier ham-
pering border trade that provides the main source of 
livelihood further diminish the building of trust with 
the central state. In Ben Guerdane alone, the infor-
mal trade sector accounts for twenty percent of the 
93 Presidential Decree No. 2013-230 of August 29, 2013 on the border buffer zone, Official Journal of the Republic of Tunisia, No. 71 (September 3, 2013), 
pp. 2851-2.
94 O. Lamloum, “Marginalisation, Insecurity and Uncertainty on the Tunisian-Libyan Border.”
95 Corinna Mullin and Brahim Rouabah, “Decolonizing Tunisia’s Border Violence: Moving Beyond Imperial Structures and Imaginaries,” Viewpoint Magazine, 
February 1, 2018.
96 Habib Ayeb, “Après Ben-Guerdane: Dépossessions, Déstructurations Et Insécurité Alimentaire Dans Le Sud-Est Tunisien,” Jadaliyya, April 23, 2016.
97 Lotfi Ayadi et al., Estimating Informal Trade Across Tunisia’s Land Borders, Policy Research Working Papers (The World Bank, 2013).
98 “Demande relative à l’établissement du statut de «Région-victime» de Kasserine,” Avocats Sans Frontières and Forum Tunisien pour les droits 
economiques et sociaux, June 2015 <https://asf.be/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ASF_TUN_R--gionVictime_201506_FR.pdf> (accessed December 5, 
2018). See also: Lana Salman, “What We Talk About When We Talk About Decentralization? Insights from Post-Revolution Tunisia,” L’Année Du Maghreb, 
2017, pp. 91–108.
region’s active population, with goods worth around 
TND 600 million entering Tunisia informally every 
year.97
The feeling of abandonment and hogra (a mixture of 
humiliation, exclusion, and oppression) unites bor-
der regions, and is reflected, among other things, in 
the application by the governorate of Kasserine for 
“victimized region” status to Tunisia’s Truth and Dig-
nity Commission (Instance Vérité et Dignité, IVD), 
together with a claim for reparations.98 And it is in 
Kasserine that people “welcomed” President Essebsi 
by chanting the same slogan addressed to Ben Ali in 
2011, namely “dégage!” (Get out!). Mistrust vis-à-vis 
formal state institutions and the poor legitimacy they 
enjoy are also reflected in very low electoral partici-
pation, such as Tataouine’s low (28 percent) turnout 
in the municipal elections of May 2018.
Given that feelings of abandonment and punishment 
are prominent in the discourse of border region 
inhabitants, and the prolonged disconnect between 
local communities and central authority – which 
preferred to police and securitize these territories 
rather than administering them – the perception of 
the state is fundamental in the context of (re-)build-
ing institutions. Hence, a renewed state architec-
ture based on inclusion and aimed at overcoming its 
“limits” needs to involve both practice and discourse, 
which are mutually reinforcing. This would help 
reduce the existing gap between the central state 
and its southern borderlands, and address material 
claims while strengthening state legitimacy, a sense 
of inclusion, and national identity.
Recommendations
 - Municipal councils should work on rapprochement 
between citizens and public institutions, enhancing 
accountability and responsiveness
Enjoying a degree of legitimacy granted by the polls, 
municipal councilors have a great responsibility 
to enact new behaviors and styles of governance. 
Hence, on a regular basis, they should:
Chapter I: Decentralization and State-Citizen Relations
36
REPORT
No. 2 | January 2020 – first published in December 2018
 - carry out awareness campaigns on service delivery 
and inform citizens about the issues they intend to 
address in the given financial year;
 - hold consultations with citizens on their needs and 
wants;
 - hold weekly or monthly public hearings with citizens 
to collect, examine, and implement specific dossiers; 
and
 - record the measures adopted to solve the issue, 
either individually and on-site, or through the 
Municipal Council. If the problem cannot be solved 
locally, official written reports should be submitted 
to the governor or minister concerned.
 - Local civil society organizations (CSOs) should con-
structively work to maintain a trustful and fruitful 
relationship between elected representatives and 
citizens
Without renouncing to their watchdog role, CSOs 
play a key role in supporting local councilors and 
members of parliament in formulating effective solu-
tions to meet the needs of the citizens they repre-
sent, and facilitating citizen participation in public 
affairs management, in accordance with good gov-
ernance best practices. Hence, they should organize 
workshops and meetings to sensitize the local com-
munity to various aspects of service delivery, the role 
of institutions, their function, tasks, and resources. 
They should operate in synergy with other associ-
ations in the area, avoiding duplication of initiatives 
and the dispersion of funds. In addition, local CSOs 
should connect citizens and elected representatives 
through information and communication technolo-
gies (ICTs), such as digital platforms or mobile appli-
cations that help people interact, look for specific 
issues, and the persons in charge.
 - Political parties at the central level and deci-
sion-makers need to promptly recognize and effec-
tively respond to local needs, establishing and rein-
forcing a common sense of belonging
To guarantee primary loyalty to the state rather than 
non-state actors, including tribal allegiances and ter-
rorist networks, central authorities should increase 
local spending, not for short-term assistance projects 
or unemployment programs, but by planning a sus-
tainable road map to improve infrastructures (roads, 
hospitals, schools) and create incentives for factories 
or start-ups. In addition, they should loosen the grip 
of militarization and the effect of being “under siege” 
by promoting an image of the security forces at the 
service of population.
Central authorities should use national media out-
lets and personal statements to promote a discursive 
framework of inclusion by valorizing the contribution 
that different backgrounds bring to national devel-
opment. Moreover, local councils need to be empow-
ered as primary intermediaries between citizens and 
the central state by assuring financial independence. 
The recent adoption of the Code on Local Authori-
ties is a first step in this direction, but the legislator 
still needs to clarify a number of issues, including the 
specific role of the governor and elected representa-
tives locally, and the financial resources municipali-
ties will have at their disposal. Finally, central author-
ities should increase the presence on the ground of 
state representatives (ministerial delegations, presi-
dential ambassadors, and MPs) through regular visits 
outside electoral periods.
Giulia Cimini is a post-doctoral researcher at the 
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workshop, she worked as a Teaching Assistant in 
Politics at the Università L’Orientale of Naples, 
where she defended her PhD with a dissertation 
entitled “The changing nature and role of politi-
cal parties in post-2011 Tunisia and Morocco.” Her 
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RADICALIZATION IN THE 
MARGINALIZED REGIONS OF 
TUNISIA – ADDRESSING THE ROOT 
CAUSES
Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi
Since the 2011 revolution, jihadist radicalism has dra-
matically increased in Tunisia, leading the country to 
become one of the main centers for al-Qaeda and ISIS 
affiliates, as well as one of the largest exporters of for-
eign fighters in the Middle East: over 3,000  Tunisians 
are estimated to have travelled to Iraq, Syria, and 
Libya. Youth radicalization rates are among the high-
est in the region and the country has been the target of 
several terrorist attacks by young Tunisians, includ-
ing attacks at the Bardo National Museum and the 
resort town of Sousse in 2015. Although the Tunisian 
government has recognized the problem of radicaliza-
tion in general and youth radicalization in particular, 
it has often been criticized for focusing on a securi-
tized response and the provision of counter-terrorism 
measures. This is especially the case in the inner and 
southern regions of the country. However, without a 
comprehensive, long-term strategy aimed at address-
ing the structural and individual drivers of radicaliza-
tion and preventing young Tunisians from succumbing 
to jihadist ideology, the government is likely to con-
tinue to fail in its attempts to curb the growth of rad-
icalization
Although it is often difficult to identify a linear pro-
cess or single route towards forms of violent extrem-
ism, it is probable that a combination of push and pull 
factors come together in the various paths leading 
to radicalization. The push factors – also defined as 
political factors – denote the various contexts and 
structural conditions that facilitate the creation of 
violent extremist groups. Such factors include gov-
ernance deficit, state failure, absence of the rule of 
law, and grievances arising from disenfranchisement 
and marginalization.99 Pull factors, on the other hand, 
are normally linked to individual identity in a social or 
psychological sense, and elements that make violent 
extremist ideas and groups appealing. Pull factors 
include religion and ethnicity, but also more imme-
diate causes that can contribute to the perception of 
exclusion, such as the experience of prison or judicial 
99 Brian Bacon et al., “The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency: Putting Principles into Practice,” USAID, September 2011, p. 4 
<https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/VEI_Polic y_Final.pdf> (accessed November 6, 2018).
100 Louise I. Shelley, “Corruption and Youth’s Recruitment into Violent Extremism,” in Marco Lombardi et al. (eds), Countering Radicalisation and Violent 
Extremism among Youth to Prevent Terrorism, Human and Societal Dynamics, vol. 118, IOS Press, pp. 37–47.
101 Lisa Watanabe and Fabien Merz, “Dealing with Jihadi Radicalisation in Tunisia,” Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, January 10, 2018 <https://
institute.global/insight/co-existence/dealing-jihadi-radicalisation-tunisia> (accessed November 6, 2018).
injustice, human rights abuses by security forces, the 
death of a loved one, the desire for revenge, or the 
pursuit of status.100
The Root Causes of Radicalization – The Tunisian 
Context
Parts of Tunisia, notably in the interior and areas 
bordering Libya and Algeria, present the structural 
conditions that often produce vulnerability to rad-
icalization among the population, and principally 
youth. Since 2014 for instance, the Islamic State 
(IS) has managed to attract large numbers of young 
 Tunisians to Iraq, Syria, and Libya, offering spiritual 
and material incentives that appeal to those who 
believe their grievances have been ignored.101
One such structural grievance is high unemploy-
ment and the floundering economy in marginalized 
regions, where economic development is very limited 
in comparison to the main coastal cities. Southern 
regions, and especially the governorate of  Tataouine, 
have some of the highest unemployment rates in 
the country at around thirty percent, over twice 
the national average (14.8 percent). Unemployment 
rates for university graduates are significantly higher 
(about fifty percent). High unemployment levels and 
a weak economy often provide the main context in 
which mass mobilization becomes viable. Unem-
ployed youth are particularly targeted and exploited 
by extremist groups who brainwash and trick them 
into joining in exchange for economic rewards. In 
Tunisia, unemployed youth have often joined IS and 
Structural conditions in 
interior and border regions 
produce vulnerability to 
radicalization
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similar groups because of the jobs, housing, and other 
monetary incentives provided.102
A further structural factor often perceived as facil-
itating radicalization in marginalized regions in 
 Tunisia is the feeling of socio-economic exclusion. 
Many inhabitants of the southern region complain 
about the lack of services and infrastructural devel-
opment, and believe that their marginalization is con-
trolled and deliberately pursued by the ruling elite.103 
This is particularly the case in Tataouine, which con-
tains a large proportion of Tunisian oil fields (about 
forty percent of national production). Nevertheless, 
the population fails to benefit from higher levels of 
employment, redistribution of state resources, or 
the provision of services, such as the construction of 
schools and hospitals, or road development.
Unemployment and the lack of services inevitably 
lead to disaffection with local and central authori-
ties, whose legitimacy is very weak. They are often 
perceived as corrupt and responsible for the area’s 
socio-economic marginalization.104 This is illustrated 
by the large number of local protests against corrup-
tion and the state of the economy.105
Finally, one frequently neglected pull factor is 
recruitment along tribal, religious, or ethnic lines. 
One study has highlighted that the various Islamic 
State-trained insurgents who staged the assault in 
Ben Gardane were from the R’baya’ tribe, whose bor-
102 Watanabe and Merz, “Dealing with Jihadi Radicalisation.”
103 Anouar Boukhars, “The Potential Jihadi Windfall from the Militarization of Tunisia’s Border Region with Libya,” Combating Terrorism Center, vol. 11, issue 
1, January 2018 <https://ctc.usma.edu/potential-jihadi-windfall-militarization-tunisias-border-region-libya/> (accessed November 6, 2018).
104 Lisa Watanabe, “Preventing Violent Extremism in Tunisia,” Policy Perspectives 6, no. 3 (May 2018) <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-
interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP6-3.pdf> (accessed November 6, 2018).
105 For instance, this perception led to a demonstration in Tataouine in 2017, where protesters expressed their anger at the rumors of hidden oil reserves 
and government collusion on deals with foreign multinational corporations. Earlier in 2016, young people had gathered together to ask the local government 
for employment at local oil and gas production sites.
106 Hamza Meddeb, “Precarious Resilience: Tunisia’s Libyan Predicament,” Istituto Affari Internazionali, MENARA Papers, Future Notes 5, April 2017 <http://
www.iai.it/sites/default/files/menara_fn_5.pdf> (accessed November 6, 2018).
107 Watanabe and Merz, “Dealing with Jihadi Radicalisation in Tunisia.”
der economy interests and land claims have histori-
cally been marginalized by the Twazine tribe.106
The Government’s Response
Aware of the challenge radicalization presents to the 
country’s long-term stability, the Tunisian govern-
ment has taken several measures, all of which are 
characterized by a heavy-handed security approach. 
One such measure has been to exert more control 
over the religious sphere. The secularization that 
took place under former President Ben Ali is deemed 
by the present government to have caused a lack of 
knowledge of Islam and, in turn, facilitated the spread 
of extremist ideas.107 The government thus reinstated 
preachers and imams in mosques that had fallen out-
side the authorities’ control, closed Islamic charities 
with suspected links to terrorism, and designated the 
Salafi movement Ansar Al-Sharia as a terrorist orga-
nization. While these measures may have reduced 
opportunities for recruitment and the promotion of 
extremist ideology, they most likely also hampered 
the credibility of official religious figures, further lim-
iting the number of role models for the community.
Tunisian authorities have also adopted repressive 
measures, such as raids and house searches, often 
relying on extraordinary powers that enable police 
officers to act without judicial authorization, or by 
carrying out indiscriminate arrests. This over-re-
liance on arrests and repression, however, has 
intensified popular animosity towards the local and 
national authorities – including the police and secu-
rity forces – thus further stimulating the structural 
drivers of radicalization.
Following the March 2016 attack by IS militants in Ben 
Gardane, the government also militarized the border 
region with Libya to prevent the informal movement 
of people and goods between the two countries. 
However, such an approach has also been considered 
counterproductive: contraband trade with Algeria 
and Libya is often the only form of employment in 
the region. Furthermore, control over criminal activ-
ity and the trafficking of illegal substances has also 
The Tunisian  government 
has responded with a 
heavy-handed security 
approach
Chapter I: Decentralization and State-Citizen Relations
39No. 2 | January 2020 – first published in December 2018
REPORT
created more openings for corruption in national 
institutions, such as the Tunisian army, which had 
previously enjoyed higher levels of legitimacy.108
As a result of the government’s approach, the eco-
nomic situation has worsened, the authorities’ legit-
imacy has decreased, and religious role models have 
been weakened, leading to a strengthening of the 
structural drivers of radicalization and failure of the 
intended goals.
Recommendations
 - Involve more ministries when designing and imple-
menting the strategy to curb the drivers of radical-
ization
The government should involve not only the Ministry 
of Interior, which deals with security issues, but also 
include the Ministry of Youth, the Ministry of Reli-
gious Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry 
of Economy. This will engender a more comprehen-
sive approach and avoid an over-reliance on a secu-
rity-based strategy.
 - Work with official religious figures, training them to 
promote peace and anti-extremism, and help them 
establish themselves as community role models
Such an approach will enable the government to 
establish a stronger connection with religious lead-
ers and maintain some form of control over their 
discourse by training them on religious matters. In 
doing so, it will enable religious leaders to effectively 
counter the propaganda of extremist groups, and 
support vulnerable youth seeking spiritual guidance.
 - In marginalized regions, reduce the sense of 
socio-economic exclusion and clarify that no eco-
nomic or political discrimination takes place
The government should boost regional investments 
to create employment opportunities, support entre-
preneurial activities, and address the lack of services. 
Some of these activities, such as service provision, 
should be delegated to local authorities, thus increas-
ing their legitimacy for local communities. The gov-
ernment should focus on the economic development 
of border areas and the integration of those who 
normally rely on the informal economy into the for-
mal economy. The strategy should also consider the 
108 Boukhars, “The Potential Jihadi Windfall.”
grievances of tribes that are particularly marginalized 
and vulnerable to recruitment by violent groups.
 - National and local authorities should reach out to 
the citizens in marginalized regions and address 
their perceptions of corruption and social injustice
This approach will enhance political inclusion, 
encourage youth participation in politics, and 
increase the legitimacy of national and local insti-
tutions. It will also provide citizens with the feeling 
that the government is aware of and responsive to 
the concerns of people living in marginalized regions.
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PRISON AND REHABILITATION 
OFFICIALS AND THE RETURN 
OF ISLAMIC STATE FIGHTERS TO 
TUNISIA
Arwa Ben Ahmed
In the context of rehabilitation and deradicalization 
processes in prisons, Tunisia faces a significant threat: 
the return of many Islamic State (IS) fighters, whose 
homecoming has also posed a huge national security 
challenge. In addition, there is disagreement between 
various political parties and national organizations 
over how to deal with the returnees. Rejectionists have 
called for stripping them of their Tunisian citizen-
ship, which contravenes the provisions of both Article 
15 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the Tunisian Constitution of 2014. Others have 
supported the notion of return and the need to deal 
with returnees fairly through the application of severe 
sanctions. But key issues remain concerning whether 
prison and rehabilitation officials are sufficiently 
trained and equipped to implement these sanctions, 
and what reform structure should be implemented. 
To address these challenges, the Tunisian state should 
introduce targeted education and training programs 
for prison officials who work with extremist prison-
ers, provide sufficient financial, human and material 
resources, and ensure that that Tunisian prisons meet 
international standards. 
With the growth in foreign terrorist fighters join-
ing the Islamic State (IS), the UN Security Council 
has called via the unanimous adoption of resolution 
2170(2014) for member states to “take national mea-
sures to prevent fighters from travelling from their 
soil to join the groups, reiterating obligations under 
previous counter-terrorism resolutions to prevent 
the movement of terrorists, as well as their supply 
with arms or financial support. It expressed readi-
ness to consider putting on the sanctions list those 
who facilitated the recruitment and travel of foreign 
fighters.”109 The resolution explicitly uses the term 
“foreign terrorist fighters,” defined as “individuals 
109 “Security Council Adopts Resolution 2170 (2014) Condemning Gross, Widespread Abuse of Human Rights by Extremist Groups in Iraq, Syria,” UN 
Security Council Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, August 15, 2014 <https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11520.doc.htm> (accessed November 8, 
2018).
110 “Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/foreign-terrorist-fighters/> 
(accessed November 8, 2018).
111 See endnote ii.
112 Sarah Mersche, “Tunisia’s Ineffective Counterterrorism Law,” Carnegie Endowment, August 6, 2015 <http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/60958> 
(accessed November 23, 2018).
113 “Tunisie : Le gouvernement présente de nouvelles propositions pour l’amendement de la loi sur la lute contre le terrorisme,” Directinfo, October 9, 2018 
<https://directinfo.webmanagercenter.com/2018/10/09/tunisie-le-gouvernement-presente-de-nouvelles-propositions-pour-lamendement-de-la-loi-sur-
la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme/> (accessed November 8, 2018).
who travel to a state other than their state of resi-
dence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetra-
tion, planning or preparation of, or participation in, 
terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terror-
ist training, including in connection with armed con-
flict.”110 Under international law, fighters are entitled 
to use force in armed conflicts. They cannot be held 
accountable for their actions in the context of war, 
but terrorist fighters do not enjoy such protection.111
Notwithstanding repeated denials by states of their 
responsibility to deal with terrorist fighters, espe-
cially if returned or extradited from foreign coun-
tries, civil society assistance in rehabilitation has 
been shown to mitigate the consequences of return. 
In response, the UN Security Council adopted Reso-
lution 2178 calling on countries to take legislative and 
practical steps to prevent and respond to the phe-
nomenon.
The State’s Response to the Return of Tunisian 
Terrorist Fighters
According to an announcement by the Minister of 
the Interior at the Tunisian Parliament on Decem-
ber 23, 2016, around 3,000 Tunisians had joined IS 
in Syria and Iraq, of whom over 800 had returned to 
the country. He further acknowledged that 160 fight-
ers were in prison. The terrorist threat has increased 
with the attacks in Sousse and the Bardo Museum in 
Tunis in 2015. The government’s first reaction was 
the adoption of a new counter-terrorism law in 2015, 
which has been criticized by several legal specialists 
and human rights organizations.112 The law uses a 
broad definition of terrorism and results in multiple 
violations of criminal procedure in terms of deten-
tion, prosecution, and human rights. Because of the 
law’s deficiencies and the criticism it has attracted, 
the counter-terrorism law in Tunisia will be sub-
ject to amendments.113 On a political level, former 
president Monsef Marzouki has suggested a repen-
tance law, which was supported by the Ennahda 
party. In 2016, the current president, Beji Caid Sebsi, 
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announced that “Tunisia does not have enough pris-
ons [for] all returning jihadists from conflict zones.”114
The return of Tunisian terrorist fighters has prompted 
the government to adopt a national strategy, which 
is expected to produce a roadmap to confront and 
eradicate these threats by various political, economic, 
diplomatic, and military means. The government fur-
ther announced its aim to implement a deradical-
ization program with support from the international 
community. National measures include the establish-
ment of the Tunisian Centre for Research and Stud-
ies on Terrorism in October 2016, which analyses the 
causes and reasons behind regional and global ter-
rorism. 
Tunisia has the right to defend its sovereignty, secu-
rity, and stability by establishing a clear security 
strategy based on the principle of legal determina-
tion, strengthening security efforts, and activating 
national mechanisms and international cooperation. 
However, while Tunisia is currently following a secu-
rity-centered approach to terrorism and radicaliza-
tion, including the expansion of police forces in every 
corner of the country, it has yet to develop a clear 
approach and strategy towards deradicalization in 
prisons. The key issues are whether prison officials 
and prisons in general are ready to deal with this kind 
of prisoner, and to what extent their training and 
educational background and standards allow them 
to manage violent extremist prisoners. A preventive 
security policy would be crucial in this regard.
Recommendations
 - Introduce targeted education and training pro-
grams for prison officials who work with extremist 
prisoners
Reforming prisons and rehabilitation institutions in 
Tunisia is part of the criminal justice reform process. 
This includes implementing an effective reform strat-
egy for officials to deal with extremists from legal, 
sociological, and psychological perspectives, and set-
ting up training programs to strengthen the educa-
tional framework for officers in partnership with civil 
society organizations, under the supervision of gov-
ernmental and non-governmental institutions. Train-
ing for prison officials should include courses on 
understanding violent extremism, identifying signs of 
extremism leading to violence, evaluating extremist 
prisoners, and dealing with individual and collective 
114 Tarek Kahlaoui, “Tunisia needs a deradicalisation strategy for returning ‘terrorists’,” Middle East Eye, December 15, 2016 <https://www.middleeasteye.
net/columns/deradicalisation-strategy-face-tunisian-terrorists-returnees-2155969> (accessed November 8, 2018).
violence while protecting prisoners using minimum 
force and observing ethical and professional stan-
dards. In addition, a psychological understanding of 
prisoners can play an active role in disengagement 
and reducing criminality by providing psychologi-
cal treatment through recreational activities. Mod-
ernizing the educational framework is key. Officials 
working with extremist prisoners should possess the 
required skills, and this should start with the recruit-
ment phase.
In addition to the role of education in rehabilitating 
extremist prisoners, it is also important to provide 
the opportunity for follow-up education outside 
prison, through a process evaluating adjustment and 
reintegration after imprisonment. Moreover, correct-
ing misconceptions about religion through construc-
tive dialogue with prison officials is also beneficial. 
Training programs organized by the Ministry of Inte-
rior, the Ministry of Justice, and civil society orga-
nizations should involve security experts and prison 
and rehabilitation officials to assist in reform efforts. 
Decision-makers can also cooperate to implement a 
code of conduct for Tunisian prison officials to meet 
international norms and conform to the Tunisian 
context.
 - Learn from best practices
The exchange of experience and joint plans in crim-
inal investigations and information analysis, along 
with the activation of national mechanisms to 
develop means of control, can help promote respect 
for the rule of law, and further achieve the difficult 
balance between respect for human rights and the 
application of law. Good practices in this field can be 
observed in the experiences of other countries.
In this context, the Danish “Aarhus model” is worth 
mentioning. This model, followed by the Danish 
Prison and Probation Service, aims to create trust 
between the authorities and the social circles in 
which radicals operate, helping individuals find a 
A preventive security 
 policy is crucial
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path back into society through a deradicalization 
process.115 Individuals such as returning fighters 
or radicals who want to fight abroad are assigned 
trained mentors. Under this approach pioneered by 
Preben Bertelsen at Aarhus University, prisoners also 
receive psychological counselling and dialogue with 
prison officials, and encouraged to think about crit-
ical life decisions and evaluate their actions.116 This 
model can be a useful example for good prison prac-
tices and management strategies.
 - Ensure the application of the rule of law
Dealing with this category of prisoner also entails 
respecting the principle of fair trial and the pro-
tection of national security as enacted by the 2015 
Anti-Terrorism and the Prevention of Money Laun-
dering Law. This legal framework is essential, espe-
cially when focusing on a unified judicial approach in 
the fight against terrorism. The 2015 law tightens the 
existing penalties and supplements them with new 
penalties. However, interpretation of the law requires 
input from legal experts. For example, the provisions 
of article 13 and 14 concerning terrorist offenses and 
penalties indicate that any Tunisian involved in ter-
rorist actions outside the country must face a prison 
sentence. It requires legal expertise to prove any 
such involvement.
 - Base treatment on a case-by-case assessment
IS members have diverse profiles: some Tunisians 
who joined the group are known to the police for 
their criminal records, and have never been religious. 
Given that the profiles of potential terrorists differ, 
appropriate treatment should be accorded to each 
group depending on the level of danger they pre-
sent to society, their age, sex, criminal record, etc. 
For example, child detention centers can be used to 
separate children involved in violent acts from other 
prisoners.
There is also a difference between terrorists who 
have committed dangerous crimes, who have strong 
connections and networks with extremist groups, 
and those who joined IS for other reasons, such as 
money or glory, or who have been brainwashed. 
115 David Crouch and Jon Henley, “A way home for jihadis: Denmark’s radical approach to Islamic extremism,” The Guardian, February 23, 2015 <https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/23/home-jihadi-denmark-radical-islamic-extremism-aarhus-model-scandinavia> (accessed November 8, 2018).
116 Ibid.
117 “Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons,” UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime, New York, 2016 <https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pd f> (accessed November 8, 2018).
118 “Deradicalizazion in Tunisian Prisons,” Search for Common Ground, July 24, 2017 <https://www.sfcg.org/deradicalization-tunisian-prisons/> (accessed 
November 8, 2018).
In this regard, a classification strategy should be 
observed.
 - Ensure prisons conform to international standards
Rehabilitation centers help provide for the psy-
chological, physical, and intellectual rehabilitation 
of prisoners to become active members of society 
once they have served their sentences. Such centers 
should function as comprehensive disciplinary bod-
ies that evaluate prisoners in their daily work, moral 
views, and qualifications. They are also the most 
effective way to impose a new reality on extremist 
prisoners. To make reform work and achieve change, 
it is necessary to implement best practices117 and 
improve skills. For Tunisian prisons to meet interna-
tional standards, they should first avoid the short-
comings of the penal system, including poor con-
ditions and overcrowding in Tunisian prisons and 
reform centers.118 
In addition, violent behavior in prisons should be 
counteracted through the provision of academic 
and sports activities to reduce violent behavior and 
improve moral discipline. Within this framework, the 
prison system has begun implementing a training 
program in partnership with international organiza-
tions to develop new ways of dealing with prisoners 
and reducing extremism. This initiative is a positive 
step towards reform.
 - Provide human and material resources
Modern legislative policy aims to enforce a new 
administrative and technical organization, consis-
tent with reformist theories in favor of deradical-
ization programs, and prisoner rehabilitation. The 
recruitment of specialized individuals from different 
backgrounds, such as security and policing special-
ists, consultants, and psychologists, is essential to 
assist officials in their everyday interactions with r e-
turnees. This could be achieved by the introduction 
of effective selection criteria and vetting for officials. 
Since prison officials themselves generally have a 
similar religious background to the foreign fighters, 
a prudent and vigilant recruitment and training pro-
cess is crucial.
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 - Provide financial resources
On January 19, 2016, the Tunisian Prime Minister 
adopted a number of measures to improve prisons by 
developing the penal system and reviewing the legal 
framework. There is also a need to introduce a system 
that respects human rights, one that takes the provi-
sions of the new Constitution and international stan-
dards into account. In this context, finance is one of 
the most important elements to ensure institutional 
stability and reform, and progress in rehabilitation. 
Therefore, providing prison institutions with the rel-
evant means – including security equipment, sanitary 
equipment, and adequate means of transport – helps 
improve rehabilitation efficiency. Better financing 
would also contribute to a reduction in overcrowd-
ing through the construction of new prison units 
that meet international standards. Designing special 
prison units together with the relevant departments 
could be achieved through international coopera-
tion, and an enhanced understanding of the profiles 
of extremist prisoners.
Arwa Ben Ahmed works as a counter-terrorism 
project officer at the British Embassy in Tunis. 
At the time of the workshop, she worked at the 
United States Institute of Peace (USIP) as part of 
the Security Sector Reform Project team. Arwa 
is a member of the International Student Young 
Pugwash (ISYP) and a PhD student, research-
ing illicit trade and arms transfers in the MENA 
Region.
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TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE WATER 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND 
FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN TUNISIA
Darius Görgen
Tunisia is overusing its renewable water resources at 
the same time as groundwater resources are rapidly 
being depleted. Rural livelihoods depend on the avail-
ability of water for agriculture, and the country is heav-
ily dependent on food imports. The suspected effects 
of climate change and associated decrease in water 
availability make immediate action to manage com-
peting water demands imperative. In the context of the 
new right to water for all, established by the post-rev-
olutionary 2014 Constitution, water access for the 
rural poor is directly linked to the political legitimacy 
of the government. Instead of favoring export-ori-
ented large-scale agricultural businesses, water and 
agricultural policies need to develop the potential of 
small-scale agriculture to increase employment rates 
and contribute to food sovereignty. Thus, the impor-
tance of a water-efficient and well-functioning agri-
cultural sector based on small-scale farms to achieve 
social equity and environmental stability needs to be 
prioritized in policy-making processes.
Water may be the most important resource of all, in 
terms of social cohesion and equity in Tunisia. Rural 
livelihoods depend mainly on agriculture as the main 
source of income, and agricultural activities are con-
tingent upon the availability of water. Without water, 
agricultural activities in the countryside cannot be 
maintained in the medium- to long-term. A current 
study shows that small-scale farmers are most likely 
to be affected by decreasing water availability and 
most vulnerable to falling below the poverty line.1 
Declining precipitation rates due to climate change 
and untargeted agricultural policies leave the rural 
poor highly vulnerable to changes in water availabil-
ity. The consequences include the possible cessation 
of agricultural activities in some regions and the 
associated loss of income together with an increase 
in rural-urban migration. This also affects national 
food sovereignty, since Tunisia is highly dependent 
on costly food imports.
As state policies on water access and use seriously 
affect the lives of one-third of the rural population, 
they also directly impact on the overall democrati-
zation process. First, current policies do not support 
small-scale agricultural activities, and second, they 
1 Hacib El Amami, “How does groundwater depletion contribute to unequal access to the resource among classes of farmers? Evidences from caste 
studies in the center of Tunisia,” International Journal of Hydrology 2, no.4 (2018), pp. 445-51.
do not adequately address declining water resources. 
The decrease in water resources seriously limits the 
potential of agricultural and rural development, thus 
endangering the social cohesion of the state if tar-
geted policies are not put in place. Therefore, the 
question to be evaluated is how state actors can 
address diminishing water and land resources by 
supporting rural development and national food sov-
ereignty, and ensuring social equity.
Marginalization of the Rural Poor
In the case of modern Tunisia, rural-urban conflict is 
by no means a new phenomenon. Colonial times saw 
the development of urban centers, and resource flows 
were concentrated and directed to the cities to sup-
port the living standards of the colonizers and their 
trading activities. Agriculture was promoted in rural 
areas, but rural development was again limited to the 
colonizers’ needs. In the first decades after  Tunisia’s 
independence in 1956, agricultural policies were 
driven by the idea of collectivism, so that arable land 
was jointly managed by state businesses. Accordingly, 
water policies were aimed at providing water to these 
companies and an extensive water-transfer infra-
structure was created. This development supported 
the emergence of rural notables who had the power 
to allocate resources and could thus establish a clien-
telist power system which hindered equal access to 
water infrastructure from the outset.
In the early 1980s, the Tunisian government aimed 
at participation in the global market. Thus, liberal-
ization policies were put in place, and state-owned 
companies were broken up. Unfortunately, rural 
families and small-scale agriculture businesses could 
not profit from these initiatives. Rather, the new pol-
icies favored large-scale, export-oriented private 
companies which were able to secure their share in 
the distribution of land and water, while rural fam-
ilies were forced to diversify their income sources, 
and were either driven out of agriculture or had to 
increase production through implementing irrigation 
practices. At the same time, Tunisia experienced very 
high urban population growth, and thus water was 
directed to the cities to supply the needs of their cit-
izens.
Nevertheless, agricultural policies supported the 
growth and export of crops for the international 
market since the increase in state income was seen 
as the most important target. This led to the loss of 
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food sovereignty in Tunisia, which today is dependent 
on imported, heavily subsidized food products. The 
food crisis of 2010, caused by cuts to these subsidies, 
was one of the triggers that eventually resulted in the 
revolutionary uprisings against the Ben Ali regime, 
when one part of the population was no longer able 
to afford basic food. Human history is littered with 
examples of how the food-water complex is directly 
linked to the political stability of regimes: if food or 
water are not available at affordable prices, the prob-
ability of political uprisings is significantly increased.
Current Water Availability
In 2014, the National Assembly adopted a new Con-
stitution. Article 14 states that the right to water shall 
be guaranteed, and that the conservation and ratio-
nal use of water is a duty of both the state and soci-
ety. Existing renewable water resources are already 
overused, and climate change projections indicate a 
possible reduction of approximately thirty percent in 
the coming decades, due to rising temperatures and 
decreasing annual rainfall. While about 87 percent of 
the population had access to piped water services 
in 2015, only 68 percent of the rural population had 
access to equal services.2 Eighty percent of water 
resources is allocated to agriculture, leaving twenty 
percent shared between the domestic, industrial, and 
tourism sectors.
The water law currently in force is based on a code 
from 1975.3 Agriculture subsidies, which also stayed 
in place after the revolution, support the growth 
2 “Universal Access to Sanitation – UNICEF Data,” UNICEF/WHO drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene database, 2017 https://data.unicef.org/topic/
water-and-sanitation/sanitation/ (accessed December 7, 2018).
3 A new water law is currently being drafted. Though not yet ratified, it aims to strengthen national and regional water planning capacities, and to 
establish a “water state of emergency,” under which the government can impose spatial and temporal restrictions on water use, and facilitate citizen 
participation in water management through the establishment of “hydraulic groups.”
4 A-L Collard et al., “‘Et si on faisait comme ceux de la plaine?’ Aspirations et limites d’une petite agriculture dynamique en Tunisie centrale,’ Cahiers 
Agricultures 24 (2015), pp. 335-41.
5 Oral communication with a GIZ project leader implementing a water management project in Tunisia.
6 “Utilisation de l’eau,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2016 <http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/
Profile_seg ments/TUN-WU_eng.stm> (accessed November 7, 2018).
of these water-intensive cash-crops for export to 
the European Union or other destinations. Reports 
show that subsidies are often granted in favor of 
large-scale agricultural farms thanks to corruption, 
while small-scale farmers do not receive payments 
even though they meet the necessary requirements.4 
High poverty rates in rural areas make people more 
vulnerable to climate change and decreasing water 
availability since they lack the financial resources to 
pay for adequate adaptation measures. While large 
agricultural companies possess the knowledge and 
financial means to adapt to changing patterns of 
water availability, these resources are not available 
to family farms.
Groundwater is over-extracted in almost all regions 
of Tunisia, and the fall of water tables has reached 
an alarming two meters per year since 2011 in Kai-
rouan.5 Small-scale farms only possess the right to 
dig shallow wells which increasingly do not supply 
the required amount of water. Meanwhile, large-scale 
agricultural companies own the rights to dig deep 
wells and actually have the means to finance them. 
Large companies can thus sustain their production 
patterns, while family farms are heavily affected by 
the fall of groundwater tables. With the 2011 revolu-
tion, the decline of groundwater resources has accel-
erated as parts of the rural population finally saw 
their opportunity to take their share of water. The 
unaccounted and often illegal abstraction of ground-
water thus increased significantly. Unaccounted 
water extraction seriously limits the effectiveness 
of government planning and endangers sustainable 
water resource management. In addition, the coastal 
zones are prone to rising sea levels too. On the one 
hand, this reduces available land resources, and on 
the other, it results in salinization of groundwa-
ter bodies, further decreasing the water resources 
available. While about eighty percent of wastewater 
is treated in proper facilities, only one-third of this 
treated wastewater is reused, accounting for around 
two percent of the total use of water resources.6
At the same time, water demand is increasing, due 
to both moderate population growth and increasing 
demands from the industrial sector. Meanwhile, price 
High poverty rates in 
rural areas make people 
more vulnerable to climate 
change
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is an inadequate tool for managing water demand, 
since water is an inelastic commodity, meaning that 
an increase in price will not lead to a proportional 
decrease in water demand. For example, in small-
scale agriculture, an increase in water prices to the 
level of full cost recovery would lead to a decrease 
in water demand of up to one third, while large-
scale farms would not decrease their water use at all, 
but instead limit the area of production.7 If full cost 
recovery were realized, this would result in a signifi-
cant reduction in general food production and small-
scale farmers being pushed out of the agricultural 
sector.
The mix of a tense environmental situation and the 
lack of personal development perspectives for the 
young leads to strong migration pressures from 
rural Tunisia to coastal cities and even across the 
Mediter ranean into the European Union and beyond. 
Cities in Tunisia already face difficulties in provid-
ing an adequate quantity and quality of living space 
and employment opportunities. Migration flows are 
also directed across state borders, with many peo-
ple seeking jobs and improved living conditions else-
where. This brain drain can also be harmful to the 
Tunisian economy.
A Way Ahead: Addressing the Water Problem in 
Tunisia
Targeted policies to foster the creation of agri-busi-
nesses could significantly increase employment in 
rural areas, combined with a decrease in migration, 
thus relieving the urban centers of high population 
growth. In the light of social equity issues in post-rev-
olutionary Tunisia, a focus on rural development 
is urgently needed. The fact that the revolutionary 
uprisings of 2010/2011 started in marginalized rural 
areas underscores that it is not only a responsibility 
of the government to engage in rural development, 
but also a moral duty in the face of the revolution-
ary heritage. While it is extremely difficult to manage 
competing demands for water in planning and poli-
cies, there is great potential for future development 
in the rural areas. A well-educated generation of 
young job-seekers is looking for innovative solutions 
to their society’s problems. The use of this potential 
is of paramount importance for the Tunisian gov-
ernment, first, to solve its economic and ecological 
problems, and second, to ensure social and political 
inclusion in the newly established democratic sys-
7 Aymen Frija et al, “Irrigation pricing policies and its impacts on agricultural inputs demand in Tunisia: A DEA-based methodology,” Journal of 
Environmental Management 9 (2011), pp. 2109-18. If the government aimed to reach cost recovery, increased water prices for low earners would 
substantially harm small-scale agricultural businesses and family farms.
tem. By using this potential, Tunisia can effectively 
work on a bundle of current issues, namely high 
unemployment, national food sovereignty, adapta-
tion to climate change, water resource management, 
rural development, and the development of domestic 
markets.
Recommendations
 - Establish financial and technical aid programs for 
small-scale agricultural businesses
Young people returning to the countryside and the 
rural population should be supported with the initial 
capital to provide them with the means to establish 
well-equipped, state-of-the-art agricultural prac-
tices that are water efficient and have the potential 
to respond to domestic food market demands. This 
would increase the employment rate and, with finan-
cial support dependent on crop type, ensure the use 
of water-efficient plants. Growing crops to meet 
domestic demands would also enhance food sover-
eignty.
 - Introduce water-smart subsidies focusing on small-
scale agricultural production
Changing the paradigm of agricultural subsidies to 
support small-scale agricultural farms, and trading 
water-efficient crops on the domestic market not 
only increases water use efficiency but also con-
tributes to national food security.
 - Mainstream rain fed agriculture production
While rainfed agriculture is not possible in the most 
arid regions of Tunisia, there are still some areas 
where natural rainfall supports plant growth for agri-
cultural production. Over recent decades, irrigation 
practices have been promoted due to their higher 
The creation of agri- 
businesses could increase 
employment in rural areas
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yields. The current depletion of water resources also 
requires a reduction in the agricultural demand for 
water. Arboriculture (e.g. olives, apricots) needs less 
water while delivering substantial yields which can be 
sold on the domestic market. The Ministry for Agri-
culture should focus on supporting sustainable and 
water-efficient agriculture by removing subsidies 
from export-orientated and water-intensive crops.
 - Fight illegal activities in the water sector
While it is clear that people need to be supported in 
securing their livelihoods, it is essential that no unac-
counted water extraction takes place, since it endan-
gers the water access of all users and complicates 
spatial and temporal planning. Corruption is also an 
issue that needs to be tackled, as farmers have stated 
that some officials only allocate state funds to those 
who will give them a share of the subsidy.8 Accord-
ingly, transparent reporting mechanisms for appli-
cations and final decisions on subsidies should be 
established, and these need to be accessible to the 
public.
 - Establish a national data exchange platform
Informed decision-making at all levels needs to rely 
on extensive data. The potential benefits of digiti-
zation for boosting employment rates and creating 
a more sustainable water and agricultural sector 
should be taken into consideration. Innovative busi-
ness models providing data services to the agriculture 
sector should also be supported. The establishment 
of a national data platform, including information 
ranging from ground- and surface water extraction 
and near-real-time climate data, to soil surveys and 
cropping patterns, would allow users to take evi-
dence-based decisions. Farmers could rely on such 
a database for their decisions on irrigation schedules 
or cropping patterns, and the database should also 
provide open access to the public. A data platform 
of this kind would also constitute a rich source for 
innovative business ideas, such as insurance or agri-
culture consultancies, which could lead to the provi-
sion of extended services to the public.
 - Extend state consulting services for farmers
State agencies’ consulting services for farmers are an 
effective tool to promote sustainable land and water 
resource management, and to introduce state-of-
the-art farming technologies and methods in remote 
8 Collard et al.
areas. These services need to be free of charge for 
everyone. While educational centers are a good way 
to showcase workable solutions, consultancy services 
cannot be limited to these centers only: personnel 
should also reach out to farmers and offer their ser-
vices on-farm. Efficient water use and the production 
of crops in demand on the national market should be 
central to such consultancy services.
Darius Görgen is an MSc student of Physical 
Geography at the University of Marburg, Germany. 
At the time of the workshop, he also worked as an 
external consultant for the Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) on inter-
sectoral approaches to water resource manage-
ment.
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EQUITABLE AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE TUNISIAN 
LIVESTOCK AND SMALLHOLDER 
SECTORS
Elhem Ben Aicha
As a source of revenue and employment, livestock facil-
itate the integration of low-income breeders into the 
national economic system. Most livestock in Tunisia 
are kept and managed by families, while most breeders 
have small herds in rural and poor areas. They form 
an integral part of mixed farming systems, where they 
help raise whole-farm productivity and provide rev-
enues for households. However, these breeders face 
economic, environmental, and social constraints that 
prevent them from expanding and prospering. Water 
scarcity, animal diseases, and high production costs 
increase the need for financial support, as well as pol-
icies that reduce vulnerability, increase resilience, and 
remove market barriers.
In Tunisia, as in all Maghreb countries, livestock 
is central to the livelihoods of the rural popula-
tion, playing many roles, including the provision of 
employment to farmers and family members (espe-
cially women), a store of wealth, and a form of insur-
ance. Increased demand for animal protein and 
meat consumption are likely to maintain livestock’s 
position as one of the fastest growing agricultural 
sub-sectors for the foreseeable future. So far, this 
growth in demand has been met by rapidly expand-
ing modern forms of intensive livestock production 
which increase the productivity of land and livestock, 
especially in poultry farming and dairy farms, to sat-
isfy the high demand for milk. Intensification can be 
defined as the increased use of external inputs and 
services to increase output quantity.9 Purchased 
inputs may include animal feeds, replacement stock, 
and breeding and health services. However, this 
intensification does not occur without consequences. 
It affects smallholder breeders who represent eighty 
percent of the market and who do not have the same 
opportunities as intensive producers. Smallholders 
are under pressure from intensive production farms, 
known as factory farms, which raise much higher 
numbers of animals and produce greater quantities 
of meat, eggs, or milk. The biggest threat to small-
holders is that they will be obliged to leave the sec-
9 H.M.J. Udo et al., “Impact of intensification of different types of livestock production in smallholder crop-livestock systems,” Livestock Science 1-2 
(2011), pp. 22-9.
10 “Tunisie – Viande rouge: La contrebande menace le cheptel national,” Turess, September 12, 2012 <https://www.turess.com/fr/wmc/124593> 
(accessed November 8, 2018).
tor, as market forces erode their competitiveness and 
labor costs rise.
Breeding and Animal Health: A Double Threat for 
Both Breeders and the National Economy
Livestock production is influenced by several factors, 
including animal health. Thus, animal diseases repre-
sent a setback for the promotion and economic value 
of livestock products. They are responsible for major 
economic losses that can impact on several levels 
in the national economy, on breeders, and various 
related sectors.
Recent political transformations have affected the 
security of the country, and consequently, health 
management has become more difficult. Security 
failures in border areas has led to the re-emergence 
of the most economically threatening diseases. In 
fact, the epidemic of animal diseases in neighboring 
countries has had a big impact on livestock produc-
tivity in Tunisia. In 2013, the outbreak of foot-and-
mouth disease in Libya was followed by its spread to 
Tunisia in 2014, and to Algeria and finally in Morocco 
in 2015. Similarly, in April 2014, Libyan veterinary 
services notified the World Organization for Animal 
Health of the presence of Newcastle disease, a con-
tagious viral bird disease. It was then found in poultry 
farms in Tunisia in September of the same year. More 
recently, the appearance of the bluetongue disease 
in ruminants in Tunisia has raised several questions 
about its origins and future dispersion. Increased 
demand, higher prices, and higher production costs 
have prompted the Tunisian government to import 
animals to fill the deficit. These imports take place 
during certain periods of the year, particularly during 
religious festivals. However, some trade remains 
beyond the control of the relevant authorities, which 
increases the risk of diseases being introduced from 
neighboring countries.
Livestock smuggling into Libya is gaining momentum 
at the expense of the local market. Indeed, the cam-
paign against smuggling from June to August 2012 
seized 2,204 head of livestock (ninety percent sheep, 
the rest were goats and camels) valued at half a mil-
lion dinars.10 In fact, the number of cattle smuggled 
out of the country exceeds estimates provided by the 
authorities. In addition to the risk of introducing ani-
mal diseases in Tunisia, this phenomenon will have 
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serious consequences in the long-term, causing the 
impoverishment of livestock and increasing the price 
of meat.
Considering these facts, and despite veterinary 
efforts to control and prevent animal diseases, the 
overall situation of animal health is still character-
ized by low immunization and vaccination coverage. 
Furthermore, the failure of the animal identification 
program and the widespread practice of ignoring 
legislation on the movements of animals threat-
ens the sustainability of the national herd remains 
threatened.
Livestock and Environment: The Impact of Climate 
Change and Water Scarcity
As the direct consequences of climate change, varia-
tions in rainfall and temperature affect livestock pro-
duction in many ways, both directly and indirectly. 
This situation is very delicate in a country that has 
known many years of drought. The deficit recorded 
at dams throughout the country reached 281 million 
cubic meters in 2017, with reserves not exceeding 
939 million cubic meters. In comparison, the national 
average over the last three years was around 1.22 bil-
lion cubic meters.11
Today, water demands have doubled, with agricul-
ture, the leading water-consuming sector, account-
ing for eughty percent of total water demand. Live-
stock use large amounts of water. Water is used not 
only for servicing and providing drink for the ani-
mals, but also for irrigating feed crops and forage, 
and during animal product processing, for example 
in dairy plants and slaughterhouses.
11 “Faibletaux de remplissage des barrages, malgré les fortes précipitations qui ont touché le pays,” African Manager, February 9, 2017 <https://
africanmanager.com/51_faible-taux-de-remplissage-des-barrages-malgre-les-fortes-precipitations-qui-ont-touche-le-pays/> (accessed November 8, 
2018).
Animal productivity, the availability and quality of 
forages and feed crops, animal health and biodiver-
sity are the most affected by water shortage. The 
impacts of climate change on animal health have also 
been documented, especially for vector-borne dis-
eases, since rising temperatures increase the winter 
survival of vectors and pathogens.
Recommendations
The sustainability and resilience of livestock breeders 
can be enhanced through targeted actions at differ-
ent levels. Several steps should be taken to ensure 
that both male and female smallholder breeders ben-
efit from affordable financial services, to help them 
expand their activities and integrate new markets, 
and practice better management of water resources 
and disease risk.
 - Ensure smaller farmers are better integrated into 
the market
In order to guarantee a better integration of small 
farmers into the local market, close collaboration 
between the public and the private sector is required. 
Conventional initiatives characterized by the exclu-
sive intervention of the state and its agents (espe-
cially the Agency for the Promotion of Agricultural 
Investments) have certain limitations. Hence, mea-
sures involving the private sector can contribute to 
finding sustainable solutions that ensure the sus-
tainability of the sector. These solutions include the 
increased use of microfinancing organizations, which 
do already exist in Tunisia, while the creation of an 
organization specifically dedicated to promoting 
livestock and the value chain can ensure its growth 
and durability. Such an institution could be created 
in different forms, including consortia or the subsid-
iaries of existing financial institutions. Ideally, this 
organization should be created and differentiated 
from existing micro-financers by specifying its field 
of intervention between a financial component, in 
which project profitability is studied for grant financ-
ing, and the provision of close technical assistance to 
breeders, assuring them with a solid starting point.
In addition, farmers should be encouraged to orga-
nize themselves into professional associations that 
can organize bank credits for their members, or pro-
vide guarantees to the banking system so that pro-
ducers obtain the credit they need. To reduce the 
Livestock smuggling into 
Libya causes the impove-
rishment of livestock and 
increases the price of meat
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frequency of non-repayment, which often occurs 
due to poor production rates, an insurance system 
should be designed and implemented, tailored to the 
specifics of agricultural production. This should be 
followed by the encouragement of investment and 
modernization of agricultural holdings. When imple-
menting these modernization programs, the speci-
ficities of the agricultural sector should be taken into 
account, in particular the diversity of production 
conditions, and especially those of small farms.
 - Ensure the availability and sustainable manage-
ment of water
Livestock producers’ resilience to climate change 
can be enhanced by improving water management. 
For example, farmers could use traditional tech-
niques against drought and water scarcity, such 
as collecting rainfall water in “feskias,” basins built 
by the  Aghlabids(c. 800-900 C.E.), which were the 
most important hydraulic works in the history of the 
Islamic world. Rainfall is free and can be used in agri-
culture and for other needs.
 - Encourage breeders towards a focus on hardier and 
more drought-resistant local breeds
Breeders should be encouraged towards a focus on 
local breeds whose water needs are not especially 
high. This could be supported by a local breed pres-
ervation initiative as part of a national program spe-
cializing in the research and development of genetic 
resources.
 - Advance gender equality and empower women
Women are largely involved in caring for small rumi-
nants, poultry, and dairy cows. In order to help 
achieve gender equality in agricultural populations, 
priority should be given to improving the working 
conditions for these women in the livestock sector. 
Improving the availability of financial aid, includ-
ing grants, would help empower these women and 
increase their ability to participate more efficiently 
in livestock keeping. Rural women’s know-how can 
be further developed through trainings and capac-
ity-building activities. As an example, many rural 
women keep poultry in their farmyards. Providing 
them with financial aid to acquire breeding equip-
ment, such as hatcheries, could increase their sales 
profits from selling eggs and birds.
 - Increase efforts in the fighting against diseases that 
threaten livestock sustainability
Effective animal disease control requires action and 
contributions from all stakeholders. The cross-bor-
der nature of some serious diseases that constitute 
a barrier to trade require: dedicated application 
of Livestock Law No. 2005-95 of October 18, 2005, 
particularly in regard to the identification and “pass-
porting” of animals; more effective control of animal 
transportation and origin by the police and National 
Guard; better organization and control of livestock 
markets; and prohibiting the sale of unidentified ani-
mals.
It is also important to focus on improving the tech-
nical skills of veterinary services. Important areas of 
intervention include, but are not limited to: develop-
ment and modernization of animal health infrastruc-
ture through private/public partnerships; better 
public service use of private veterinarians through 
accreditation programs, cross-border collabora-
tion, and sharing human and physical resources; and 
strengthening and harmonizing disease surveillance 
and detection systems through the active participa-
tion of all stakeholders.
A further crucial point for consideration is the acti-
vation and expansion of the existing compensation 
fund, responsible for compensating breeders for 
the death of their animals due to highly contagious 
diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease, or in the 
event of a natural disaster, such as major periods of 
drought or flooding.
Elhem Ben Aicha is an animal husbandry engineer 
at the National Institute of Zoosanitary Vigilance 
in Tunis, Tunisia, where she works on topics related 
to animal health economics and cost benefit 
analysis. She is also a PhD student at the National 
Agronomy Institute in Tunis.
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CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPING 
TUNISIA’S INTERIOR: CURRENT 
ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN THE 
TATAOUINE GOVERNORATE
Laroussi Bettaieb
Seven years after the “Jasmine” revolution, popular 
demands for decent jobs, justice, and better and more 
inclusive government remain unsatisfied. Tunisia’s 
youth, the main driving force of this historic transfor-
mation, remain highly frustrated and face chronically 
high unemployment levels. Bridging the gap between 
skill supply and demand in the Tataouine governorate 
in the south of the country is essential to facilitating 
integration in the job market by linking education cur-
ricula to companies’ needs.
Since the 2011 revolution that ended decades of dic-
tatorship, Tunisia has undergone significant politi-
cal changes as part of its transition to a pluralistic 
and democratic society. Yet despite being hailed in-
12 All figures on population and employment are taken from “The General Census of Population and Housing, 2014,” a four-year survey prepared by the 
National Institute of Statistics, April 2015 <http://www.ins.tn/fr/publication/recensement-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral-de-la-population-et-de-lhabitat-2014-
principaux-indicateurs> (accessed November 27, 2018).
ternationally as a model of peaceful transition, 
 Tunisia remains a fragile democracy facing a lack 
of investment, large deficits, and high unemploy-
ment levels. Indeed, Tunisia’s unemployment rate is 
unusually high and includes considerable numbers 
of young people who have simply dropped out of 
the labor force. The situation is worst in Tataouine 
gover norate, located in the far south of the country, 
where unemployment stands at 27.06 percent, the 
highest in the country.12 This high rate is aggravated 
by the chasm between skill supply and demand in the 
job market, and the inefficiency of local ecosystems 
in promoting entrepreneurship initiatives. 
Unemployment Characteristics in the Region
With its 150,000 inhabitants and vast geographical 
area covering a quarter of the country,  Tataouine 
is among the most disadvantaged governorates 
in  Tunisia. The following Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis summa-
rizes the main employment challenges in the region:
Strengths
 - Virgin and fertile ground for intervention
 - Diverse natural resources (gypsum, oil, gas)
 - Geographical location scattered over one- 
quarter of the Tunisian territory
 - Priority zone as classified by the Tunisian 
government, where more incentives are allo-
cated to investors
 - High rate of university graduates
 - Young population
 - Tourism potential
 - Agriculture opportunities
Weaknesses
 - Lack of soft skills
 - Shortage of entrepreneurial spirit, innova-
tion and initiative
 - Bureaucracy / Centralization
 - Weak infrastructure
 - Needs are not accurately identified
 - Shortage of investment
 - Slow pace of implementation of governmen-
tal strategic plans
 - Limited and monopolistic markets, informal 
economy
 - Marginalized women and youth
 - Immigration
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Mismatch between Supply and Demand
One major factor in youth unemployment is the dif-
ficult transition from education to employment. This 
problem is most obvious in interior regions where 
youth have fewer chances at job market integration. 
The situation is even worse in Tataouine. This is 
mainly due to a lack of reform of the education sys-
tem, which currently fails to produce graduates with 
appropriate skills to match private sector demands. 
This is because elementary and high schools are ori-
ented towards formal qualifications as opposed to 
competitive skills.
Indeed, in the Tunisian system, there is a disconnect 
between the institutions of school and work, imply-
ing that technical training is not closely related to 
the skills needed by employers. The Tunisian edu-
cational system emphasizes general studies leading 
to the baccalaureate – the ultimate reference point 
in classifying qualifications – and subsequently to 
higher education. Students oriented toward voca-
tional training are frequently left out of mainstream 
education. In response, vocational training diplomas 
have been designed to prepare young people for 
skilled occupations, and to overcome some of the 
inadequacies of the elementary system by providing 
all students with a sufficiently high-quality education 
to meet national standards.
13 Tataouine is classified as one of the regions with a very low rate of enterprise creation among the 24 governorates of Tunisia <http://dataportal.ins.tn/
fr/Map?Dk6PGqZQx0K0VfNCnBmQeg> (accessed November 27, 2018).
The difficult transition to employment is com-
pounded by a straightforward conflict: on the one 
hand, employers concerned with profitability, lower 
costs and flexibility, will only hire graduates who will 
improve their bottom lines. On the other hand, job-
seekers face a labor market overcrowded with people 
who have the same qualifications. The combination 
of a large youth population, where 44 percent of the 
populace is aged under 20, plus a stagnant business 
environment in Tataouine, leads to growing pressure 
on the education, health, and social welfare sectors, 
as well as employment.
It is worth noting that 26.28 percent of the unem-
ployed in Tataouine are young people with only lim-
ited (elementary school) education. These people 
tend to work in the informal economy. In turn, this 
has led to the rise of a smuggling network, which 
provides them with a decent income.
Entrepreneurship Status in the Region
The business environment in Tataouine tends to 
discourage enterprise creation and young entre-
preneurship. Over recent years, only a negligible 
increase in new businesses has been observed,13 
mainly because the area lacks an industrial tradition: 
its inhabitants tend to avoid business risks, prefer-
ring to invest time and money in traditional activities 
such as trade, rather than investment and innovation.
Threats
 - High community demands and expectations
 - Terrorism
 - Smuggling
 - Corruption
 - Political, economic, and social instability
 - Migration and immigration
 - Low quality of education
 - Fragile social environment
Opportunities
 - Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) pro-
grams
 - Funding programs (international donors)
 - Investing in human capital
 - Investing in natural resources
 - Social businesses
 - Local cultural heritage
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Moreover, start-ups in Tataouine face considerable 
difficulties entering the market and establishing a 
foothold. Not enough firms are created, and few 
manage to expand because of the constraints they 
face from government regulations, lack of financing 
from banks, and an educational system that does not 
nurture entrepreneurship. Little attention is paid 
to business planning in school curricula, limiting 
students’ ability to start their own businesses after 
graduation.
Young entrepreneurs in particular face several 
constraints: a lack of information regarding local 
economic opportunities, insufficient clarity over 
the roles and responsibilities of public administra-
tions, limited access to financial institutions, and 
 poorly-equipped business development support 
offices that also lack technical capacity. In addition, 
the culture of the region does not promote an entre-
preneurial profile. Most young people graduate from 
literature specialties, such as Arabic or philosophy, 
which do not prepare them for business or familiar-
ize them with business risks. As a result, most pre-
fer to work in the public sector. Furthermore, many 
refuse to consider interest-bearing loans for cultural 
reasons. Overall, people with financial resources are 
reluctant to risk them in industrial activities and pre-
fer simple commercial projects. The population of 
Tataouine has not yet developed a tradition of man-
ufacturing or services activities. Most projects in the 
region are banal and repetitive, such as snack bars, 
restaurants, internet access points, and so on. Pro-
jects typically lack innovation.
The Tunisian administration also presents a heavy 
burden on local entrepreneurs. This is particu-
larly relevant in the case of innovation. Creating a 
startup requires large amounts of paperwork and 
waiting, and papers are often rejected for minor rea-
sons. Once the startup is legal, more paperwork is 
required. To obtain funding from banks, entrepre-
14 As reported to the author by a representative of the Tunisian Chamber of Commerce.
neurs also need to provide a certificate of innovation, 
which takes a long time to process. According to the 
Tunisian Chamber of Commerce (UTICA), the main 
impediments facing businesses creation in Tataouine 
are related to:
 - a lack of economic dynamism, such as the creation 
of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) 
around large projects;
 - limited access to funding, which also entails 
lengthy administrative procedures and complex 
funding conditions;
 - inefficiency of coaching programs: only 2-3 per-
cent of trained entrepreneurs manage to realize 
their project. This is due to the lack of motivation 
and coaching, and a shortage of technical and 
managerial experts and consultants in the region;
 - difficult market access, due to the remoteness of 
markets and networks, and poor infrastructure. 
The ports of Sfax and Gabes are very far away, 
which limits the competitiveness of regional prod-
ucts;
 - institutional inadequacies, including the lack of 
regional representation by ministries and public 
institutions (Office of Topography, Land Court, 
and so on); and
 - government policies: institutions must intervene 
more to complement funding for projects. Banks, 
even public banks, are reluctant to finance pro-
jects.14
Recommendations
 - Solve the mismatch between job market demand 
and supply
The education system should improve the match 
between training and business needs. Higher edu-
cation and vocational training must help create the 
skills that will encourage firms to hire new graduates. 
Regional dialogues with key players should be initi-
ated, including the Ministry of Higher Education, the 
Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment, and 
universities, to provide a framework for discussing 
and coordinating joint actions and cooperation.
The business environment 
in Tataouine discourages 
entrepreneurship
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At the regional level, the existing Higher Institute 
of Technological Studies (ISET) and Vocational 
Training Centers should be empowered to launch 
new specialisms in line with private sector needs. 
New ISET specialisms would also represent an 
attractive hub for students, leading to improved 
workplace competencies. In terms of vocational 
training programs, new specialisms in oil and gas 
exploitation (welding, pipefitting, instrumenta-
tion, safety, and so on), and gypsum processing 
should be introduced. Since both ISET and the 
Tataouine Vocational Training Center (TVTC) 
have well-equipped laboratories, these specialist 
courses could be launched in partnership with 
private oil companies in the region to improve 
local training for youth.
 - Simplify the administrative procedure of busi-
ness creation
Promoting administrative and regulatory sim-
plification and flexibility in Tataouine is highly 
advisable. Interviews with start-up accelera-
tors15 underline the difficulties new companies 
face in expanding their local market, since pub-
lic procurement procedures are hindered by 
a lack of transparency. Tailored support from 
local authorities would simplify the necessary 
procedures and formalities for entrepreneurs 
to develop their projects, and create an innova-
tion-friendly environment. In addition, providing 
specific incentives will foster the development of 
new ventures. In this regard, close cooperation 
between the private sector, civil society, banks, 
and local authorities is necessary to reduce insti-
tutional handicaps and improve the quality of 
services provided to young entrepreneurs.
 - Facilitate project funding
Funding institutions should relax their require-
ments to encourage young people to set up their 
businesses on reasonable terms, and reduce bar-
riers to the current funding system. Interest-free 
loans could act as financial intermediaries, pro-
viding those “fresh” entrepreneurs with loans 
to enable them to create their own businesses. 
Moreover, encouraging the implementation of 
Small Grant Programs can also prove to be an 
important step towards a flexible funding system.
15 Conducted by the author with public stakeholders involved in business creation in Tataouine.
Laroussi Bettaieb serves as head of the 
Knowledge Management Center at Skills to 
Success (StS), a local development organiza-
tion based in Tataouine, Tunisia. StS aims to 
develop tangible solutions to socio-economic 
challenges facing southern Tunisia.
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REGIONAL DISPARITIES AND 
HEALTH INEQUITY IN TUNISIA
Anne Martin
While inadequate provision and access in healthcare 
provision are a country-wide problem, persisting 
regional inequities in Tunisia’s health care system 
are undeniable. Hence, progress in the development 
of Tunisian health care is imperative. Poorer people 
face greater difficulties in accessing and receiving 
high-quality health care; at the same time, they are 
more afflicted by chronic diseases. Regional inequities 
persist, especially in terms of the availability of pub-
lic health care facilities and equipment, accessibility 
of qualified medical personnel, and the health status 
of the population. A number of steps could be taken 
to promote better health care development. Regional 
public health directorates should enhance programs 
to increase transparency and prevent corruption in 
the health sector. In order to cope with the ongoing 
epi demiological transition, better health education 
is essential. The participation of civil society actors 
should be enhanced, since schools, citizens, and local 
organizations are key players in implementing reforms 
at the local level. Health matters need to be considered 
as a cross-cutting issue, and the Ministry of Health 
should ensure coherent cooperation between stake-
holders. Partnerships with the private health sector 
also need to be strengthened, especially given their low 
presence in marginalized regions.
16 M. Abu-Zaineh et al., “Fairness in Healthcare Finance and Delivery: What about Tunisia,” Health Policy and Planning 4 (2014), pp. 433-42.
In Tunisia, health indicators and health care perfor-
mance have improved in recent decades. For instance, 
lower infant mortality rates, under-five-mortality 
rates, and maternal mortality rates have resulted 
in higher life expectancy at birth (Figure 1). In 2016, 
communicable, maternal, perinatal, and nutritional 
conditions only accounted for eight percent of total 
deaths for all ages and both sexes.
However, the demographic and health status of the 
Tunisian population is undergoing radical change as it 
is facing an epidemiological transition. Mortality and 
disease patterns are transformed from high infant 
and child mortality rates, episodic famine, and epi-
demics affecting all age groups, to a predominance of 
degenerative and man-made diseases that principally 
affect the elderly. This results in fewer infectious dis-
eases, particularly thanks to vaccinations, but also a 
higher occurrence of non-communicable and chronic 
diseases that are also related to behavioral issues. 
The reasons behind the onset of non-communica-
ble diseases (NCDs) are multidimensional and often 
related to lifestyle or childhood development; there 
is a strong link between NCD occurrence and social 
determinants of health. Members of lower socio-eco-
nomic groups in Tunisia are much more likely to fall 
ill: about a quarter of all chronic diseases affect the 
poorest ten percent, while only four percent of these 
diseases can be found among the richest decile.16
Figure 1: Important health indicators
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Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live biths)
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Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
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Source: “DataBank. World Development Indicators,” The World Bank. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/source/world-development-indicators (accessed December 19, 2018).
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Tunisia’s population is undergoing rapid changes in 
urbanization and age structure. Two thirds now live 
in cities and are increasingly experiencing lifestyle 
changes, such as higher unhealthy (fast) food con-
sumption, lack of exercise, and the use of tobacco 
or other addictive substances. These behavioral 
issues are associated, on the one hand, with a higher 
probability of NCDs and, on the other, with a higher 
occurrence in persons of low socio-economic status. 
Simultaneously, dramatic changes in age structure 
are taking place as the population is rapidly age-
ing, and older people are more at risk of developing 
NCDs.
Inequalities in Accessing the Tunisian Health 
System
The right to health and health care is defined by 
Article 38 of the Tunisian Constitution, which deter-
mines not only the right to health for each human 
being, but also stipulates the provision of and access 
to high-quality health care by the state, as well as a 
state guarantee of free health care for the poor. How-
ever, having established a public health care system 
in the 1960s, the Tunisian state then faced financial 
problems which resulted in medicine and resource 
shortages in health care facilities. Subsequent pri-
vatization from the early 1990s led to a higher use of 
private health services and a de facto outsourcing of 
clinical and non-clinical health services to the private 
sector. The increased volume of costly private ser-
vices has helped contribute to the growing inequali-
ties in access to health care. In addition, this process 
was accompanied by cuts to state subsidies and a 
gradual withdrawal of the state from health provi-
sion. This policy was illustrated by the introduction 
of public health system user fees for both clinical and 
basic health care. In particular, the fees for clinical 
care increased sharply from 1995 to 2005.17
While the share of health expenditure in Tunisian 
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) has risen steadily 
since 1980, this is in large part due to increased pri-
vate sector spending, and thus to a growth in the 
number of private clinics and medical practices. 
Accordingly, total health expenditures indicate that 
the government share has only increased slowly (59 
percent in 2012).18 By contrast, private households’ 
17 Ibid.
18 “World Health Statistics 2015,” World Health Organization <http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/170250/978924069 4439_eng.
pdf;jsessionid=7FC24C44D969BA443D19D54E5CC822FB?se quence=1> (accessed November 17, 2018).
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Abu-Zaineh et al., “Fairness in healthcare finance and delivery.”
22 “DataBank. World Development Indicators.”
spending on health costs remains high (at 41 percent 
in 201219), most of which consists of out-of-pocket 
expenditures – payments due when the service is 
used and not refunded. In 2012, these out-of-pocket 
expenditures accounted for 86.7 percent of private 
health expenditure: medicines, expenses for visits to 
the doctor, hospitalization, and other costs.20 Low-in-
come households are disproportionately burdened by 
these outgoings. Higher-income households receive 
a greater share of health care, especially in terms of 
hospitalization, since they have greater access to 
health services in the more expensive private sector.21
For those who fall ill in Tunisia and have to visit 
medical facilities, there is a risk of falling to a lower 
socio-economic level due to health expenditures and 
the associated financial losses. This is particularly 
evident in the number of households experiencing 
catastrophic health expenditures, where out-of-
pocket-spending on health accounts for more than 
ten percent of total household expenditure, or even 
impoverishing health expenditures, where out-of-
pocket-spending on health accounts for more than 
one quarter of total household expenditure. In 2010, 
16.7 percent of the Tunisian population were exposed 
to catastrophic health expenditures, and 2.4 percent 
faced impoverishing health expenditures.22
The problem of unequal access to and provision of 
health care services in Tunisia has become remark-
ably clear in recent months: Tunisia was hit by a 
shortage of drugs, including vital medicines, which in 
turn affected patients suffering from a chronic dis-
ease the most. The Tunisian Central Pharmacy has 
observed the tendency of both patients and pharma-
Health inequalities 
 contribute to a lower life 
expectancy in margina-
lized regions
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cies in Tunis to stock up with medicines;23 this aggra-
vates the situation for pharmacies and their patients 
in the interior governorates.
Health Inequalities Particularly Affect Marginal-
ized Regions
Although national averages are most often used to 
report health indicators, indicators within countries 
are also important, since they can highlight health 
inequities, the unfair and avoidable differences in 
health and health service provision. Whereas the 
whole of Tunisia is facing difficulties in health care 
provision and access, some regions are particularly 
vulnerable. Regional inequities persist in regard to 
development, infrastructure, and socio-economic 
dimensions. Coastal regions are generally better off 
than those in western Tunisia and the interior of the 
country. These regional differences are also reflected 
in the health status of the population and regional 
health system infrastructure.
In 2015, the Tunisian Ministry of Health published its 
new “carte sanitaire,” a report that details the cur-
rent state of the health sector as well as important 
23 According to Aymen Mekki, Chief Executive Officer of the Tunisian Central Pharmacy, in an interview with Haythem el-Mekki <https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=hIgweAh_K3E> (accessed December 18, 2018).
24 “Carte sanitaire année 2015. Direction des études et de la planification. s/direction des statistiques,” Tunisian Ministry of Health <http://www.
santetunisie.rns.tn/images/docs/anis/stat/cartesanitaire2015.pdf> (accessed July 24, 2018).
health indicators.24 The report addresses inequalities 
by integrating data on interregional differences and 
health care gaps. Regions in western and interior 
areas of the country have a greater average distance 
to a university or regional hospital (Figure 2), more 
inhabitants per day or night pharmacy, and fewer pri-
vate laboratories and hemodialysis machines. These 
deficits are not limited to, but especially apparent in 
Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid, Siliana, Gafsa and Kébili.
Another indicator of regional health inequities is the 
limited number of private sector health care facili-
ties in the western or interior regions of Tunisia. This 
poses a threat to the provision of health services to 
the population in marginalized regions as the existing 
public health care sector is not sufficiently funded 
and often lacks medicines and machines for the pro-
vision of even basic health care.
In addition, the basic public sector health care cen-
ters (centres de santé de base) face many problems. 
These centers exist throughout Tunisia and are the 
first access point to the health system for many peo-
ple. However, these basic health care centers are 
insufficiently funded and often lack basic equipment 
Figure 2: Average distance from a hospital
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and qualified personnel. 45 percent provide medical 
consultations only once a week. This is particularly 
alarming in regions that lack other health care facil-
ities and usually have a very high demand for these 
health centers. In regions that can be considered 
marginalized, centers tend to offer fewer consulta-
tion days than in coastal areas (Figure 3).25
Moreover, private health facilities or university cen-
ters mostly tend to be located in coastal regions, 
which represents a structural disadvantage for the 
interior regions. Tunisians seeking medical atten-
tion often use the more expensive private sector 
facilities because of the poor quality of equipment at 
more affordable public facilities. Populations in inte-
rior regions have to travel long distances for special-
ized and high-quality health care, and are particu-
larly affected by the high amounts of out-of-pocket 
spending. At the same time, health care professionals, 
and specialist doctors in particular, prefer to work in 
the better-funded private sector, mainly located in 
coastal areas, rather than in public institutions under 
poorer working conditions and for lower wages (Fig-
ure 4).
25 “Carte sanitaire de la première ligne – 2015. Direction des études et de la planification. s/direction des statistiques,” Tunisian Ministry of Health, 2016 
<http://www.santetunisie.rns.tn/images/docs/anis/stat/Soinsprimaires 2015.pdf> (accessed July 28, 2018).
26 “Livre Blanc-Tunisie: Nouvelle Vision du Développement Régional,” Tunisian Ministry of Regional Development, Tunis.
All these problems contribute to a lower life expec-
tancy for populations living in the marginalized 
regions: in 2009, life expectancy was around seventy 
years in Kasserine and Tataouine, and 77 in Tunis and 
Sfax.26 Progress in Tunisia’s socio-economic devel-
opment is urgent, as it is interlinked with other fac-
tors including protests, emigration, and recruitment 
by extremist groups. Achieving universal equity in 
terms of health status and access to health care will 
be a major challenge in the years to come at both the 
national and subnational levels. The Tunisian govern-
ment and its partner organizations (such as the WHO 
and international development organizations) must 
act now to transform the health care system to meet 
the future challenges of an ageing population and its 
characteristic diseases (NCDs).
Recommendations
 - Strengthen governance
Regional public health directorates (les directions 
régionales de la santé publique) can directly access 
the needs and deficits of their regions and munici-
palities, and play a key role in implementing reforms. 
In order to prevent corruption and improve inspec-
Figure 3: Consultation at basic health care centers once a week vs. every working day
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Source: “Carte sanitaire de la première ligne – 2015. Direction des études et de la planification. s/direction des statistiques,” Tunisian Ministry of Health, 2016 <http://www.santetunisie.
rns.tn/images/docs/anis/stat/Soinsprimaires 2015.pdf> (accessed July 28, 2018), pp. 15, 16.
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tion and monitoring, regional directorates should 
enhance programs to increase transparency, par-
ticularly in regard to access to public and private 
health care facilities. Advancements could include 
improved accessibility and continuous updating of 
the regional registers of doctors, as well as strength-
ened cooperation with the regional councils of phy-
sicians (les conseils régionals des médecins). In addi-
tion, the establishment of a national online platform, 
which would include the tasks, objectives, achieve-
ments, and reporting obligations of regional public 
health directorates, would be a good way to improve 
accountability and restore citizens’ trust in the (pub-
lic) health system.
 - Step up health education to promote a healthy life-
style
In the interest of reducing mortality and the financial 
burden on households and the state, public health 
programs aimed at preventing non-communicable 
diseases (and their costly long-term implications) 
should be strengthened. Given the ongoing epi-
demiological transition, health education should be 
stepped up to promote a healthy lifestyle. Vulnera-
ble groups, such as pregnant women, children, and 
senior citizens should receive training programs 
specific to them, and which address their health 
concerns. The following topics must be addressed: 
healthy diet, most notably during pregnancy and for 
children, the dangers of smoking, the importance 
of regular exercise for all ages and genders, and the 
consequences of stress. All sectors, including health, 
transport, housing, and education, should address 
these issues and work together on effective policies 
and interventions.
 - Include civil society actors
Schools, citizens, and local organizations are key 
players in implementing reforms at the local level. 
They should be actively engaged and motivated to 
participate in approaching and educating target 
groups. National as well as local sports clubs can be 
a powerful ally in promoting regular exercise and 
informing people about the benefits of exercise and 
healthy nutrition. The inclusion and motivation of 
girls and women is particularly important. Education 
on health problems should be intensified in schools, 
for example by promoting a National Healthy Schools’ 
Day with nationwide activities: once a year, every 
school would organize a “Health Day” where children 
Figure 4: Distribution of doctors per 100,000 inhabitants
Si
di
 B
ou
zid
300
250
200
150
50
0
350
100
Tu
ni
s
Sf
ax
So
us
se
Ar
ia
na
Mo
na
st
ir
To
ze
ur
Be
n 
Ar
ou
s
Mé
de
ni
ne
Bi
ze
rte
Na
be
ul
Ké
bi
li
Ga
bè
s
Ma
nn
ou
ba
Za
gh
ou
an
Ma
hd
ia
Ga
fs
a
Bé
ja
Le
 K
ef
Si
lia
na
Ka
ss
er
in
e
Je
nd
ou
ba
Ka
iro
ua
n
Ta
ta
ou
in
e
all doctors per 100.000 inhab. Trend (all doctors)
general practitioner per 100.000 inhab. Trend (general doctors)
medical specialist per 100.000 inhab. Trend (specialist doctors)
Source: “Carte sanitaire année 2015,” Tunisian Ministry of Health, pp. 72, 73, 75.
Chapter II: Socio-Economic Challenges and the Development of Marginalized Regions
61No. 2 | January 2020 – first published in December 2018
REPORT
are informed about a healthy lifestyle, the impor-
tance of exercise for a long and healthy life, a healthy 
diet, the effects of stress on health, and basic infor-
mation on resuscitation.
 - Establish partnerships with the private health care 
sector
Policies and incentives to increase the presence of 
private health care facilities and specialist doctors 
in Tunisia’s western and interior regions are essen-
tial, both on the national and the subnational level. 
Existing policies should be evaluated and reviewed, 
with the inclusion of local authorities in the process. 
Possibilities include targeted support for junior staff 
from marginalized regions during medical training, 
for example with scholarships, and special incentives 
for doctors willing to settle in marginalized regions, 
including special remuneration and trainings.
 - Consider health issues as a cross-cutting issue and 
ensure coherent cooperation between national and 
international stakeholders
The involvement of the Ministry of Health in orga-
nizing cooperation between international organiza-
tions and the Tunisian state should be intensified. It 
is important to raise awareness around the fact that 
development projects not directly related to health – 
such as promoting employment or education – may 
still have an impact on the health status of a (local) 
population, as they can affect various determinants of 
health. Accordingly, the involvement of the Ministry 
of Health in the relevant steering committee (comité 
de pilotage) of a project is appropriate, even if health 
issues are not addressed directly. Since the causes 
of health inequities are multifaceted, international 
development organizations (bilateral, European, or 
multilateral organizations and private or regional 
development banks) should take health issues into 
account during the planning phase of their projects 
and consider cooperation with other international 
donors or national and local actors.
Anne Martin was studying on the Master’s pro-
gramm in Middle Eastern Politics and Economics 
at the Philipps University of Marburg, Germany, 
at the time of the workshop, where she focused 
on social movements, contentious politics, and 
social inequalities in the Maghreb. In 2017/2018, 
she worked at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) on a proj-
ect to promote city-to-city cooperation between 
municipalities from Germany, Algeria, Morocco, 
and Tunisia. 
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INFORMAL MARGINALIZED 
DISTRICTS IN TUNIS – AN URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT FAILURE LEADING 
TO RAMPANT SOCIAL INEQUALITIES
Maha Kouas
Since the first half of the twentieth century, sponta-
neous housing has proliferated in Tunisia. This urban 
phenomenon is clearly visible: almost the whole coun-
try is witnessing an explosion in the number and 
size of entirely informal cities, which originated in 
illicit, illegal, and temporary settlements around the 
big metropolitan areas. Today, these informal settle-
ments have become numerous and permanent. They 
are high-density urban environments lacking indus-
trial, educational, health, and social infrastructure and 
equipment, which illustrate the impact of inequitable 
political, economic, and social development in the 
country. The consequences are unemployment, high 
school dropout rates, gender discrimination, and social 
violence, including terrorism. Therefore, to establish a 
new urban democracy27 that fights the rampant social 
inequalities in these neighborhoods, it is necessary to 
combine urban restructuring and territorial rehabil-
itation with a participatory approach to governance.
From 1930 to 1943, as the country endured economic 
hardship under French rule, the new phenomenon 
of “rural exodus” appeared in Tunisia, beginning 
with minor interior migration of jobseekers from the 
southern and inner regions to the capital and other 
big cities. The first informal and ephemeral con-
structions appeared as a result. According to the UN, 
informal housing refers to a group of ten or more 
dwellings located on public or private grounds, built 
without any legal formality or respect for urban plan-
ning laws.28
After Tunisia gained independence in 1956, the gov-
ernment began to redraw the profile of the country, 
and launched economic and urban development 
plans. However, the focus on the capital and the east-
27 The notion of urban democracy reflects the idea that the city functions as a space for forming citizenship, by allowing the population to participate in 
the production and improvement of their own city, thus it is a democratic solution to social inequalities and injustice.
28 Valérie Clerc, “Les politiques de résorption de l’habitat informel à Phnom Penh. Influence des organisations internationales et contradictions de l’action 
publique,” Géocarrefour 3 (2015) <http://journals.openedition.org/geocarrefour/1160> (accessed November 10, 2018).
29 “Population urbaine (% de la population totale), Tunisie,” Perspective monde <http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/tend/TUN/fr/SP.URB.TOTL. 
IN.ZS.html> (accessed November 23, 2018).
30 National Institute of Statistics, “Final Report of the General Census of Population and Housing in Tunisia,” 2014.
31 Habib Dlala, “Métropolisation et recomposition territoriale du Nord-Est tunisien,” Cybergeo: European Journal of Geography, document 410, 2007 
<https://journals.openedition.org/cybergeo/13863> (accessed November 10, 2018).
32 Morched Chabbi, “Potentialities and obstacles to the constitution of an urban region – the case of Greater Tunis,” Congress Report on the 40th 
ISOCARP Congress, 2004, p. 7.
33 ARRU is an industrial and commercial public agency created by Law No. 81-69 of August 1, 1981. It oversees the execution of state policy in the areas 
of urban rehabilitation and renovation under the supervision of the Ministry of Equipment, Housing and Territorial Development <http://www.arru.nat.tn/> 
(accessed November 10, 2018).
34 District of Tunis, “Draft of preliminary project report – 3rd urban project of the Restructuring of Ettadhamen-Douar Hicher,” October 1981, p. 2.
ern coast, with a concentration of industries, services 
and institutions, created a deep territorial disparity 
and social segregation. Since then, a huge new rural 
exodus has taken place, leading to urban population 
growth of up to 65 percent in 2006,29 representing an 
average annual growth rate of 3.5 percent.
Uncontrolled Urban Extension as the Main Urban 
Issue
Tunis is now considered the largest urban area in 
Tunisia, with 2,643,695 inhabitants,30 almost a quar-
ter of the country’s population. The size of this urban 
area is now six times larger than it was fifty years 
ago, totaling 32,000 hectares in 2009.31 Incomers 
from poor rural regions choose cheap areas of land 
in the capital’s suburbs to construct their irregular 
housing, often close to factories. These settlements 
are built without respect to city planning or building 
permits, without the involvement of architects and 
engineers, and no construction taxes are paid. Most 
of the time, these new buildings are built in vulner-
able areas exposed to natural disasters and hazards, 
such as floods and lakeside landslides. This uncon-
trolled urban extension applies great pressure on 
devastated agricultural land32 and further leads to 
other urban problems, including inefficient public 
transport, an unattractive architectural landscape, 
inadequate housing conditions, and reduced public 
facilities such as water, electricity, and sanitation.
Since the 1980s, the government has begun rehabil-
itating these informal districts, and has contributed 
via the Urban Rehabilitation and Renovation Agency 
(ARRU)33 to improving the living conditions of over 
192 neighborhoods in the country.34 Since 1992, sup-
port for this has been provided by the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and the French Development 
Agency (AFD). Major projects have been implemented, 
including the demolition of low-quality buildings, the 
construction of social housing for the poorest fam-
ilies, the introduction of drinking water, electricity, 
and access to health services, and road improvement. 
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However, since this form of urban growth has never 
stopped, the government is unable to fully manage or 
overcome it.
Social Issues and Rampant Inequalities
The resulting chaos and lack of development strategy 
has produced high unemployment and school drop-
out rates, low educational levels, gender discrimina-
tion, and all types of violence in precarious neighbor-
hoods in Tunis. This situation encourages the growth 
of feelings of disappointment, contempt, inequality, 
isolation, and negligence, giving rise to hostile and 
highly defensive behavior.
Poverty, Violence, and Crime 
In the district of Ettadhamen, for example, which is 
three kilometers from central Tunis and has a very 
high population density estimated at 23,420 inhab-
itants per square kilometer, the unemployment rate 
is considered one of the highest in the country at 18 
percent in 2014.35 This situation, fed by exaggerated 
media coverage of negative events in the region, has 
stigmatized a large part of the local population based 
on where they live. This is a major impediment to 
the professional integration of local inhabitants and 
young people in particular, seriously affecting their 
chances of being hired.
In December 2015, International Alert, supported by 
the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 
conducted a social survey36 in the Ettadhamen neigh-
borhood,37 interviewing 740 young people between 
the ages of 18 and 34. Of this sample, a small percent-
age was completely illiterate (2 percent), most had 
dropped out of high school (51.7 percent), and only 
27.9 percent had completed higher education. Many 
had lost faith in school as an institution that allows 
them to climb the employment ladder. Over eighty 
percent reported that they only attended school to 
please their parents, while sixty percent rejected 
school because of corporal punishment and discour-
agement from their teachers. The average absentee 
rate in local schools is sixty percent.
Paradoxically, respondents were perfectly aware 
that their rejection of school was an obstacle in their 
35 See note 30.
36 “Strengthening youth participation in Ettadhamen and Douar Hicher,” International Alert <https://www.international-alert.org/projects/13591> 
(accessed November 23, 2018).
37 Abdelhamid Ferchichi, “Douar Hicher et Ettadhamen sous la loupe de International Alert: Une jeunesse à bout de patience,” African Manager, December 
8, 2015 <https://africanmanager.com/douar-hicher-et-ettadhamen-sous-la-loupe-de-international-alert-les-jeunes-a-bout-de-patience/> (accessed 
November 10, 2018).
38 Maha Abdelhamid, “Informal housing in the city of Gabes, urban extensions, social and spatial marginalization and environmental degradation,” PhD 
Thesis, University of Nanterre, Paris, 2012.
quest for decent work. Prematurely leaving school 
between the ages of 13 and 16 rendered them unem-
ployed immediately, without qualifications or super-
vision. Their first destination is usually the street, 
where they find themselves easy prey for drug deal-
ers, gangs, and delinquency (such as theft and loot-
ing). These young people do not hesitate to legitimize 
their actions which, they claim, represent an alterna-
tive to unemployment.
The percentage of crimes and violence recorded in 
the informal districts of Tunis is indeed the high-
est in the country. A state of disorder and disobe-
dience reigns there and in most cases, violence is 
more attractive than tolerance or peaceful solutions. 
This is certainly caused by the unhealthy social and 
economic environment, stress, insecurity, feelings of 
suffocation and contempt, and uncertainty about the 
future.
Own research conducted in 2016 revealed that older 
inhabitants shared the feeling of dissatisfaction. They 
were disillusioned and dispossessed of the dream 
that accompanied the Tunisian revolution, namely 
that their long-term isolation would be lifted. Over 
the years, discontent and disappointment deepened. 
These precarious living conditions highlight a major 
failure on the part of the state to control the impact 
of urban chaos or solve rampant inequalities, as 
urban and social processes are “both upstream and 
downstream, means, cause and effect.”38
The Emergence of a New Religious Fundamental-
ism
Religious extremism has emerged since the popu-
lar riots in Tunisia, quickly gaining ground with the 
rise of radical Salafism and the “Adherents of Sharia,” 
who claim to attempt reconciliation with faith and an 
expression of repentance after years of marginaliza-
tion under the old regime. Clashes have occurred on 
several occasions, sometimes armed and dangerous, 
between supporters of the extremist movement and 
the security forces. Since 2011, National Guard units 
have dismantled several terrorist cells in the Ettad-
hamen neighborhood alone, whose members were 
aged between 16 and 67; others have gone to fight 
in Syria. This new wave of fundamentalism has only 
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intensified social tensions in these marginalized dis-
tricts.
Recommendations
 - Introduce an urban restructuring and territorial 
rehabilitation strategy
The Tunisian government should continue the reha-
bilitation of informal cities and provide them with 
all essential systems (drinking water, sanitation, 
electricity, public transport, and so on). It should 
also re-launch social housing programs and re-inte-
grate these neighborhoods into national territorial 
development to reduce their isolation. More indus-
trial zones should be created around them to pro-
vide employment opportunities. This cannot happen 
without improvements to the infrastructure and nec-
essary facilities that would function as a foundation 
for attracting national and international economic 
investments in these regions.
 - Control excessive chaotic urbanization in the sub-
urbs and avoide improvisation in urban manage-
ment
There is an urgent need to publish revised city plans, 
which determine the urban boundaries of each 
region, accompanied by new technical specifications. 
This will help municipal authorities and citizens to 
understand their administrative and urban limits, 
prevent the construction of new buildings beyond 
those boundaries, and control the current urban 
sprawl. To stop the proliferation of lawlessness and 
crack down on public land abuses, it is crucial to 
enforce the obligation to consult architects, obtain 
building permits, pay municipal taxes before start-
ing any construction, and respect construction reg-
ulations and codes. Enforcement of laws, up-to-date 
measures, and regulations must be firmly applied 
as well, by providing warnings to lawbreakers, and 
imposing penalties, including destruction, on any 
unlawful occupation.
 - Enhance social and associative work by encourag-
ing the presence of international and independent 
national organizations
These organizations should aim to promote gender 
diversity, social cohesion, human rights, and combat 
school dropout and child labor in informal districts. 
Such associations can provide courses and programs 
to women and unemployed teenagers, offering train-
ings in different fields to promote their professional 
integration and help them become financially inde-
pendent. By strengthening their social and economic 
presence, this may contribute to lower rates of 
unemployment and violence.
Other associations, such as scouting, cultural, and 
sports activity providers, are of paramount impor-
tance for children and teenagers in these districts, 
who lack sufficient leisure and equipment to practice 
their hobbies and channel their energies. Expanding 
sports and cultural activities can provide youngsters 
with a broader education, prepare them for social 
life, and help them discover hidden skills.
 - Encourage a local and participatory governance 
approach
As the city cannot be transformed without first 
incorporating its inhabitants’ expectations, civil 
society, associations, NGOs, experts, and politicians 
must work together in the decision-making process, 
to improve existing conditions in an atmosphere of 
coexistence and democracy. Periodic forums and 
meetings should be organized by the municipalities 
to discuss the main issues in the marginalized dis-
tricts and find realistic solutions. All stakeholders 
should be involved together in future projects, such 
as the collective elaboration of a mobility plan, the 
development of public and green squares, the imple-
mentation of public lighting, the embellishment of 
the city, and so on. This also requires a participatory 
transparent budget mechanism to allow for inhabi-
tants’ direct decision-making and control of munici-
pal budget spending.
Following the first municipal elections in Tunisian 
history (May 2018), this new approach should be 
applied in all urban districts. It has the potential to 
re-integrate insecure populations, and reduce feel-
ings of injustice and isolation that for years have led 
to social violence and crimes. Inhabitants will be 
encouraged to get involved in the development pro-
cess while raising a new consciousness of ownership, 
Uncontrolled urban growth 
creates great pressure and 
social problems
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taking charge of their own future living spaces in 
total justice, dignity, and equality.
Maha Kouas is an architect, urban planner, and 
PhD student in Urban Sociology at the University 
of Tunis, Tunisia, and in Urban Planning at the 
École Polytechnique de Bruxelles – ULB in Bel-
gium. Her research focuses on the development 
of metropolitan areas and the increase of their 
socio-spatial inequalities.
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TAX COLLECTION – AN IMPORTANT 
LEVER FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH
Oumaima Jegham
Fiscal policies are one of the main tools available to 
public authorities to intervene in and enhance eco-
nomic growth and social development. In 2014, Tuni-
sia started implementing its fiscal reform by tackling 
various types of tax, including income tax, corporate 
tax and value added tax. This reform was driven by 
the rapid increase in public spending, which in turn 
required better tax collection and higher tax revenue. 
These tax reforms ended up burdening consumers, 
most notably low income groups, and failed to fully 
include small producers, who are major actors in the 
Tunisian economy. Thus, establishing a less burden-
some, more progressive, and more inclusive fiscal sys-
tem is crucial for increasing economic activities and 
ensuring social stability.
The post-revolutionary period in Tunisia has revealed 
the full extent of the country’s dire economic and 
social situation, and has been accompanied by polit-
ical, economic, and financial reforms. In May 2013, 
the Ministry of Finance launched a deep and struc-
tural reform of the tax system, which was halted by 
November 2014. Reforms included a review of the 
taxes and rates already in force, and grouping scat-
tered fiscal provisions into one single code. However, 
when reaching the implementation phase, the group-
ing section of the reform was dropped, and only the 
urgently needed fiscal provisions were implemented 
by consecutive finance laws.
In addition, the overall economic situation is far from 
reassuring; even the most positive indicators are con-
sidered insufficient to resolve the crisis. For example, 
the growth rate, expected to reach 2.7 percent,39 is 
not high enough to reduce the unemployment rate, 
currently fixed at 15.4 percent.40 At the same time, 
the budget deficit continues to worsen, reaching 6.1 
percent of GDP in 2017.41 Following the same trend, 
public debt is expected to reach 71.4 percent of GDP, 
according to calculations provided by the Finance 
39 Report on the Finance Bill of 2018, p. 21 <http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Ite 
mid=722&view=finish&cid=1287&catid=10&lang=ar-AA> (accessed December 6, 2018).
40 Unemployment figures from the Institut National de la Statistique (INS) <http://www.ins.nat.tn/fr/themes/emploi#1908> (accessed December 6, 
2018).
41 Budget deficit figures from the Ministry of Finance <http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_content&view=ar ticle&id=73&Itemid=447&lan
g=ar-AA> (accessed December 6, 2018).
42 “Synthèse des Résultats des Finances Publiques (Budget de l’Etat),” Ministry of Finance <http://finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article& id=134&Itemid=304&lang=fr> (accessed November 14, 2018).
43 “Tunisie: Rapport de suivi de la situation économique,” World Bank, 2018 <https://www.banquemondiale.org/fr/country/tunisia/publication/eco nomic-
outlook-april-2018> (accessed November 14, 2018).
44 “Rapport de l’observatoire social Tunisien,” Forum Tunisien des droits economiques et sociaux, March 2018, p. 9 <https://ftdes.net/rapports/
fr.mars2018.pdf> (accessed December 6, 2018).
Law of 2018.42 Moreover, the 2018 Gini index of dis-
tribution stands at 30.9 percent.43 According to the 
Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights, 1,490 
social movements were registered in January 2018, 
most of which were formed in response the new fis-
cal provisions presented in the Finance Law of 2018.44
The Impact of Direct Taxation on Low-Income 
Households and Small- and Medium-Enterprises 
(SMEs)
Taxes are divided into two groups: direct and indi-
rect. Direct taxes are paid directly by an individual 
or organization, and usually consist of income taxes, 
corporate taxes and taxes on capital (such as prop-
erties or land). Indirect taxes, commonly known as 
value added tax and consumption duties, are passed 
onto consumers as part of the purchase price of 
goods or services. They are usually collected by one 
entity in the supply chain and are finally paid to the 
government.
Tax may also be understood in terms of its progres-
sivity or non-progressivity. Progressivity entails 
increasing the tax rate according to the increase in 
the taxable amount, while proportional taxes have 
a fixed tax rate regardless of the taxable amount. 
Unlike proportional tax, progressive tax plays a major 
role in reducing inequalities through imposing rates 
that are dependent on income levels. This implies 
that the lowest income groups pay a smaller amount 
compared to high-income groups, without impacting 
the living standards of either.
Income Tax
Income tax is commonly associated with progres-
sivity. In Tunisia, income tax has witnessed few 
changes over the years. Since the country gained 
independence in 1956, income tax has only been 
reviewed three times: the first adjustment was in 
1986, followed by another revision in 1989 as part of 
the structural adjustment plan, and the latest change 
took place in 2017. As Table 1 illustrates, tax brack-
ets have been dramatically revised between 1986 
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and 2017, in accordance with attempts to make the 
tax system less complicated. However, income tax 
has retained its progressive character, which guar-
antees the principle of tax justice, where tax payers 
con tribute according to their income, and the most 
vulnerable social economic groups are exempt from 
paying.
One 2017 study45 on fiscal policy, income redistri-
bution and poverty reduction in Tunisia has found 
that two-thirds of inequality reduction arises from 
applying income tax and social programs such as 
subsidies.46 The same study analyzed the income 
tax burdens on various social economic groups, and 
the findings indicate that the poorest groups tend 
to pay relatively high rates of income tax and social 
security contributions compared to their net market 
income. Income tax figures from 1989 until 2016 show 
45 Nizar Jouini et al., “Fiscal Policy, Income Redistribution and Poverty Reduction: Evidence from Tunisia”, CEQ Institute, Working Paper No. 38, January 
2017, p. 4.
46 These results were obtained through comparing the Gini index before and after the application of income tax, as well as adding simulated benefits from 
social programs.
that low-income groups earning under the minimum 
wage were taxed at very high rates, even when infla-
tion started to grow in 2013. 
The new income tax system, introduced in 2017, has 
reduced the tax burden on the lowest income groups: 
prior to 2017, an individual earning 6,300 TND a year 
paid tax on 11.43 percent of their monthly income, 
compared to only 5.36 percent now. Even though 
these changes have brought about a remarkably 
lower tax burden on low-income groups, it is still not 
enough, especially when considering the dramatic 
increase in the inflation rate, from 4.8 percent in 2017 
to 7.5 percent in 2018.
Figure 1: Individual Income Tax Rates (1986-2017)
1986-1989 1989-2016 2017-Now
Tax rateTax Bracket
0 à 900 dinars
900 à 1.300 dinars
1.300 à 1.500 dinars
1.500 à 2.000 dinars
2.000 à 2.500 dinars
2.500 à 3.000 dinars
3.000 à 3.500 dinars
3.500 à 4.000 dinars
4.000 à 5.000 dinars
5.000 à 6.000 dinars
6.000 à 8.000 dinars
8.000 à 10.000 dinars
10.000 à 14.000 dinars
14.000 à 25.000 dinars
25.000 à 40.000 dinars
40.000 à 60.000 dinars
60.000 à 80.000 dinars
Au-delà de 80.000 dinars
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
36%
42%
48%
54%
56%
58%
60%
62%
64%
66%
68%
Tax rateTax Bracket
0 à 1.500 dinars
de 1.500,001 à 
5.000 dinars
de 5.000,001 
à 10.000 dinars
de 10.000,001 
à 20.000 dinars
de 20.000,001 
à 50.000 dinars
Plus de 50.000 dinars
0%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Tax rateTax Bracket
0 à 5.000 dinars
de 5.000,001 à 
20.000 dinars
de 20.000,001 
à 30.000 dinars
de 30.000,001 
à 50.000 dinars
Plus de 50.000 dinars
0%
26%
28%
32%
35%
Source: Figures from the Ministry of Finance, Table 1 (1986-1989): Finance Law 1986, Article 8 <http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/1985/1985A/Ja09185.pdf> 
(accessed December 6, 2018). Table 2 (1989-2016): Habib Ayadi, “Droit fiscal,” (Tunis: CERP, 1989). Table 3: Finance Law 2017, Article 14.
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Corporate Tax
The other pillar of Tunisian tax revenues is corporate 
tax (CT). Unlike income tax, CT is not progressive and 
the same tax rate is usually applied to all taxpayers, 
regardless of their profits. Most CT payers are local 
and foreign companies established in Tunisia, as well 
as non-resident, non-established legal entities with 
a Tunisian income. These companies must pay a pro-
portion of their revenues on a quarterly basis. The CT 
rate was initially set at 35 percent by Law No. 80 of 
2006, however, from 2007 onwards, this rate gradu-
ally declined, reaching 25 percent in 2014.47 CT rates 
vary according to industrial sector. For instance, 
agricultural and crafts companies, exporters, and 
firms who mostly hire young people all pay a reduced 
47 Amine Bouzaïene, “Equité fiscale et système d’imposition en Tunisie”, Observatoire Tunisien de l’économie, Briefing Paper No. 4, November 22, 2017 
<http://www.economie-tunisie.org/sites/default/files/20171010-bp-equitefiscale-ab-fr.pdf> (accessed November 14, 2018). The 35 percent rate was 
changed by Article 1 of Law No. 80 of 2006 on reducing tax and tax burdens on companies. Law in Arabic, p. 4 <http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/
files/journal-officiel/2006/2006A/Ja1012006.pdf> (accessed December 7, 2018).
rate of ten percent, while companies operating in the 
financial, communication, insurance, and oil sectors 
pay 35 percent of their revenues.
One aspect of reducing inequalities and promot-
ing inclusive growth is through economic prosper-
ity, thus providing an easily accessible market to all. 
Over recent years, the reduction in CT and other fis-
cal provisions has been interpreted as tax incentives 
for companies to increase production and hire more 
people. However, as indicated in the graph below, the 
share of CT in overall state revenue has halved since 
2015.
The Finance Law of 2018 introduced a new provi-
sion that imposes a twenty percent tax rate on SMEs 
Figure 2: Evolution of State Revenues 2015-2018
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whose revenue does not exceed one million Tunisian 
dinars for commercial activities, and 500,000 dinars 
for non-commercial activities. This tax is applied 
progressively, so that companies pay according to 
their revenues.
The Impact of Indirect Taxes on Low-Income 
Groups
Value added tax (VAT) was a product of the structural 
adjustment plan introduced in the 1980s. Prior to 
that, the Tunisian government imposed consumption 
duties, which mostly applied to alcoholic beverages, 
cigarettes.
Today, VAT represents around 19.92 percent of total 
state revenue, compared to 9.77 percent from income 
tax and 6.83 percent from corporate tax.48 VAT has 
been reformed several times over the years, most 
recently in 2017, with a rate increase of one percent. 
VAT is now imposed at 19 percent, with a 7 percent 
rate for health services, hotels, and catering services, 
and a 12 percent rate payable for services from inde-
pendent professions (such as lawyers and doctors), 
electricity, and oil production. However, no published 
data exists on the exact revenue generated by each 
tax rate.
The VAT burden usually falls on the consumer, since 
the tax is placed on a product whenever value is 
added at each stage of the supply chain, from pro-
duction to the point of sale. In addition, VAT rates do 
not take individuals’ income levels into account, thus 
impacting their purchasing power and even access 
to basic needs. One tax burden analysis has shown 
that consumption duties and VAT reduce the market 
income of the lowest third in Tunisia by an average of
15.17 percent.49 However, these results are not only 
restricted to low-income groups. Considering the 
nature of the tax, where it increases as a percent-
age of total expenditure of disposable income, it rep-
resents the same burden on high-income groups.
Even though the VAT and consumption duties burden 
is the same for all income groups, its impact is felt 
differently from one group to another. Poor house-
holds tend to be net consumers with little, if any, sav-
ings. Thus, an increase in VAT will negatively impact 
their purchasing pattern, and thus their consumption 
48 This is our own calculation based on the numbers presented in the Finance Bill: <http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Ite 
mid=722&view=finish&cid=1287&catid=10&lang=ar-AA> (accessed December 7, 2018).
49 Jouini et. al.
50 Ibid.
too. On the other hand, better-off households tend 
to be net savers, so an increase in VAT will result a 
change to saving patterns, while keeping their con-
sumption constant. Considering the huge impact of 
taxes on individuals and the private sector, and espe-
cially in relation to last year’s public protests against 
the Finance Law and the deterioration of living stan-
dards, it is now crucial for Tunisia to review some of 
its tax rates and policies, in order to promote eco-
nomic growth, and reduce both poverty and inequal-
ities.
Recommendations
Under the scope of the Finance Law of 2019, poli-
cy-makers should:
 - Review the applicable income tax rates and brackets
The inflation rate under which the applicable rates 
were designed has increased by 1.4 percent over the 
past year, which has impacted the purchasing power 
and living standards of individuals dramatically. One 
study has shown that these rates burden lower-in-
come groups to an even greater extent.50 To solve 
this, tax brackets should be reviewed, either through 
further dividing the income bracket into multiple 
income brackets, thus achieving have a more pro-
gressive income tax, or through further exemptions 
of lower-income groups from paying. This provision 
will reinforce the purchasing power of individuals, 
and also result in greater economic activity through 
increased consumption.
 - Opt for a Progressive Corporate Tax
The Finance Law of 2018 established a tax rate that 
takes companies’ revenue levels into consideration. 
This provision falls under the scope of promoting 
and enhancing the growth of SMEs. Noting that more 
than two-thirds of the private sector is composed of 
SMEs, with differing revenues, this rate should be 
made more inclusive for other SMEs, independent 
from the sector of activity, in order to allow them 
more funds to invest and enter new markets, thus 
enhancing economic growth.
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 - Review VAT
Due to the lack of data on the amount generated 
from each taxable service and good, it is not possible 
to target a specific tax rate. However, when reviewing 
VAT, deputies are encouraged to request the amounts 
generated from each rate, and their evolution over 
recent years. This type of information is crucial for 
deciding which services and goods should be taxed 
less (or more), while bearing in mind the possible 
impact of these rates on poorer households. Reduc-
ing VAT rates or exempting certain goods and ser-
vices will certainly impact the state budget, causing 
a loss in state revenues. Nonetheless, reinforcing 
efforts to date, and increasing the means to tackle 
tax evasion and fraud, estimated at around forty per-
cent,51 is one part of the solution.
Oumaima Jegham is an advocacy officer at Oxfam 
in Tunisia. At the time of the workshop, whe was 
a project analyst within the budget observatory 
“Marsad Budget” team at the Tunisian NGO Al 
Bawsala. In her role as an analyst, she worked 
on analyzing, simplifying, and visualizing bud-
getary data to reach as many people as possible 
and raise awareness about public finance issues 
in Tunisia. She has also conducted research and 
advocacy activities, most notably on the current 
reform of the budgetary process, and on inclusive 
growth and tax reform matters.
51 Ibid.
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REINFORCING THE JUDICIARY – 
TUNISIA’S STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH 
ITS CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Rim Dhaouadi
The new Tunisian Constitution of 2014 has introduced 
new principles designed to break with past practices 
and autocratic traditions. To put these principles into 
practice, the Constitution envisaged the creation of 
several new institutions to reinforce the power of the 
judiciary and ensure its independence from the exec-
utive. Article 102 of the Constitution granted extensive 
powers to the judiciary, and the Constitutional Court 
in particular, to ensure the supremacy of the Consti-
tution over all other legislation, ensure the consistency 
of all laws with the Constitution, and act as a check on 
the executive and legislature while arbitrating between 
them in disputes, all of which serve to uphold the rule 
of law.1 Four years later, the establishment of the Con-
stitutional Court has stalled due to endless rounds of 
political negotiations. In order to sustain Tunisia’s 
reform momentum, political stakeholders should pri-
oritize and accelerate the nomination of court mem-
bers, and ensure those members have the suitable 
character and competence to reinforce its indepen-
dence and authority.
Tunisia’s new 2014 Constitution granted significant 
powers to a new Constitutional Court, creating a 
new dynamic between political powers. The Tunisian 
judiciary will have the power to oversee the consti-
tutionality of the legislative and the executive’s work. 
However, so far, key political stakeholders with a 
strong interest in maintaining the status quo have 
yet to take the necessary steps to set up the Consti-
tutional Court.
The Powers of the Constitutional Court
The Constitutional Court is an independent judicial 
institution designed to guarantee the supremacy of 
the Constitution, protect rights and freedoms, and 
ensure respect for the rule of law. Its decisions cannot 
be appealed. The National Constituent Assembly cre-
ated a Constitutional Court to achieve several goals. 
The first is the classic role of ensuring respect for 
the Constitution. The second is linked to the Tunisian 
context and recent history, where the law was often 
used as a means to limit rights and freedoms rather 
than protect them. Finally, the Constitutional Court 
is the only jurisdiction in charge of overseeing all 
1 Xavier Philippe, “Contrôle juridictionnel et Cour constitutionnelle dans la Constitution,” La Constitution de la Tunisie – Processus, principes et 
perspectives, UNDP, 2016, p. 544.
constitutional matters relating to all powers, includ-
ing other judicial institutions, thus empowering the 
judiciary and creating a balance between the three 
branches of power.
According to the Constitution, the Court is to be a 
central institution with a significant national role. 
The Tunisian model is in fact a centralized one, in 
which the Court is the sole authority responsible 
for reviewing the constitutionality of all laws. It does 
not have regional representation and does not pro-
vide any opportunity for direct appeals by citizens. 
However, although it is a central institution based in 
Tunis, it is accessible to citizens all over the coun-
try through its indirect post facto review of laws that 
parties can request before any tribunal.
The Constitutional Court has constitutional review 
powers essentially aimed at purging existing legisla-
tion of unconstitutional provisions and unifying the 
interpretation of the Constitution. The Court has 
two types of constitutional review powers. The first 
is an a priori constitutional review of draft laws. This 
review process can be launched upon the request of 
the President of the Republic, the Head of the Gov-
ernment, or at least thirty members of the Assembly 
of Representatives of the People (ARP) within seven 
days of the ARP’s adoption of the draft law and before 
its ratification by the President. In addition, this pro-
cedure enshrines the right of the opposition in par-
liament – only thirty out of 217 ARP members – to 
effectively challenge the constitutionality of the leg-
islative majority agenda. If the Court deems a draft 
law unconstitutional, the President of the Republic 
must then return it to the ARP for a second reading. 
The Court automatically reviews the second version, 
according to Article 122 of the Constitution. Before 
signing the draft law, the President of the Repub-
lic must resubmit it to the Constitutional Court to 
reconsider and rule on its constitutionality.
The second type of constitutional review, outlined 
in Article 123 of the Constitution, is the ex post facto 
review, which applies to cases where litigant parties 
in a dispute before any court in the country claim the 
unconstitutionality of the law applicable to the case. 
If the Constitutional Court finds the law in question 
or a part of the law unconstitutional, the implemen-
tation of the part or law in question is immediately 
suspended. This procedure extends indirect access 
to the Court to a wider segment of the population.
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In addition, the Court has other important powers. It 
is responsible for overseeing constitutional amend-
ments, proposals, and procedures, and reviewing the 
constitutionality of international treaties before the 
draft law approving them is ratified. It also reviews 
the constitutionality of the ARP’s bylaws. The Con-
stitution has also granted the Court other significant 
powers vis-à-vis executive authorities. It rules on 
the removal of the President of the Republic in the 
event of a serious violation of the Constitution, and 
declares the temporary or permanent vacancy of the 
position of President of the Republic (Article 85). The 
Court also rules over the continuation of what the 
Constitution refers to as “exceptional circumstances” 
(including, for example, a state of emergency) upon 
referral by the ARP President or thirty ARP members 
(Article 80). This is particularly relevant since suc-
cessive governments have been renewing the state 
of emergency for the past seven years in the absence 
of any constitutional review. Finally, the Court rules 
on disputes over the respective powers of the Pres-
ident of the Republic and the Head of Government 
(Article 101).
The Constitution introduced new principles to break 
with past practices and autocratic traditions. To 
implement these principles, it foresaw the creation 
of several new institutions with jurisdictional powers 
to reinforce the power of the judiciary and ensure its 
independence.
The Supreme Judicial Council Election: A Lengthy 
Process
The Constitution provided for the creation of a new 
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) with extended powers 
to oversee the organization and reform of the justice 
system, and manage the appointment and tenure of 
judges. Its election2 took place in a tense atmosphere3 
nearly two years after the constitutional deadline for 
the election had passed.4 This delay has impacted on 
several transitional processes, primarily on the rein-
forcement of judicial power, including the creation of 
the Constitutional Court.
2 “Tunisie : Election historique du nouveau conseil supérieur de la magistrature,” Jeune Afrique, October 24, 2016, <http://www.jeuneafrique.
com/368233/politique/tunisie-election-historique-nouveau-conseil-superieur-de-magistrature> (accessed November 13, 2018).
3 Abdesellam al Kikli, “Birth Pangs of the Supreme Judicial Council in Tunisia,” Legal Agenda, December 20, 2016 <http://www.legal-agenda.com/article.
php?id=3324> (accessed November 13, 2018).
4 Article 148, paragraph 5: “The Supreme Judicial Council shall be created within a maximum of six months from the date of the first legislative elections; 
and the Constitutional Court shall be created within a maximum of one year from the elections.”
5 “Création d’un syndicat des magistrats tunisiens,” Turess, March 25, 2011 <https://www.turess.com/fr/tapfr/35745> (accessed November 13, 2018).
6 “Tunisie: élection historique pour le nouveau Conseil supérieur de la magistrature,” Jeune Afrique, October 24, 2016 <http://www.jeuneafrique.
com/368233/politique/tunisie-election-historique-nouveau-conseil-superieur-de-magistrature> (accessed November 19, 2018).
7 “Tunisia: amendments to the High Judicial Council law would weaken the independence and authority of the judiciary,” International Commission of 
Jurists, March 30, 2017 <https://www.icj.org/tunisia-amendments-to-the-high-judicial-council-law-would-weaken-the-independence-and-authority-of-
the-judiciary/> (accessed November 19, 2018).
The adoption of the SJC organic law on April 26, 
2016 – which occurred after passing of the organic 
law on the Constitutional Court in December 2015 
– was characterized by polarization and divisions 
among different actors within the judicial sector. This 
included a schism between the Magistrates Union, 
created in 2011,5 and the Association of Tunisian Mag-
istrates (AMT), which dates back to the Ben Ali period 
and was engaged in advocating for the independence 
of the judiciary from the executive power. There 
was also criticism from civil society actors, such as 
Human Rights Watch,6 who denounced attempts by 
political parties to neutralize the new SJC.
In addition, the organic law on the SJC was revised 
by the ARP to strip the Temporary Judiciary Com-
mission of the authority to appoint the President of 
the Cassation Court to convene the first meeting of 
the new SJC, instead giving this prerogative to the 
President of the ARP. This was considered by civil 
society actors, including the International Commis-
sion of Jurists, as a violation of the separation of pow-
ers,7 and undue interference by the legislative power 
into the internal affairs of the judiciary. The same 
ARP amendment also included lowering the quorum 
needed to validate the meetings, which would enable 
a minority of SJC members to rule over the judiciary.
Successive governments 
have been renewing 
the state of emergency 
in the absence of any 
 constitutional review
Chapter III: The Role of the Judiciary
74
REPORT
No. 2 | January 2020 – first published in December 2018
Impact on the Constitutional Court
The organic law on the Constitutional Court was 
adopted before the law on the SJC. According to the 
former, parliamentary blocs select and present can-
didates for the Constitutional Court, however, no 
steps have been taken to start setting up the Court 
prior to the creation of the SJC. This procedural 
delay may at first seem logical, given that the Coun-
cil must appoint one third of the Court’s members. 
However, neither the Constitutional Court law nor 
the SJC law prohibit the ARP from progressing on 
both institutions simultaneously. The ARP could have 
started negotiations over candidates while waiting 
for the establishment of the Council. Such an initia-
tive would have shown greater engagement by the 
legislative power, and political actors more generally, 
towards implementing constitutional provisions and 
rectifying errors and delays. It may even have helped 
in consolidating public trust in political institutions 
and their willingness to continue reform.
An Overall Hostile Political Environment
The Constitution provided for the creation of other 
new state bodies, such as independent institutions 
in charge of overseeing human and civil rights pro-
tections,8 and a new infrastructure to decentralize 
administrative justice. However, continuous delays in 
creating these institutions reflect a political climate 
that is generally hostile to institutional reform, pre-
cisely because such institutions, once created, will 
influence the political and legal landscapes and bal-
ance the executive and legislative powers. But these 
delays negatively impact on the legitimacy of demo-
8 The Elections Commission, Audio-Visual Communication Commission, Human Rights Commission, Commission for Sustainable Development and the 
Rights of Future Generations, The Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Commission.
9 “Tunisia: Slow Reform Pace Undermines Rights,” Human Rights Watch, January 18, 2018 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/tunisia-slow-
reform-pace-undermines-rights> (accessed November 19, 2018).
10 Law organizing the temporary commission that reviews the constitutionality of draft laws <http://www.cnudst.rnrt.tn/jortsrc/2014/2014f/jo0322014.
pdf> (accessed December 11, 2018).
11 Rihab Boukhayatia, “Voici pourquoi la loi sur la reconciliation administrative est attaquée pour inconsittutionnalité,” HuffPost Tunisie, September 22, 
2017 <https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2017/09/22/reconciliation-administra_n_18072586.html> (accessed November 19, 2018).
12 Amna Gallali, “The law that could be the final blow to Tunisia’s transition,” Middle East Eye, May 23, 2017 <https://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/
reconciliation-bill-threatens-tunisia-s-transition-1123332030> (accessed November 19, 2018).
cratic change and citizens’ trust in state institutions. 
At the same time, several laws inconsistent with the 
spirit of the Constitution are being enacted, such as 
the so-called administrative reconciliation law that 
shields civil servants implicated in corruption from 
future prosecution.9
Despite the existence of a temporary commission 
overseeing the constitutionality of draft laws cre-
ated in 201410 and composed of six members, in the 
absence of a Constitutional Court, many laws con-
sidered unconstitutional by more than thirty ARP 
members11 and civil society organizations,12 and 
especially those laws with political implications, are 
being passed. This is a result of the tied vote inside 
the temporary commission on the constitutionality 
of draft laws: in such situations, the President of the 
Republic, as protector of the Constitution, has the 
tiebreaker role in deadlocks over constitutionality, 
and in the case of the reconciliation law, the Presi-
dent eventually ratified the bill.
The Difficult Appointment Process and Risk of 
Politicization
The appointment of Constitutional Court members 
involves the three branches of power: the legislature 
(ARP), the executive (via the President of the Repub-
lic), and the judiciary (via the SJC). Each of these pow-
ers appoints four members to the Court. Initially, the 
delay in the creation of the Constitutional Court was 
explained by its dependence on the establishment of 
the SJC, whose creation was itself delayed for nearly 
two years and carried out in a tense atmosphere of 
political tensions and disagreements. The nomination 
process of Court members, initiated in March 2018 
at the ARP, provoked heated debates between parlia-
mentary blocs and civil society actors.
Candidates’ Selection and Voting Process
Article 118 of the Constitution establishes a mandate 
for three separate authorities to nominate members 
of the Constitutional Court in a sequential fashion 
starting with the President of the Republic, then 
the ARP, and finally the SJC. Articles 11, 12, and 13 of 
The political climate 
is generally hostile to 
 institutional reform
Chapter III: The Role of the Judiciary
75No. 2 | January 2020 – first published in December 2018
REPORT
the organic law, however, reversed this order and 
mandated that the ARP will be the first nominating 
authority. This change may be explained by practical 
considerations, since the ARP’s pace of deliberation 
is slower than that of other institutions. Yet the con-
stitutionality of this change might also be debatable 
in the sense that the constitutional version should 
always prevail.
Besides, in the current context, the blockage within 
the ARP is delaying the nomination process due to 
a lack of consensus between parliamentary blocs, 
as well as their lack of organization and prepared-
ness. For instance, according to civil society activist 
Chaima Bouhlel,13 several candidates were rejected 
on formal grounds because the dossiers presented 
were incomplete, indicating that parliamentary blocs 
and their candidates had not adequately prepared 
the candidacy files.
The ARP’s voting process on candidates has gener-
ated several controversies. Negotiations over can-
didates are taking place between the presidents of 
parliamentary blocs behind closed doors at the con-
sensus committee, which holds meetings in secret. 
In addition, according to Article 11 of the organic law 
on the Constitutional Court, ARP members’ votes on 
candidates are also secret, which is inconsistent with 
the principles of transparency and accountability of 
decision-making.
After seven months of deliberations and negotiations 
and three election rounds, so far, only one candi-
date has been able to secure the required majority 
of votes. This leaves eight other Court members who 
still need to be elected. The source of the election 
blockage seems to reside in most candidates’ lack 
of support among ARP members, as each nominee 
is relatively unknown to all the blocs except the one 
that nominated them. 
Instead of seeking solutions that open the process up 
to more participation and input, the President of the 
Republic has proposed a solution to the blockage that 
shrinks democratic buy-in by introducing a draft law 
13 Interview with Chaima Bouhlel conducted by the author on August 25, 2018.
14 “A legislative intervention to establish the Constitutional Court: A solution to overcome the crisis or an attempt to dominate the process?” [in Arabic], 
The Legal Agenda, May 17, 2018 <http://www.legal-agenda.com/article.php?id=4464> (accessed November 19, 2018).
15 Ibid.
16 “L’amendement de la loi sur la Cour constitutionnelle : Al Jomhouri pas d’accord,” Webmanagercenter, May 10, 2018 <https://www.webmanagercenter.
com/2018/05/10/419755/lamendem ent-de-la-loi-sur-la-cour-constitutionnelle-al-jomhouri-pas-daccord/> (accessed November 19, 2018).
17 Nadia Dejoui, Interview with Jinan Limam, L’ Economiste Maghrébin, March 23, 2018 <https://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/2018/03/21/jinan-
limam-risques-politisation-cour-eleves> (accessed November 19, 2018).
18 Ibid.
19 Yasmine Hajer, Interview with Kais Saied [in Arabic], The Legal Agenda, May 25, 2018 <http://legal-agenda.com/article.php?id=4500> (accessed 
December 11, 2018).
seeking to modify the Constitutional Court’s organic 
law, which would reduce the required majority of 
votes needed to approve candidates from a two-
thirds majority to an absolute majority.14 This draft 
law has been criticized by civil society activists15 and 
political actors16 who have noted that for the second 
time, and as the result of a precedent set by the mod-
ification of the organic law organizing the SJC men-
tioned above, a change of legislation is being under-
taken to overcome a political struggle. In addition to 
interfering with executive power in the affairs of the 
judiciary, this change also shows the inability of the 
ARP to adopt sustainable laws that ensure the stabil-
ity of institutions. Changing the organic law can open 
the door to other changes and eventually endanger 
the Constitutional Court’s power and independence.
Risk of Politicization
In addition to the powers of the Constitutional Court, 
the nine-year term for Court members provided by 
Article 118 of the Constitution may also explain17 why 
the two largest parties in the ARP (Nida Tounes and 
Ennahda) seem anxious to control the future Court, 
rather than making it truly independent. Contrary to 
what is mandated by the Constitution, some experts, 
such as the public law professor Jinan Limam,18 argue 
that some candidates tend to be chosen for their 
political loyalties rather than on competencies alone. 
In addition, constitutional law professor Kais Saied19 
considers that the potential politicization of the 
Constitutional Court is closely linked to the appoint-
ment system: since Court members are appointed by 
politicians, the Court’s council is inevitably going to 
reflect political power relations in Tunisia.
Nevertheless, the Constitution and organic law set 
a number of minimum independence guarantees for 
Court members to adhere to the mission entrusted to 
them. The single, lengthy nine-year terms served by 
Court members (Article 118 of the Constitution) is one 
measure intended to guarantee some independence. 
Moreover, Court members enjoy functional immunity 
(Article 22 of the organic law), while the remunera-
tion of the Court’s president equals that of minis-
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ters, and the remuneration of the remaining mem-
bers equals that of state secretaries (Article 23 of the 
organic law). Court members must also declare their 
assets (Article 25 of the organic law). Finally, Court 
members are not allowed to engage in any lucrative 
or non-lucrative professional activities other than 
those necessitated by their missions (Article 26 of 
the organic law). This does not exclude them entirely 
from being active in associations, provided that they 
respect their duty of confidentiality as mandated by 
Article 27 of the organic law.
In May 2018, a civil society coalition of activists and 
organizations20 launched a campaign criticizing 
“the governmental initiative to reduce the majority 
required for the election of Court members and the 
blessing of the President of the Republic,” and advo-
cating for “an independent Constitutional Court.” 
The coalition published a joint communiqué and an 
online petition21 urging all political and institutional 
stakeholders to proceed quickly with the election of 
Constitutional Court members, and to ensure the 
transparency of this process and the independence 
of the Court.
Given the nature of its work, the Constitutional 
Court is designed to be the guarantor of rule of law 
in Tunisia. Most importantly, over time, its work will 
help ensure coherence in the entire body of existing 
Tunisian legislation, gradually transforming Tunisia 
into a “rule of law” state, preventing arbitrary deci-
sion-making at all levels and thus improving citi-
zens’ legal security. Strengthening the rule of law in 
Tunisia is a key objective of the ongoing institutional 
reform. It involves reforming the justice system to 
increase its independence vis-à-vis the executive, 
and improve access to justice for citizens.
Recommendations
 - The President of the Republic and the Supreme 
Judicial Council should accelerate the selection of 
their candidates to the Court
The Constitutional Court will be crucial in purging 
unconstitutional provisions from Tunisian laws, and 
will support the legislature in maintaining the con-
sistency of legislation. There should be no further 
delays to the nomination process, and appointments 
20 See note 13.
21 Online petition [in Arabic] https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScNCIM0hNABxmUIofjit MxDJB64-JCngAX_XAc_amVeDFmjNA/viewform 
(accessed December 11, 2018).
22 A civil society coalition for an independent Constitutional Court, composed of ten organizations and several activists, published an official communiqué 
calling for the establishment of an independent Constitutional Court on May 31, 2018 <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RvNcz4bno2L3Ytc631Tkmd_-
KlcTzaab/view> (accessed November 19, 2018).
should be made as soon as possible to reinforce the 
independence and authority of the Court.
The organic law on the Constitutional Court should 
not be modified on any grounds. This would ensure 
that no unconstitutional amendments are possible in 
the absence of the Constitutional Court. In addition, 
changes aimed at controlling or weakening the Court 
constitute interference by the legislature and execu-
tive in the affairs of the judiciary.
 - Voting on candidates should be transparent, 
respecting the principles of transparency and 
accountability, and ensuring that political actors 
do not to control the Court
Candidates should be auditioned at the ARP’s ple-
nary session before their election in order to present 
their expertise, ideas, and motivation to be a mem-
ber of the Constitutional Court.22 Auditions would 
allow members to choose candidates on the grounds 
of their competencies. Ensuring the transparency 
of the election process would increase public trust 
in the Constitutional Court and ensure that future 
Constitutional Court members would be known to 
the public. It would also increase trust in political 
actors’ willingness to advance institutional reforms, 
since they would have to demonstrate their commit-
ment to implementing the Constitution and rectify-
ing delays.
 - The President of the Republic should defer all new 
decisions over controversial draft laws until a Con-
stitutional Court can adjudicate and lend legiti-
macy
In the absence of a Constitutional Court, the Presi-
dent of the Republic is the only protector of the Con-
stitution. In cases where the constitutionality of new 
laws and measures is disputed, the President should 
defer all new decisions until a Constitutional Court 
can adjudicate.
 - The ARP, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry 
of Finance should ensure that the Constitutional 
Court has the proper funds, premises, and assis-
tance to carry out its missions
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Once established, the Constitutional Court should 
have proper premises and assistance to carry out its 
missions and serious responsibilities. It will be start-
ing from scratch and will need to assert its authority 
over most powers and other jurisdictions. The Court 
also needs to meet tight deadlines imposed by the 
Constitution to make its rulings, and will probably 
be overwhelmed by the number of appeals referred 
by ordinary courts at the request of citizens. There-
fore, the Court should have suitable premises, proper 
administrative assistance, and research support.
 - Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) should support 
the campaign for the independence of the Consti-
tutional Court
CSOs should gather together a broad alliance of 
organizations and independent activists to support 
the campaign for the independence of the Consti-
tutional Court, and expand its social basis through 
media presence and public awareness campaigns.
 - International actors should be more pro-active in 
supporting the creation of an independent Consti-
tutional Court
International organizations should support civil 
society actors in advocating for the prompt estab-
lishment of the Constitutional Court, and help 
ensure the transparency of this process as well as 
the independence of the Court. Much of the exist-
ing support from international actors has focused on 
justice reform; their rule of law programs have not 
specifically focused on the issue of the Constitutional 
Court, a lacuna that should be addressed in future.
Rim Dhaouadi is a Tunis-based lawyer and 
researcher in international law and security stud-
ies. She has over six years of experience in the 
non-profit sector in Tunisia and abroad, working 
with international organizations such as Democ-
racy Reporting International (DRI) and the Geneva 
Center for Democratic Governance of Armed 
Forces (DCAF). She holds an LL.M. degree in Inter-
national Law from the Faculty of Law and Political 
Science of Aix-en-Provence, France.
Chapter IV: The Role of 
International Actors
Chapter IV: The Role of International Actors
79No. 2 | January 2020 – first published in December 2018
REPORT
THE UNINTENDED IMPACTS OF 
EU DEMOCRATIC ASSISTANCE ON 
TUNISIAN CIVIL SOCIETY
Ragnar Weilandt
Tunisian civil society is widely seen as one of the rea-
sons for the country’s relatively positive development 
since 2011. Financially supporting and consulting 
civil society associations has thus become an impor-
tant element of the EU’s democracy promotion strat-
egy towards its Northern African neighbor. In doing 
so, the EU aims at further supporting the evolution of 
a vibrant civil society that pushes for human rights, 
democracy, good governance, and the rule of law, and 
that defends existing progress. However, at times, the 
way the EU and its delegation in Tunis implement 
funding programs or manage consultations with civil 
society on the ground have unintended consequences 
that undermine this objective. Notably, the EU’s prac-
tices inadvertently contribute to the transformation 
of civil society activism from an idealist calling to a 
professional career structure, as opposed to creating 
a bottom-up force rooted within Tunisian society. 
To mitigate such developments, the EU should work 
towards organizing more inclusive consultations, 
develop schemes for the distribution of smaller grants 
with less demanding application procedures, and more 
explicitly target funding at civil society organizations 
in the interior regions.
Tunisia’s civil society has been widely identified as 
a relevant factor in helping to prevent the country 
from following the disastrous path followed by other 
states that experienced popular uprisings in 2010-
11.1 Accordingly, the European Union (EU) has iden-
tified Tunisian civil society organizations (CSOs) as 
key partners for its democracy promotion agenda. Its 
engagement with Tunisian CSOs occurs on two lev-
els: first, the EU provides substantial financial assis-
tance aimed at empowering local actors to engage for 
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. In that 
context, the EU funds numerous non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) that implement projects 
on a wide range of issues such as election monitor-
ing, gender equality, or the fight against corruption. 
These bottom-up measures complement the EU’s 
1 International recognition of Tunisian civil society’s role culminated in the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet in 
2015.
2 Catherine Ashton, “Speech at the European Parliament,” SPEECH/11/608, Strasbourg, September 27, 2011.
3 European Commission, Press Release, “The EU’s response to the ‘Arab Spring’,” MEMO/11/918, Brussels, December 16, 2011.
4 Several interviews with EU officials in Tunis and Brussels conducted in 2015 and 2016.
5 Various interviews with Tunisian civil society activists conducted in Tunisia between March and October 2015; EU Neighbours South (2017), “Factsheet 
Tunisia,” April 26 – May 21, 2017 <https://www.euneighbours.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2017-12/Factsheet%20Tunisia%20ENG.pdf> (accessed 
November 9, 2018).
top-down approach to democracy promotion, which 
involves direct influence on the Tunisian govern-
ment through aid conditionality and other political 
and economic incentives, such as enhanced access 
to its markets.
Second, the EU regularly invites civil society activists 
to consultation meetings to give them the opportu-
nity to comment on and discuss EU-Tunisian rela-
tions and Tunisian domestic affairs. This is informed 
by what former High Representative Catherine 
 Ashton has called “the need to acknowledge past 
mistakes and listen without imposing”2 when working 
with Arab partners, as well as the EU’s commitment 
to “consult civil society organizations more system-
atically in the preparation and monitoring of bilat-
eral action plans and financial cooperation projects.”3 
While EU officials regard this as the right thing to do, 
they also see a practical value in these meetings as 
the insights they gather might help to improve EU 
policy. More generally, in view of the EU delegations’ 
limited staff and intelligence-gathering capabili-
ties, these consultations are also seen as a source of 
potentially valuable information about political and 
social developments within the country. Finally, the 
EU conceives of these consultations as a channel 
through which relevant stakeholders in Tunisia may 
be influenced.4
Yet despite the EU’s ambition to support the creation 
of a vibrant Tunisian civil society and include a c-
tivists in policy-making processes, the ways in which 
its activities are implemented on the ground occa-
sionally lead to unintended outcomes that, at times, 
undermine these very same objectives.
Tunisian Civil Society Perceptions of the EU and 
its Agenda
A first problem relates to the way the EU is per-
ceived by its Tunisian interlocutors. In general, the 
EU, its member states, and their engagement tend 
to be seen more positively than the activities of the 
United States or countries from the Gulf region.5 
However, the way the EU implements both its con-
sultations and its financial assistance undermines the 
generally favorable attitudes activists have towards 
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it. Specifically, it raises doubts regarding what kind 
of an actor the EU is and what objectives it pursues 
in Tunisia. For example, EU officials’ conduct during 
consultation meetings may contribute to the image 
of the EU as a self-interested or paternalistic actor. 
Such notions may be due to minor cases of patron-
izing or arrogant language and behavior that do not 
necessarily reflect the respective officials’ views, let 
alone the EU’s official position. However, such con-
duct may create a lasting impact. Meanwhile, the EU’s 
funding practices create the impression among some 
activists that the EU is using NGOs to push its own 
priorities – notably when it comes to economic liber-
alization – rather than genuinely trying to contribute 
to a vibrant domestic civil society that develops its 
own agenda. Such views are mainly informed by the 
selection of CSOs who benefit from EU funding, as 
well as the extent to which the EU predefines what 
its grants should be used for.6
The mistrust created or nourished by some EU 
practices is not only detrimental to its objectives in 
interacting with civil society. It may also affect EU 
objectives in Tunisia more generally, as civil society 
can influence perceptions of the EU in the broader 
society. And while perception is not reality, some of 
the concerns within civil society are indeed rooted in 
real problems.
How EU Practice Inadvertently Disadvantages 
Parts of Civil Society
A crucial issue affecting Tunisian civil society atti-
tudes towards the EU is the question of who is 
invited to consultations or awarded grants – and 
more importantly: who is not. Certain misgivings 
towards the EU are informed by frustration over not 
having been considered. Having said that, there are 
6 Various interviews with Tunisian civil society activists conducted in Tunisia between March and October 2015.
7 Various interviews with Tunisian civil society activists conducted in Tunisia between March and October 2015 and informal discussions with Tunisian 
civil society activists during a workshop at the German Association for Foreign Relations (DGAP) in August 2018.
indeed some structural factors that unintentionally 
lead to the exclusion of some parts of civil society. 
In the case of consultations, invitations are often at 
the discretion of the official organizing the meeting 
in question. For meetings to be fruitful, officials quite 
understandably invite individuals whom they know 
to have expertise on the subject under discussion. 
However, in practice, this means that they tend to 
invite activists who either have a certain degree of 
prominence in Tunisian society, or those with whom 
they have already engaged in the context of previ-
ous project funding. At the same time, the fact that 
the most relevant consultations usually take place 
during working hours at the EU delegation in Tunis 
makes it hard for non-professional and non-Tunis-
based activists to attend, even if they are invited. As a 
result, the EU risks obtaining a rather one-sided view 
on developments in Tunisia.
Furthermore, the EU’s funding practices indirectly 
exclude many CSOs. For example, the grants awarded 
through the European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR), a key funding line for 
civil society in third countries, all range between sev-
eral tens and hundreds of thousands of Euros. The 
EU prides itself on having quite low overhead costs 
in its development assistance. This means that only 
a low share of its aid budget is used for administra-
tive purposes, such as running application proce-
dures and overseeing project implementation. Such 
costs rise proportionally with the individual number 
of grants awarded, which in turn incentivizes the 
EU to award fewer and larger grants. However, this 
practice excludes all CSOs who lack the capacity to 
manage projects with such large budgets. Moreover, 
the distribution of large grants requires burdensome 
application procedures that are hard to complete and 
quite discouraging for Tunisian activists.7
As a result, substantial amounts of EU funding are 
awarded to professionalized NGOs staffed with 
experts trained and experienced in grant writing 
and project management. Meanwhile, local a c tivists 
whose engagement is driven by idealism, based 
on volunteering, and informed by on-the-ground 
knowledge, are often left empty-handed. Not only do 
they have lower chances of obtaining a grant, they 
may not even have the time or resources to dedicate 
to the major effort required by the grant application 
process.
Local activists whose 
engagement is driven by 
idealism are often left 
empty-handed
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These effects of EU funding practices are miti-
gated by the EU’s practice of cascading funds, which 
involves the distribution of financial assistance to 
professional, international NGOs for projects that 
redistribute funding to smaller associations and ini-
tiatives through less bureaucratic procedures. How-
ever, from the perspective of Tunisian civil society 
activists, the use of this tool is not yet sufficiently 
widespread.8 Meanwhile, the Programme d’Appui à 
la Société Civile (PASC), a major EU-funded project 
with a budget of seven million Euros,9 which specif-
ically aims at strengthening local civil society across 
Tunisia through both financial assistance and capac-
ity building, has been widely perceived as a failure. 
Activists have criticized the delays in its implemen-
tation, a lack of accountability and efficiency, and 
questionable recruitment decisions. Some activists 
have explained these issues by referring to the fact 
that the project was set up by the European Partner-
ship for Democracy, a Brussels-based NGO, that had 
neither a Tunisian office nor relevant on-the-ground 
experience in the country.10
The Side Effects of EU Interaction with Tunisian 
Civil Society
Since the EU’s funding and consultation practices 
regularly include some parts of Tunisian civil society 
and exclude others, the EU in effect also contributes 
to changes in the overall structure of Tunisian civil 
society in the medium to long-term. Owing to the 
EU’s practices, activists included in its civil society 
consultations tend to be either part of the old, pre-
2011 generation, or the highly professional and inter-
national NGO microcosm that has emerged since 
2011, and includes many non-Tunisian organizations 
and staff. With their access to decision-makers, the 
influence of these individuals rises over time com-
pared to those who are not included. Similarly, EU 
funding practices give professional NGOs the advan-
tage over local grassroots movements. As a result, the 
former may increase their activities and gain more 
influence and prominence than that enjoyed by the 
latter. With more financial means at their disposal, 
they have a greater ability to influence the executive 
or external political actors involved, through aid and 
democracy promotion. Hence, these organizations 
enjoy a bigger impact on Tunisian politics.
8 Informal discussions with Tunisian civil society activists during a workshop at the German Association for Foreign Relations (DGAP) in August 2018.
9 European Commission, “Synopsis: Programme d’Appui à la Société Civile en Tunisie (PASC Tunisie)” <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tunisia/
documents/more_info/2_fi che_pasc_juin2013_fr.pdf> (accessed November 9, 2018).
10 Various interviews with Tunisian civil society activists, including two former employees of the PASC.
11 Ragnar Weilandt, “Socio-economic challenges to Tunisia’s democratic transition,” European View 2 (2018) <https://doi.
org/10.1177/1781685818805681> (accessed November 9, 2018).
In addition to empowering this non-representative 
and largely Tunis-based sub-set of Tunisian civil 
society, the EU also incentivizes the excluded CSOs 
to become more professionalized and adapt a more 
project implementation-based approach to activism. 
The EU is therefore contributing to the transforma-
tion of civil society engagement from an idealist call-
ing to a professional career, one that primarily values 
grant-writing and project management capabilities, 
and chosen by many seeking better pay than in the 
domestic public and private sectors. This poten-
tially undermines the overall EU objective of creat-
ing a bottom-up force rooted within and influencing 
 Tunisian society at large.
Finally, these EU practices also affect the kind of 
causes for which NGOs advocate. Both in terms of 
funding and consultations, activists focusing on the 
most pressing concerns of Tunisian youth are under-
represented, as are activists rooted in and advocat-
ing for the concerns of the interior regions. By and 
large, NGOs included by the EU tend to focus on 
progressive social reforms rather than on socio-eco-
nomic rights. At a time when one of the most signif-
icant challenges to the successful transition is youth 
unemployment, and the ensuing dissatisfaction with 
the post-2011 system in impoverished rural inlands,11 
this is less than ideal.
The Risks of a Tunis-Based Civil Society Elite 
Shaping the Agenda
The risk of an elitist, Tunis-based civil society driv-
ing an agenda detached from Tunisian society in 
general and the country’s interior regions in partic-
ular is illustrated by two recent reforms. One reform 
The EU in effect 
 contributes to changes in 
the overall structure of 
Tunisian civil society
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repealed a law banning Tunisian women from mar-
rying non-Muslim men, while the other guaranteed 
that sons and daughters would, in future, receive 
equal amounts of inheritance. These reforms were 
quite rightly met with applause in the Western world, 
and contribute to the image of the Tunisian transi-
tion as a success story and as a modern and progres-
sive society in comparison to other parts of the Arab 
world.
However, it is worth noting that neither of these 
reforms – for which Tunis-based progressive CSOs 
had lobbied quite substantially – is supported by 
domestic majorities. A poll commissioned by the 
International Republican Institute found that around 
two-thirds of respondents expressed strong opposi-
tion to both the marriage law and the new inheritance 
legislation.12 Opposition to such progressive legisla-
tion is particularly strong in socio-economically mar-
ginalized inland regions, where its imposition on a far 
more conservative society may help Islamist funda-
mentalists in their attempts to discredit and under-
mine democracy. This danger becomes even more 
real when people in these regions start losing faith 
in democracy’s ability to deliver the socio-economic 
improvement they have been expecting. In the worst 
case, this might discredit civil society objectives of 
strengthening human rights and stabilizing democ-
racy in Tunisia. Of course, the EU is by no means the 
only international donor whose practices contribute 
to these developments. But as one of the main pro-
viders of financial assistance and a key interlocutor 
for activists, its approach to Tunisian civil society can 
make a difference.
Recommendations
 - Engage more sensitively in direct meetings with 
representatives of Tunisian civil society
EU delegation officials should take care to exercise 
sensitivity in their engagement with Tunisian civil 
society interlocutors. Having been closely allied to 
the Ben Ali regime prior to its sudden demise, the 
objectives of the EU and its member states are still 
easily misperceived and misconstrued. Ways of com-
municating that may rightly or wrongly be inter-
preted as patronizing and arrogant should be avoided 
at all costs. Officials need to make sure that their 
conduct contributes to the establishment of a rela-
tionship of mutual trust and respect.
12 “Public Opinion Survey of Tunisians, November 23 – December 3, 2017,” International Republican Institute, January 10, 2018 <http://www.iri.org/sites/
default/files/2018-01-10_tunisia_poll_presentation.pdf> (accessed November 12, 2018).
 - Organize more inclusive consultations with civil 
society
The EU delegation in Tunis and its officials should 
ensure that participants in its consultations reflect 
a broader cross-section of civil society. Notably, they 
should make sure that invitees also include represen-
tatives from different regions of Tunisia rather than 
only activists based in the greater Tunis area.
 - Provide more small grants with less demanding 
application procedures
The EU should at least partially move away from the 
notion that low overheads are a sign of sound finan-
cial management, and establish more schemes for 
the distribution of small to medium-sized grants. In 
doing so, EU officials might draw upon the experi-
ences of the European Endowment for Democracy, 
which specializes in needs-based allocation of small 
to medium grants through less burdensome applica-
tion procedures. The EU should also make applica-
tion procedures and information about them avail-
able in Arabic. Finally, it should increase the amount 
of financial assistance to civil society distributed 
through cascading funds.
 - Provide more structural funding for associations’ 
on-going daily work
The EU should consider moving away from exclu-
sively project-based funding, and directly provide 
financial support to associations and their on-going 
work. This would enable successful organizations to 
continue working in their field rather than having to 
regularly venture into new areas where they are less 
adequately equipped and motivated, merely in the 
interest of obtaining further funding.
 - Explicitly target funding at civil society organiza-
tions in the interior regions
The EU should create new funding lines that are 
specifically directed at associations from Tunisia’s 
interior regions and provide capacity-building mea-
sures that enable them to apply for existing funding 
lines as well. Moreover, it should provide incen-
tives encouraging Tunis-based CSOs to co-apply 
with CSOs from the interior regions. The envisaged 
extension of the Programme d’Appui à la Société 
Civile (PASC) should reflect the lessons learned and 
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avoid past mistakes relating both to its execution 
and communication.
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